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YALTA, A TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATION TO FORM THE POST-WAR WORLD 
ORDER: PLANNING FOR THE CONFERENCE, THE BIG THREE’S STRATEGIES 
 British influence on the diplomacy of WWII, as it relates to postwar planning, is 
underappreciated. This work explores how the use of astute tactical maneuvering allowed 
Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden to impact the development of the post-war world in a 
greater degree than is typically portrayed in the narratives of the war. Detailing how the study 
of business negotiations can provide new insights into diplomatic history, Yalta exposes 
Britain’s impact on the creation of the post-war order through analyzing the diplomacy of 
WWII as a negotiation. To depict WWII post-war planning diplomacy as a negotiation 
means that the Yalta Conference of 1945 must be the focal point of said diplomacy with all 
the negotiations either flowing to or from the conference. 
 This analysis reveals that Britain harnessed the natural momentum of the negotiation 
process to create bilateral understandings that protected or advanced their interests in ways 
that should not have been afforded the weakest party in the Grand Alliance. By pursuing 
solutions to the major wartime issues first and most stridently through the use of age-old 
British diplomatic tactics, they were able to enter into understandings with another member 
of the Grand Alliance prior to the tripartite conferences. Creating bilateral understandings 
with the Americans on the direction of military operations and the Soviets over the 
European settlement produced the conditions under which the tripartite negotiations 
transpired. Options available to the excluded party were thus limited, allowing for outcomes 
that aligned more favorably to British interests.  
 A synthesis of diplomatic documents, diaries, and memoirs with historical writings as 
well as research on business and international negotiations brings to life the diplomatic 
encounters that led to the creation of the post-war order. To provide the reader a basis for 
analysis of wartime diplomacy, this work is broken down into two parts. Part I focuses on 
the strategies created for Yalta. Part II (future doctoral dissertation) will use these strategies 
to evaluate the performances of each party. Combined the two parts expose that British 
diplomatic maneuverings is an undervalued aspect of wartime diplomacy.  
Kevin Cramer, Ph. D., Chair
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Conferences of WWII 
1. Atlantic Conference (Riviera1, August 9-12, 1941) – Anglo-American political meeting. 
2. First Moscow Conference (September 29 – October 1, 1941) – Anglo-Soviet-American 
supply meeting. 
3. First Washington Conference (Arcadia, December 22, 1941 – January 14, 1942) – 
Anglo-American military meeting.  
4. Second Washington Conference (Trident, June 20-25, 1942) – Anglo-American military 
meeting. 
5. Second Moscow Conference (August 12-17, 1942) – Anglo-Soviet military meeting. 
6. Casablanca Conference (Symbol, January 14-24, 1943) – Anglo-American military 
meeting. 
7. First Québec Conference (Quadrant, August 17-24, 1943) – Anglo-American military 
meeting. 
8. Moscow Ministers’ Meeting/ Third Moscow Conference (October 18 – November 1, 
1943) – Anglo-Soviet-American foreign ministers meeting. 
9. First Cairo Conference (Sextant, November 23-26, 1943) – Sino-Anglo-American 
military and political meeting.  
10. Teheran Conference (November 28 – December 1, 1943) – Anglo-Soviet-American 
heads of state meeting.  
11. Second Cairo Conference (December 4-6, 1943) – Anglo-American military and 
political meeting. 
12. Bretton Woods (July 1-15, 1944) – The Allies’ international monetary policy meeting. 
13. Dumbarton Oaks (August 21-29, 1944) – The international organization’s drafting 
meeting. 
14. Second Québec Conference (Octagon, September 12-16, 1944) – Anglo-American 
military and political meeting. 
15. Fourth Moscow Conference (Tolstoy, October 9-17, 1944) – Anglo-Soviet political 
meeting. 
16. Malta Conference (January 30 – February 2, 1945) – Anglo-American pre-Yalta 
meeting. 
                                                          
1. Denotes the conference codename. 
 ix 
17. Yalta Conference (Argonaut, February 4-11, 1945) – Anglo-Soviet-American heads of 
state meeting. 
18. United Nation Organization Conference (April 25 – June 26, 1945) – The 
international organization’s charter meeting.  
19. Potsdam Conference (Terminal, July 17 – August 2, 1945) – Anglo-Soviet-American 
heads of state meeting. 
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Introduction 
Prologue 
The Yalta conference of World War II (WWII) was the pinnacle of wartime 
diplomacy, as it related to postwar planning. “At Yalta the three leaders (Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Joseph V. Stalin, and Winston S. Churchill)” of the Grand Alliance (US, UK, and 
USSR), notes Geoffrey Roberts; “were firmly focused on the emerging postwar order.”1 All 
decisions regarding the creation of the postwar order either flowed to or from the 
conference. Still, despite its importance, Yalta is often misunderstood, affecting the way that 
WWII postwar planning as a whole is assessed. “Stalin won” the conference, declares Robert 
Gellately, “because he was a better negotiator.”2 A better appraisal is that the Russians 
emerged from Yalta in the premier position because they had the greatest options available 
for their postwar aims to be realized. Yet, the Western parties also secured their 
counterparts’ adherence to their foremost diplomatic aims at the conference. 
The British protected all but one of their traditional interests and achieved most of 
their diplomatic objectives. British diplomat, Gladwynn Jebb, observed, “[I]t is indisputable 
that our major foreign political objectives have largely been secured by the constitution of 
the new World Organization [the UN],” because it was the “principle objective” of their 
diplomacy “to induce the United States to accept lasting commitments on the continent of 
Europe.”3 Furthermore, the US also achieved their major diplomatic goal: the establishment 
of American socio-economic principles – defined by the Roosevelt administration – as the 
foundation of the postwar world order. All three parties had achieved real success in 
imprinting their ideas onto the emerging order. If the Big Three had maintained their alliance 
into the postwar, this outcome would appear likely as the result of a collaborative 
negotiation, but the alliance fell apart, making these conclusions appear counterintuitive. So, 
how can these seemingly disparate outcomes exist together?  
                                                          
1. Geoffrey Roberts, “Stalin at the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences” in Journal of Cold War Studies 9, no. 
4 (Fall 2007), 21. 
2. Robert Gellately, Stalin's Curse: Battling for Communism In War and Cold War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2013), 103.  
3. Paul Preston, Michael Partridge, and M. L Dockrill, British Documents On Foreign Affairs--Reports and Papers From 
the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part III, From 1940 Through 1945, Series L Second World War and General, 5 vols. 
(Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1998), (hereafter referred to as FO: General), vol. 5, 233, 
328.  
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 Britain’s astute use of tactics – an act whose aim is to convince, cajole, or induce the 
other party(s) to adopt the party employing the act’s position – to harness control of the 
negotiation process created the context in which WWII postwar planning was determined. 
However, they were the weakest party and thus could not overcome, through force or 
leverage, the natural suspicions and distrust that their control over the process unleashed. 
The British framed the options available at the tripartite negotiations to reflect their 
preferred positions by entering into bilateral understandings (verbal or non-specific written 
agreements) with the Russians and, more often, the Americans through acting as the Big 
Three’s intermediary. “Framing refers to the mental structure,” notes David de Cremer and 
M.M. Pillutla, “which we use to make the situation in question more readily understandable 
and accessible.”4 These tactics weakened the bargaining power of the Soviets and Americans 
and defined how the options available were perceived when the Grand Alliance met at the 
tripartite conferences.  
Bilateral Anglo-American military negotiations at Casablanca, Québec I, and Cairo I, 
for instance, dictated the timing of the opening of the Western front, leaving Stalin little 
ability to affect when it would take place at Teheran. Similarly, the agreement between 
Churchill and the Russian ruler dividing up Eastern Europe – the percentage deal – left 
Roosevelt with no option but acceptance of the agreements’ implications when the Big 
Three met at Yalta. The delayed invasion of Europe allowed Britain to focus the war effort 
in the Mediterranean in 1942-43, plus the percentage deal placed Greece under the British 
auspice, thus protecting Britain’s preeminent position in the Near East. They never forced 
their partners to make decisions, much to their consternation; however, due to presenting 
the issues to one party at a time (acting as an intermediary) and entering into bilateral 
understandings (framing) the British were able to channel the process of the negotiations 
and thus created the context for the postwar planning diplomacy.  
The process of a negotiation displays a dynamic momentum; decisions build upon 
themselves, reducing options and at the same time defining how the parties viewed the 
available alternatives. As Thomas Smith notes, amidst a negotiation “constraints are imposed 
by previous decisions taken, and the range of choices narrows.”5 Britain used the 
                                                          
4. David de Cremer and M. M Pillutla, Making Negotiations Predictable: What Science Tells Us? (New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 82.  
5. Thomas W Smith, History and International Relations (London: Routledge, 1999), 142. 
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aforementioned tactics to exploit the dynamic momentum of a negotiation as well as the 
inherent process of a multilateral negotiation: that even with “the presence of several 
parties,” a negotiation wants to “become bilateral encounters.”6 Their exploitation of the 
process through the shrewd use of the procedures (tactics) granted British positions more 
authority than their standing (often called prestige) should have afforded them had all three 
parties determined the course to be taken simultaneously. This progression eventually 
fostered an outcome by which most of their traditional interests were protected.  
Initially, Churchill and his Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, worked at cross 
purposes, which meant the protection of their interests was short-lived. Only when the two 
men start to work together, in late 1944, does Britain’s tactics work as hoped. We know the 
final British bilateral understanding of the war as the Anglo-American “special relationship.” 
The “special relationship,” stresses David Reynolds, should be seen as British “diplomatic 
stratagem” more than a natural occurrence.7 Afterwards, the US helped ensure stability on 
the Continent, underwrote and eventually succeeded British maintenance of Near Eastern 
stability as well as trade routes, helped perpetuate colonial rule in Southeast Asia, and even 
retreated from their major commercial policy victory in the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). The final act of framing was Churchill’s famous “Iron Curtain” speech, 
which portrayed Britain and American interests as overlapping and anti-Soviet. Far from 
sinister or duplicitous, the English statesmen, during WWII, pulled off an impressive feat of 
diplomacy. 
At Yalta, the Russians negotiated agreements that gave them the prime bargaining 
position moving forward but were unable to capitalize on this advantage. Written 
agreements favorable to their ends were obtained, i.e., the options chosen were beneficial to 
their objectives. However, the Soviets did not finalize these agreements in a manner that 
upheld or advanced these gains. Reparations were the embodiment of their failure to 
capitalize on the advantageous results at Yalta. The Soviet’s assumed they had achieved 
success on the issue by convincing the West to acquiesce to the Russian’s $10 billion figure 
as the basis of reparation discussions. Yet, they soon found out an issue is not settled until 
                                                          
6. William Zartman, “The Structure of Negotiation,” in International Negotiation: Analysis Approaches, Issues, 2nd 
Edition, ed. Victor Kremenyuk, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002), 80. 
7. David Reynolds, “Rethinking Anglo-American Relations” in International Affairs 65, no. 1 (Winter 1988-89), 
94. 
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the agreement is implemented. With security as the foremost priority, at Potsdam, Stalin 
reluctantly conceded large-scale reparations to maintain his gains in Eastern Europe. 
Working together at the conference, the Anglo-Americans left the Russians with no other 
option but to choose either security (maintenance of their gains in Eastern Europe) or 
reparations. With the former reflecting their underlying interest, Stalin conceded any claim to 
large-scale reparations.  
 The Americans emerged from WWII as the preeminent world power partly because 
they were left virtually untouched by the war. However, the US achieved this status primarily 
because they never moved from hard positions (detailed momentarily) during the postwar 
planning negotiations. Though the Americans made a number of concessions, some in a 
magnitude greater than necessary, they never conceded their hard positions – the United 
Nations Organization (UNO) founded on American concepts and principles as well as 
Washington’s control over international commercial (multilateral free trade) and monetary 
(dollar-based world economy) policy. Despite the American right’s myths about a sellout of 
Eastern Europe, it was “not an area in which the United States Government wished to 
participate,” nor did the region encompass their vital interests, recalled Britain’s wartime 
ambassador to the US, Lord Halifax.8 The British who had to concede on international 
commercial and monetary policy and the Russians on reparations, however, did move from 
hard positions. The Americans’ lack of movement on these positions allowed them to instill 
their socio-economic concepts worldwide and emerge from the war as the Premier world 
power.  
 The previously described picture of WWII diplomacy appears when it is studied as a 
negotiation that follows certain patterns typical of that process, yet also takes into account 
the differences amongst the actors and the influences that shaped their thinking. The 
dynamic momentum of the negotiation process defines how the participants viewed the 
available options while their influences shaped the way they sifted through these options, i.e., 
the negotiator’s decision-making context. Contextualizing an event is the major aim of a 
historian; still, a sole focus on its background fails to take into account the impact of the 
                                                          
8. Paul Preston, Michael Partridge, and Richard Crockatt, British Documents On Foreign Affairs--Reports and Papers 
From the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part III, From 1940 Through 1945. Series C North America, 5 vols. 
(Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1998), (hereafter referred to as FO: North American), vol. 
IV, 392.  
 5 
negotiations’ process. Only a methodology that incorporates the background as well as the 
process and procedures at work will be able to properly analyze an international negotiation. 
 Some of the best works on Yalta and WWII diplomacy combine the study of History 
with International Relations (IR) to connect background and process. Historical 
methodology allows an analyst the ability to ascertain the background of individuals and 
states as well as detail the actors’ influences. IR generates an understanding of the processes 
at work in inter-state relations. However, a key piece of the puzzle is missing – the 
procedures of negotiations. The incorporation of negotiations analytics will reveal the 
interplay between actor and process through the use of procedures. Negotiation analytics 
combined with historical methodology while maintaining some IR methods will help avoid 
the consistent pratfall emblematic of structural diplomatic history – determinism. As Orfeo 
Fioretos declares, strict “path dependence” is often “criticized for having a deterministic 
understanding.”9 The historiography will detail more thoroughly how the addition of 
negotiation analytics will help fill in the gaps, add weight to previous arguments, and 
overcome the tendency towards determinism. 
“IR theory,” relates Inanna Hamati-Ayati, views the system “as having some 
essential, unchanging feature, whether at the level of its unit actors (realism) or its own 
structure (neorealism).”10 These concepts fail to take into account how the actors can affect 
the process and the process can mold and shape the way the actors view their own and each 
other’s actions, creating an organic system that the strict universality of structuralism can 
easily overlook. Negotiation analytics’ method of qualitative assessment, which determines 
prioritization through the concepts of vital interests (hard positions) and interests worth 
sacrificing (soft positions) grants the analyst a means to gauge the affect of actor and process 
on the shape of a negotiation. It is created by discerning how the actor’s influences shaped 
their decision-making and how the process affected what options were available as the 
negotiation moved forward. The inclusion of this method with diplomatic historical 
                                                          
9. Orfeo Fioretos, “Historical Institutionalism in International Relations,” International Organization, 65, no. 2 
(Spring 2011), 377. 
10.  Inanna Hamati-Ayati, “Paths Not Taken: A Retrospective Systemic Reading of Post-Soviet International 
Alternatives,” Journal on World Peace, 27, no. 3 (September 2010), 12, 13.  Some IR theorists – constructivists – 
“consider that international order is not merely a given insofar as it is mainly constructed by the beliefs of the 
international actors,” as Ayati notes. However, they tend to downplay the effect of the organizational structure 
on the way the actors define their beliefs, thus negotiation analytics is a better combination of the two most 
important structural factors – the actors and organization – than three leading schools of international 
relations: constructivism, neorealism, and realism.   
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methodology will reveal that although the process does reduce alternatives, these options are 
not as static or conditioned as determinism suggests. The actors have a certain control over 
the process through the procedures they employ, but the effect the process has on the actors is 
still present, since each decisions limits or at least redefines the options remaining.  
The chronology-based time-series negotiation analytics techniques and its principles 
seem most applicable to this type of analysis. “The most popular application of time-series 
techniques is to predict outcomes retrospectively,” proclaims Daniel Druckman. Using this 
method, “an analyst desires to recreate a path of events leading to an outcome.” In addition, 
“[f]or Negotiation Analysis, the value of this approach is to understand the processes that 
preceded – or led to – the outcome,” either to comprehend events or concoct a strategy for 
future negotiations.11 It is complemented by organizational theory, which helps assess the 
composition of the delegations. Ascertaining the primacy of particular intra-delegation 
perspectives is vital in determining what were hard and soft positions (prioritization). These 
techniques will shed light on how the seemingly disparate conclusions – that Russia achieved 
the best results at Yalta and Britain protected most of their traditional interests, yet the 
Americans emerged the preeminent world power – resulted from the negotiation that was 
WWII postwar planning diplomacy. This work will not be the first to put forth the 
aforementioned argument; instead, the use of negotiation analytics will provide a fuller voice 
to this contention.  
WWII was one of those historical events that touched everyone’s lives directly. The 
process of total mobilization drew into the conflict every segment of society. Rightfully, the 
story of WWII is about all of these groups – the front line infantry; the politicians; the 
women in factories; the civilian heroes of Dunkirk, Leningrad, and Stalingrad; the families 
dealing with war; etc.  However, the story of WWII diplomacy as it relates to the planning and 
creation of the postwar order, up to and including Yalta, was a story of three men – Churchill, 
FDR, and Stalin – and their favored subordinates. The populace during these phases should 
be thought of as factors with little direct control over the events. Reynolds’ analysis of summits 
(discussed momentarily) emphasizes that only in the final stage does “how to present the 
meeting to their publics” become “an overriding concern for leaders.”12 Therefore, in the 
                                                          
11.  Daniel Druckman, “Time-Series Designs and Analyses,” in Methods of Negotiation Research, ed. Peter J. 
Carnevale and Carsten K.W. de Dreu (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 62.  
12.  David Reynolds, Summits: Six Meetings That Shaped the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 432.  
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years after the fall of France through Yalta, all decisions about which of the available options 
would further their countries’ interests were made by Churchill, FDR, and Stalin. These 
choices reflected their vision of their countries’ national interests and at the same time laid 
the foundation for the postwar order. As Charles Maier points out, diplomacy, even in a 
democracy, “is still largely executed, if not ultimately shaped, from the top-down.”13 
Similarly, some may argue that other countries, like China and France, helped shape the 
postwar world. Again, however, these countries had little control over and instead were only 
factors in the decision-making processes of the Big Three leaders up to and including the Yalta 
conference.  
When the organizational structure of the WWII postwar planning negotiation is 
ascertained, it exposes an exclusivity of control, which is similar to the management of 
business negotiations, allowing for the transference of methodology. These negotiations are 
typified by a hierarchy with the leading member being the sole decision maker who is 
informed by his subordinates about the issues (difference between the parties) to be 
addressed by the negotiations. The members of the administrations such as Averill 
Harriman, Alec Cadogan, and Andrei Gromyko were specialists who helped their respective 
leaders create positions (a stance a party takes on an issue). Yet, Churchill, FDR, and Stalin 
(or a person to whom they delegated this authority) decided solely whether to adopt a 
position and what priority to assign it, as Hans Morgenthau points out; it is ‘essentially the 
character of the president which determines the outcomes of policy.’14 General Alanbrooke 
backs this notion, the Prime Minister’s (PM) “personality was such, and the power he 
acquired was adequate, to place him in a position where both Parliament and Cabinet were 
only minor inconveniences to be humored occasionally.”15 Thus, the organization of the 
delegations was tiered and controlled from the top-down, with the heads of state as the main 
molders of the process, then he and his favored subordinates determined what were vital 
and less vital interests, and finally those not included in the top tiers – the remainder of the 
government and the population as a whole – factored into molding and shaping the 
outcome.  
                                                          
13.  Smith, 123. Maier quoted. 
14.  Ibid, 83. Hans Morgenthau quoted. 
15.  Alan Brooke Alanbrooke, Alex Danchev, and Daniel Todman, War Diaries, 1939-1945: Field Marshal Lord 
Alanbrooke, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 170. 
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The process of negotiations further granted the Big Three leaders control over 
WWII diplomacy, since it was conducted primarily through the heads of state’s 
correspondence, foreign ministry communiqués, bilateral meetings, and tripartite summitry. 
The latter two were the arena where most decisions were made about the postwar order. 
Churchill coined the term “summit” for these types of meetings “at the highest level.” He 
wanted “a parlay at the summit” because only at the summit (the head of state) could an 
agreement be reached without the need to take it to other bodies for further deliberation.16 
Under this setting, the leader can make immediate decisions and establish quid pro quo 
cooperative bargaining – a negotiation. The tripartite summits of Teheran, Yalta, and 
Potsdam were, respectively, the pinnacle conferences of the three stages of negotiations: pre-
negotiations, negotiations, and implementation.  
Teheran was the major conference of the pre-negotiation stage, but the Moscow 
Ministers Meeting and other bilateral and tripartite discussions during 1940 to early 1945 
comprise the stage as well. When the parties are “exploring possible trades, suggesting 
possible packages,” and creating “written agreements,” they are in the negotiation stage, 
according to Lawrence Suskind; this describes Yalta succinctly.17 Since a peace conference 
never occurred, as was presumed, Potsdam takes on greater importance as the apex of the 
implementation stage. Still, with the leaders believing a peace summit would occur, not all 
issues are resolved at Potsdam, and the implementation stage lasted until the crises of 1946-
47 – Berlin, Greece, Iran, and Turkey – and the GATT negotiations when the new order was 
codified. The process exposes a clear delineation point: when the delegation’s principle has 
overriding control (1st and 2nd stages) and when they are influenced by other groups (3rd 
stage).  
However, this study’s main purpose is adding business methodology to the methods 
of study diplomatic history. For this reason, a different delineation point is needed; 
separating the preparation stage from the negotiation and implementation of the agreements 
on the postwar order because it allows for a focus on strategies (a coordinated and 
synchronized plan of action based on prioritized aims as well as concessions and/or fallback 
                                                          
16.  Robert Rhodes James, ed., Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, Vol. 8 (Columbia University, New York, 
1974), 7944, 8484-85. 
17.  Lawrence Suskind and Jeffrey L Cruikshank, Breaking Robert's Rules: The New Way to Run Your Meeting, Build 
Consensus, and Get Results (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 37. 
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positions). Besides discerning the Big Three’s strategies, this delineation permits an 
understanding of the background of Churchill, FDR, Stalin, and their favored subordinates 
as well as the context of the negotiations. All three aspects are prerequisites for analyzing 
WWII diplomacy in regards to the creation of the postwar order. 
Part I: Planning for the Conference: the Big Three’s Strategies will therefore focus on the 
diplomacy up to Yalta. Part II: A Successful Conference and a Failed Alliance: Negotiated Agreements 
versus Implemented Agreements will focus on the conference and the subsequent meetings that 
implemented (or cast aside) the decisions reached at Yalta.  
Part I will examine only the diplomacy that exposed the Big Three’s strategies 
entering the conference, since it is impossible to cover every aspect of WWII diplomacy. 
More importantly, far too often, post-Yalta events bleed into the analysis of the conference, 
affecting the interpretation in negative ways by contextualizing events using Cold War 
patterns which were neither recognizable nor influential on the parties’ decision-making. 
Defining strategies going into Yalta will help negate this phenomenon. For some baffling 
reason, very few historians have taken the time to ascertain the parties’ strategies prior to 
their analysis of a conference. Still, those who included these details have greatly enhanced 
their works. Keith Sainsbury’s Turning Points is the epitome of how defining strategies prior 
to an analysis of a conference strengthens a historian’s argument. Not coincidentally, his 
work has stood for thirty years as one of the best analyses of Teheran. 
The key to any form of negotiation analytics is to discover the catalyst for position 
evolution and to track said evolution. Negotiation analytics’ emphasis on tracing position 
evolution relates the varying effects of the actors and process as well as the procedures used. 
Furthermore, “an analyst desires to recreate a path of events leading to an outcome” because 
position evolution reveals prioritization.18 Prioritization then allows an analyst to ascertain 
the value placed on a particular position vis-à-vis  other positions. In a negotiation, the party 
wants “to prioritize among goals, while contemplating fall back positions and potential trade-
offs,” relates Herb Cohen.19 Once priority is ascertained, the give-and-take aspects of the 
negotiation, i.e., what were hard and soft positions, are affirmed. This is important because 
in establishing a negotiation strategy, the “first and foremost important factor is your 
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objective for [it].” In other words, proclaims de Cremer and Pillulta, it is “the price that you 
are prepared to pay to achieve your objectives.”20 Once all of these parts are put together, 
the whole takes shape; that is to say, it can be discerned with a high degree of certainty what 
strategies the Big Three were pursuing when entering into the negotiations at Yalta.  
Historiography 
 Much of the recent literature on Yalta is both thought provoking as well as very 
informative, especially to this project. However, it always seemed that even though the 
formula came out with the right numeral (a greater role for the British in shaping the 
outcome of the postwar order than has typically been portrayed), a remainder (an 
unaccounted piece) was always attached, which made the answer seem inconclusive. A few 
recent examples can reveal how and why there seemed to be a remainder. At the same time, 
this brief historiography can expose where combining historical methodology with 
negotiation analytics and its principles can fill in certain gaps, add needed aspects and facets, 
as well as avoid deterministic conclusions.  
When Fraser Harbutt set out to analyze Yalta in his attempt to comprehend “the 
transition from WWII to the Cold War,” he came to a very significant conclusion: one must 
“reject the familiar ‘East/West’ conception.” His conclusion is ascertained by designing the 
analysis to “look forward to Yalta” instead of trying “to explain the origins of the Cold War” 
via the conference. The East/West dichotomy, argues Harbutt, is a “Cold War pattern,” not 
a wartime pattern. Worse, it “attributes profound effects to American thoughts and actions,” 
especially in regards to Europe. Thus, Harbutt finds that modern historiography on WWII 
diplomacy is too American-centric, something this work’s dual methodology will confirm. 
Furthermore, it fostered a vision of diplomacy based on a three-tiered hierarchy: US-Soviet 
political, Anglo-American military, and “a thinly developed” and little noticed Anglo-Soviet 
political discussions.21 This tiered hierarchy distracts the historian’s attention away from 
crucial Anglo-Soviet deliberations that propelled the momentum of the negotiations as well 
as limited the available options. 
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 Cold War patterns as the basis of an interpretation negatively affects a historian’s 
analysis. Under the new pattern, “[w]e start to see Yalta as it appeared to contemporaries 
rather than as it seems to us in Cold War retrospect,” proclaims Harbutt. When viewed in 
this manner, Yalta (and the strategies going into the conference) becomes “rooted in the 
prewar 1930s patterns,” instead of the “Cold War patterns.”22 For instance, the Roosevelt 
administration’s multilateral trading program was designed to deal with the autocratical 
tendency of the 1930s, not the Cold War’s bipolar economics, which came to a head in 1971 
when the Bretton Woods Accords are drastically modified. The pattern is important, argues 
de Cremer and Pillutla, because “the context can have a more decisive influence on the final 
outcome of the negotiations than the personality of the negotiator.”23 Again, the importance 
of the interplay between actor and process is depicted. 
Represented in this manner, the record exposes a more passive American diplomatic 
approach to Europe, with greater “separation, up to the time of Yalta, of the European and 
American political worlds.” The vacuum this created was filled by Anglo-Soviet discussions 
and understandings, in particular the Anglo-Soviet Treaty negotiations in 1942, the 
Eden/Molotov discussions at Moscow in 1943, and the percentage deal agreements in 1944. 
These events had “profound” effects on “the future of Europe,” even though they were 
completely removed from the summitry that so encompassed previous analyses.24 The 
impact of the Anglo-Soviet political discussions on the postwar order is revealed by using 
negotiation analytics search for the catalyst of position evolution.  
 The explanation that typical analyses of Yalta and wartime diplomacy overlook the 
role Anglo-Soviet political discussion played in the formation of the postwar order is 
enlightening. Yet, Harbutt diagnoses only a symptom, not the cause, of why Britain’s impact 
on the postwar order was greater than typically portrayed. Two missing pieces fully explain 
why the Anglo-Soviet political diplomacy had such a “profound effect” on the future of 
Europe – the process and procedures of WWII’s postwar planning negotiation. 
 WWII diplomacy evolved after the fall of France, the invasion of the Soviet Union, 
and the attack at Pearl Harbor into tripartite negotiations amongst the Big Three. Tripartite 
negotiations have a number of forms. In this case, the parties do not have equal standing 
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(the status of a party vis-à-vis  the other party(s) with whom it is negotiating). One form, 
under this scenario, unfolds with the two superior parties appropriating, through force or 
leverage, the possessions of the junior party. Some, especially our British friends, might want 
to depict WWII diplomacy in this form. With the exception of global financing, however, 
British possessions, neither colonies nor markets, were appropriated by the US or USSR 
during postwar planning diplomacy.  Therefore, this form lacks support from the record.  
Another form of unequal tripartite negotiations is characterized by the junior 
partner’s maneuvering as the impetus for position evolution amongst all parties. Under this 
scenario, the junior partner tries to reach bilateral understandings through operating as the 
liaison between the senior parties that reduced, favorably to them, the options of the non-
consulted major party. The aim is to define the context for future tripartite negotiations so as 
to provide undue significance to the junior partner’s position(s) – framing. “Various studies 
have shown,” relates de Cremer and Pillutla, “that the process of framing can have a 
significant impact on the final outcome of the negotiations.”25 The percentage deal illustrates 
this type of junior partner maneuvering. Before entering into the Yalta negotiations, 
“Churchill and Stalin had already agreed on a postwar framework for (sic) Europe,” observes 
Harbutt, “and both seemingly wished to protect and preserve it,” leaving FDR little choice 
but to accept the agreement or risk Red Army participation in Manchuria.26 The PM exposed 
the tactics by reaching an agreement first with Stalin then presenting it to Roosevelt, thus 
limiting and defining his available choices.  
A focus on strategies reveals the impact of these types of maneuverings. This is best 
done by tracking a nascent position as it evolves until the position is either adopted, 
conceded, or deemed untenable. The priority a party places on a position as well as the price 
that a party is willing to pay to have it adopted is identified through this method. Since the 
record reveals the British machinations forced enough Soviet and American position 
evolution, WWII Big Three negotiations were advanced by the junior partner’s 
maneuverings as the main impetus for all the parties’ position evolution. Thus, the reason 
Harbutt found a greater role for the UK in postwar planning is explained by the nature of 
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WWII diplomacy – junior partner-led negotiations (process) shaped by the tactic of framing 
through Britain’s ability to act as liaison (procedures). 
S.M Plokhy’s Yalta: The Price of Peace focuses on the conference as a negotiation. 
Depicting Yalta as what it was (a give-and-take discussion between parties – a negotiation) 
grants him a better understanding of the conference  because the pattern depicted is akin to 
the way participants themselves would have evaluated what took place. Others have 
attempted to analyze Yalta as a negotiation, such as Diane Clemens. Yet, claims Warren 
Kimball, “Plokhy’s study of the conference supplants Diane Shaver Clemens’s Yalta” 
because as another of his reviewers, Vlad Zubok, argues, “Plokhy analyzes rather than 
moralizes.”27 This emphasis leads Plokhy to a more nuanced conclusion, “No matter how 
much effort is put into the preparation and conduct of an international conference, however 
skillful and resourceful its participants, and however promising its outcome, democratic 
leaders and societies should be prepared to pay a price for close involvement with those who do 
not share their values (Itals, MMG).”28 His analysis is based on how humans act, not how 
one would want them to act.  
Clemens argues, “Unfortunately, the Soviet Union’s co-operativeness was soon 
forgotten,” which is why the Yalta accords failed. She believes “the decisions made there 
portended a different course than relationships took after the war.”29 However, Plokhy sees 
the two systems possessing “profoundly different geopolitical aspiration.”30 He concludes 
the West would not have been served by acquiescing to Soviet wishes because they paid the 
heaviest price during the war. “[Revisionist] accounts,” notes Gellately, “do not consider the 
consequences of any such concession.”31 As Cohen relates, “[I]f the relationship is 
adversarial, the contending party may see a concession that came to easy as a sign of 
weakness.”32 Clemens’ work is an example of how moralism adversely affected previous 
attempts to study the processes of Yalta.  
The West should have weakened their national interests for the betterment of the 
world, according to Clemens, a laudable goal but an infeasible basis for assessing the 
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performance of the delegations. “[W]hile it is important to take the other party’s needs into 
consideration, it is not a good idea to own their problems,” according to de Cremer and 
Pillutla, because of the risk “the other side may try to make you an unwitting partner to their 
problems.”33 Furthermore, Plokhy found “no indication Stalin would have been prepared to 
yield.” Hence, “the Western delegates at Yalta had little choice but to accept the fact of 
preponderant Soviet Power” in Eastern and Central Europe.34 What is important to 
recognize, therefore, is not the Soviets and their needs but what aims could the West achieve 
with a “weak hand.”  
Unlike many Yalta scholars, Plokhy starts his analysis by divulging to the reader the 
aims of the Big Three. Furthermore, he prioritizes these aims so that the reader can 
understand what each party was willing to concede in return for what they wanted.  By 
analyzing the conference as a negotiation and finding the aims of the Big Three as well as 
prioritizing them, i.e., their strategies, as Zubok relates, “Plokhy lays to rest the myth of the 
‘betrayal of Yalta.’”35 Plokhy concludes, “Roosevelt did not do too badly” because the 
Soviets participated in the war in the Pacific and the United Nations was formed on a tiered 
and worldwide basis, his “two main goals.” 36 
Plokhy bases his evaluation of Yalta on the achievement of aims. A better way to 
evaluate a negotiation is to use the previously mentioned hard and soft positions. When 
Churchill decreased the British role in most of Eastern Europe during the percentage deal, 
he was moving from a hard position and accepting a Russian hard position: a collective 
security system including all European states to that of a dual bloc system. He makes a 
greater concession to the Soviets than when FDR traded the Kurile Islands, Darien, etc., for 
Red Army participation in the Pacific. Roosevelt’s trade was a soft position aimed at deal-
making, since it did not hinder only advanced American vital interests. Yet, both achieved 
major aims: British maintenance of their traditional role in the Eastern Mediterranean and 
the Red Army fighting the Japanese. If these concessions are evaluated by ends, then both 
are relatively equal. However, if they are judged by whether the party moved from a hard or 
soft position, then Churchill’s maneuver is less impressive and therefore the British paid a 
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higher price than the Americans. Remember, it is just as important to know what “price” a 
party “is prepared to pay to achieve” their objectives as it is to know their aims.37 
Negotiation analytics does not radically challenge Plokhy’s assessment; instead, it adds 
greater weight to his argument that the West did what they could with a “weak hand.” 
  Reynolds’ Summits is an exploration into the “human dramas of summitry.” When he 
analyzed six different summits of the twentieth century, he found a number of similarities 
existed in all of them. Three notable findings give weight to the contentions made by this 
work. First, summits can be viewed as “a business meeting to clinch a deal” displaying the 
characteristics of “an intimate business meeting between two or three heads of government,” 
which “turns on the capacity of individual leaders.” These leaders are dependent on “smooth 
teamwork with their bureaucrats.” Reynolds terms the summit at Yalta a “Plenary Summit” 
because the personal meetings were complemented by specialists who helped their leaders 
directly via their own preliminary meetings or advising during main sessions. “Lower-level 
negotiations between specialists are therefore essential,” since they laid the groundwork for 
the principles meeting(s).38 Ultimately, this description would be readily recognizable to 
anyone who has entered into business-to-business negotiations. It exposes the analogous 
organizational structure between high diplomacy and business negotiations. 
 Second, Reynolds finds that during these meetings, “leaders find it hard to 
disentangle their country’s national interests from their personal political goals.” With the 
control noted above, these leaders, therefore, have more say than usually given leaders, 
especially democratic heads of state. They push an agenda defined by them, not their 
countrymen. It is actually the point of summitry to grant greater agency to the leaders. 
Reynolds observes this as well, proclaiming “summitry is often undertaken … in the hope 
that by going to the very top you can soar above the fog” of political and diplomatic malaise. 
Recall, only in the implementation (final) stage does “how to present the meeting to their 
publics” become “an overriding concern for leaders.”39 Thus, Reynolds seems to find from 
his analysis of summits backing for the contention that these are atypical “great men”-driven 
events. 
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Finally, Reynolds reminds us that “a summit involves three distinction phases: 
preparation40, negotiation, and implementation.”41 Cristophe DuPont and Guy-Oliver Faure 
have also identified these three stages as the makeup of any negotiation. However, they point 
out, “The process may be fuzzy, the phases may be of differing duration, they may overlap 
or backtrack, and confusion may appear in the secession of events. Nevertheless, looking at 
the whole sequence, one sees the process is distinctive and original.” 42 That stages are elastic 
is a vital aspect of postwar planning negotiations that cannot be properly incorporated by 
studying Yalta exclusively. The three-stage formula is inner summit and is the pattern for all 
meetings and discussions that relate to the issues being addressed by the negotiation, in this 
case the creation of the postwar order.  
Yalta was not the only postwar planning negotiation; it was the penultimate. A better 
assessment of prioritization can be garnered when position evolution is traced from the 
beginning of negotiations instead of identifying them at an arbitrary point. This traced 
evolution exposes the positions’ prioritization, allowing the analyst to discern hard and soft 
positions. Positions prioritization divulges the price each party is willing to pay as well as the 
options still available. Therefore, the three-stage pattern must contextualize all wartime 
meetings and discussion regarding postwar planning to ascertain the dynamic momentum 
created by the interplay between actor and process through the procedures used. 
A quick glance at Keith Sainsbury’s Turning Points exposes why discerning the parties’ 
strategies is crucial to this type of analysis. It also reveals why discerning the options 
available to each party is vital to understanding the diplomatic decision-making process. For 
instance, he begins his strategy section for the Moscow Ministers Meeting by identifying two 
essential points: the makeup of the delegation and whether a consensus existed amongst 
them. In the case of the Americans, the delegations’ preferred positions “were not different 
from Roosevelt’s,” which makes it easier to distinguish the main priority. Sainsbury pinpoints 
this as “the agreement of Russia and Britain to the principle of postwar international 
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cooperation.”43 Thus, he identified the Americans’ underlying interest allowing him to 
discern position prioritization. 
Sainsbury finds that China’s role is deemed essential for postwar international 
cooperation by Secretary of State Cordell Hull who Roosevelt authorized to negotiate on his 
behalf. FDR’s Chinese “policy was aimed at creating a strong pro-American China to emerge 
from the war as a great stabilizer among the oppressed peoples of the Orient,” recalled 
American Air Commander in China, Claire Chennault.44 So, elevation of China to the role of 
a major power was a central concern to the US at the conference. Another salient aspect to 
establishing a strategy is to find what position(s) would be helpful as concession(s), i.e., “the 
price that [one is] prepared to pay,” to make certain their main positions were adopted.45 
Since the Russians had made clear their fear of and need to control Germany after the war, 
“Germany was therefore the second item on the US agenda,” with plans for harsh treatment 
of the country.46 This would show good faith to the Russians and set up a possible trade. 
Without belaboring the point, the effect of ascertaining strategies can reveal much about 
how the parties viewed each other, themselves, the issues, and their positions.   
However, a problem exists with Sainsbury’s exploration of the conferences of 1943.  
He claims these conferences “resulted in a ‘turning point’” and that Moscow and Teheran 
marked the point when “the option of resisting effectively the creation of a Soviet sphere of 
interest in Eastern Europe probably ceased to exist.”47 Sainsbury relies too much on the 
endowment effect – the mental process by which value is added to a possession because of 
one’s custody of it. It is true that as de Cremer and Pillutla claim, “[C]oncessions which have 
been negotiated with the other party in previous negotiations are viewed as valuable 
possessions which are difficult to renegotiate.” Yet, all “this means is negotiations will run 
less smoothly,” not that they are ended or that a position change is untenable – the price has 
just become higher.48  
A closed option does not mean that option is off the table. These are two distinctly 
different places for the option to rest. An option off the table means it will no longer be 
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discussed, whereas a closed option can be reopened if a party is willing to make a major 
concession, usually moving from a hard position. Thus, options reduction is always present, 
but alternatives are not static. The percentage deal exposed this type of movement. When 
Churchill traded away British say in Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, the British recaptured 
predominance in Greece and reestablished influence in Yugoslavia. Sainsbury’s determinism 
caused him to overlook the two phases of agreements. It is essential to comprehend that 
deals made via negotiations follow a two-phase process, which if not taken into account 
leads to an improper view of what options were still available to the parties.  
Dean Pruitt purports, “[T]he concept of negotiation is a joint decision-making 
process” that follows “a two-phase activity: exploring to find a formula of agreement and 
then adjusting the details.”49 In the case of the percentage deal, Moscow and Teheran were 
the first phase, and Tolstoy (the percentage deal meeting) the second. For the negotiations as 
a whole, Yalta was the process of “finding a formula” for agreement. Though the loss of 
FDR changed the members, Potsdam and the other post-Yalta conferences and discussions 
was the “adjusting of details” phase i.e., implementation. During this phase adjustments to 
previous decisions about borders, zones of occupation, etc., were made. An agreement can 
be made between parties, but until the exact details are decided and put into effect, 
maneuverability is possible, especially if, like Churchill, a delegation head is willing to move 
from a hard position. Also, “Even if a deal is made,” highlights Robert Mnookin, “there is a 
risk it may not be honored.”50 Therefore, written agreements are only one side of the coin, 
and to ascertain the way a negotiation unfolds, both sides must be analyzed. To evaluate any 
conference properly, the analyst must look beyond the main conference to the point when 
the decisions reached at said conference are either implemented or cast aside.  
The implementation of an agreement gives time for new options to become 
available, thus undercutting a deterministic argument. A focus on process and/or actors 
without including procedures used can cause an analyst to fall into other deterministic 
snares. Ironically, this is exactly what happens in Neil Fergusson’s work the Cash Nexus 
because the book aimed at revealing why Paul Kennedy’s economic determinism in The Rise 
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and Fall of the Great Powers was not formulaic.  Fergusson exposes the failure of Kennedy’s 
concept of “overstretch” when it came to Vietnam and the Soviets’ loss in Afghanistan. 
Furthermore, the concept would have seen the American system start to falter in the 1980s 
and 1990s as it took on greater commitments in an attempt to cause the fall of Soviet Union 
and later by maintaining and expanding NATO after said fall. Fergusson’s argument that the 
US political system was “the right balance … between the different sections of the 
economy” allowing the Americans “to maximize war-making resources without undermining 
domestic well-being” is astute.51 Economics is an important factor in the power of a country, 
but unlike Britain earlier in the century, no country existed to take the place of America if 
they “overstretched.” Therefore, no actor could enact the procedures necessary to replace 
American hegemony, and thus a pattern or rule could not be extrapolated from the earlier 
phenomena. Yet, Fergusson falls into the same deterministic trap by trying to claim that 
political systems govern state-to-state relations. 
“The key difference between France and Britain in the eighteenth century,” 
emphasizes Fergusson, “was not a matter of economic resources. France had more. Rather it 
was a matter of institutions,” which led to Britain’s supremacy over its chief rival. Similarly, 
in the case of the Soviet-American postwar rivalry, “Reagan’s defense budget was a symptom 
of American superiority, not a cause of the Soviet collapse,” as Kennedy determinism would 
suggest.52 Fergusson’s contention that “under the right circumstances, rising public 
expenditure on the technology of defense and destruction can co-exist with rising 
consumption” was a good refutation of Kennedy’s thesis. However, in the same theory, his 
political determinism could not be used as a nomothetic rule for all American international 
actions. 
Fergusson’s belief in the idea that the politics of nation determined the course it 
would take in international relations led him astray. At the end of Cash Nexus he contends 
American people, specifically their democratic underpinnings, would restrain US 
policymakers from embarking on any truly imperialistic adventures such as the invasion of 
Iraq and the overthrowing of its regime to instill democracy in the country. He argues, “The 
idea of invading a country[,] deposing a dictator[,] and imposing free elections at gunpoint is 
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generally dismissed as incompatible with American ‘values.’”53 However, this event did take 
place only two years after the completion of his work. George W. Bush and his 
administration had underlying interests – misplaced security concerns, money/oil, reelection, 
or a score to settle (depending on one’s view of Operation Iraqi Freedom) – that upset the 
paradigm established by Fergusson. Whatever interest to which one subscribes, it caused the 
administration to violate Fergusson’s rule by manipulating American public opinion, through 
fear, away from what he deemed its “traditional” thinking. The structure was important, but 
the actors still had the ability to affect the way the system functioned through the procedure 
of fear-based propaganda.   
Thus, as revealed from the examples of Fergusson, Kennedy, and to a lesser extent 
Sainsbury, the process is very important to understanding how international interactions 
unfold as well as who is making the choices amongst options and how they sift through said 
alternatives. Yet, the ability of the actors to shape the process and the feedback that has in 
reducing alternatives is equally important. Therefore, to understand how the negotiations at 
Yalta unfolded all three parts, the background and influences of the actors (History) as well 
as the process and procedures (Negotiation Analytics) must be incorporated into the study. 
Done properly, this multidisciplinary methodology will forestall the tendency towards 
structural determinism indicative of History’s combination with realist and neorealist IR.  
Overview 
Four different aspects of WWII postwar planning diplomacy background need to be 
ascertained to uncover the Big Three’s strategies going into Yalta: the makeup of the parties 
and the influence derived from their life experiences, the standing of the parties, the issues to 
be addressed, and the parties’ positions. Taking into account DuPont and Faure’s warning 
about the elasticity of the negotiational stages, each of these aspects can be viewed as 
separate parts and as such are the focal points of the four chapters of Part I.  Each chapter 
reveals how the British and Churchill, in particular, were able to lead the negotiations and 
thus framed the debate – junior partner-led negotiation. This can further inform us about 
the dynamic processes at work during the postwar planning diplomacy and why the outcome 
of an East/West division happened when that partition was not the way the negotiations 
themselves transpired. 
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Chapter 1, which is an overview of the postwar visions of Churchill, FDR and Stalin, 
reveals the opening given to the PM and the British to lead the negotiations. Why they 
needed to act as an intermediary and frame the debate is explained when the standing of the 
three countries and its effect on the negotiations is depicted in Chapter 2. The issues 
confronting the Grand Alliance appear in Chapter 2, but in Chapter 3 these issues become 
readily apparent. Here the differences between the parties, especially the Western ones, are 
detailed, which further depicts the failure of the traditional East/West pattern to describe 
events up to and including Yalta. Chapter 3 grants the first glimpse of positions; however, 
Chapter 4 relates how these positions evolved and what events predicated this change.  
Churchill’s vacillation, at times pragmatic and at others chaotic, between Teheran and Yalta 
exposed how British actions affected the other parties and forced their positions to evolve, 
which details that Britain’s maneuvering directed the momentum behind the negotiational 
processes of WWII  postwar planning diplomacy. Part I culminates, with the aid of 
contemporary preparatory work from the State Department, Foreign Office (FO) and 
Foreign Commissariat, in the retracing of the evolution of position to form a concrete 
determination of the Big Three’s strategies for Yalta. 
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Chapter One: Lessons of the Past 
The reason this work combines historical methodology with negotiation analytics is 
that a historical examination gives an analyst the best ability to ascertain the background of 
the parties, in particular the delegation leaders, as well as the context of the negotiations. 
Both are perquisites for understanding the delegations’ strategies. “A basic fact about 
negotiation” that is “easy to forget,” emphasize Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce 
Patton, “is that you are dealing not with abstract representatives” but “with human beings” 
who “have emotions, deeply held values, and different backgrounds,” which affect their 
decision-making.1 An exclusive focus on negotiation analytics would fail to identify all of the 
various influences that informed the thought processes of Churchill, FDR, and Stalin as they 
developed their postwar plans and decided amongst the options available to them. “The path 
to understanding foreign policy almost certainty travels through the minds of the foreign 
policy maker,” relates Smith.2 Without identifying these influences and the concepts derived 
from them, it would be difficult to discern how and why the Big Three leaders’ positions 
evolved.  
Churchill 
Winston Churchill (1874-1965) was born in Victorian England, which held a special 
place in his heart throughout his life. During this period, Britain was the preeminent world 
power. The future Prime Minister felt it should maintain this paramount position in the 
world. He believed they earned this status because though it “had been very tempting to join 
with the stronger [European coalitions] and share the fruits of his conquest” England 
“joined the less strong powers … and thus defeated and frustrated the Continental military 
tyrant,” which “preserved the liberties of Europe [as well as] protected the growth of its 
vivacious and varied society.”3 Along with this aid to Europe, the PM noted, the British 
Empire “has spread and is spreading democracy more widely than any other system of 
government,” which helped orient countries towards the Empire.4 Britain was able to 
accomplish these feats due to the power derived from their colonies and vast trade networks, 
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which gave the British men and resources independent of the Continent and made them a 
great power. However, by the start of the war, it was quickly becoming apparent that the 
Americans would replace the British as the leading world democracy and economic 
powerhouse.  
The 1930s revealed that the Empire was as much of a burden as it was an asset. The 
Empire setup, especially the colonies, involved large military outlays to protect’ a price that 
the Americans did not have to assume. Since the Premiership of Pitt the Elder, “vast outlays 
of public funds” had been extended “to support armies [and navies] all around the world,” 
relates Francis Jennings.5 Furthermore, in spite of the Great Depression, America’s 
economic metrics were such that they were primed to become the economic juggernaut of 
the democratic world, with all the power that entails. This new position would mean like-
minded countries would look first to Washington, not London, for direction in world affairs. 
Still, Churchill did “not believe that [the] Americans wish[ed] to deprive us of our legitimate 
place in world affairs.”6 
 “Britain cannot be a first-class power without its empire,” declared diplomat John 
Davis.7 If England could partner with the Americans, the combination would lead world 
affairs. The British, notes Mark Stoler, “had used and would continue to use bilateral 
understandings as a means of getting powers to protect its far-flung interests.”8Therefore, 
Churchill and most of the Cabinet felt, Britain had “to collaborate with the United States, 
whatever happens, to survive as a Great Power.””9 Shifting some of the financial burden for 
protecting trade routes and the Pacific (cover for British colonies) onto the Americans would 
preserve the Empire. As British diplomat Lord Vansittart claimed, without American 
backing, Britain ‘must eventually be done in the Far East.’10 Both countries wanted security 
and the ability to trade; Churchill realized these desires were the opening to align the two 
countries.  
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Lessons from Britain’s past gave Churchill the inspiration on how he could frame 
British interests as Anglo-American interests. “The evident influence on his thoughts of 
great persons and great events of times long past” was apparent to all, recalled Halifax.11 His 
love affair with the Victorian age drew much of the PM’s attention to the period known as 
the Concert of Europe (1815-1853). In many ways, he wished ‘to put the clock back to the 
Congress of Vienna,’ remembered British diplomat Oliver Henry.12 His perception of how 
the Concert functioned guided Churchill’s thinking about the postwar order.   
 The Concert was formed by the leading powers of nineteenth century Europe: 
Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia. The period, according to Gordon 
Craig, was marked by diplomacy and statecraft of the “Great Powers,” which “were capable 
of restraining the passions” of the lesser powers of Europe through “the principle of the 
balance of power.”13 The balance of power within the Concert was maintained by two or 
three power understandings. The agreements upheld the balance of power and forestalled 
changes to the existing order. As Henry Kissinger wrote this type of “balance of power 
inhibits the capacity to overthrow the international order.”14 For instance, during the Belgian 
Revolution crisis (1830s), “Britain,” declares Matthew Rendell, “held the balance of power 
between Prussia and France” because “had either side committed an act of aggression, 
London surely would have thrown its support to the other side.”15 Thus, declares G. John 
Ikenberry, Churchill’s aim was “to provide a measure of restraint on the autonomous and 
indiscriminate exercise of power by major states.” 16 This aim could only be achieved through 
“a revived European balance in which Britain had influence,” allowing Britain to “remain a 
Power of the first rank,” contends B.J.C. Mckerber.17  
Sustaining British geo-political standing through a balance of power setup, therefore, 
was the most powerful influence on the PM’s postwar planning.  A re-adaptation of the 
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Concert’ makeup, based on three powers (UK, US, USSR) seemed the best mechanism to 
reestablish a European balance of power. As will be detailed, it was more than just a Big 
Three triumvirate that Churchill desired; he felt he must act as the triumvirate’s intermediary 
to compensate for Britain’s lack of standing amongst the group. Like the Concert period, 
Churchill felt the British would need to work with the Russians to forestall American 
ambitions. However, similar to the late Concert period, one of the powers (in that case 
France) was clearly the ideal partner for most instances due to their complementary setup to 
the British Empire – America.   
By the time Queen Victoria came to power (1840s), relates Rendell, “the French” 
believed “the European status quo” was beneficial to their interests.18 This new belief 
presented the British, who profited the most from the status quo, with an opportunity to 
find a like-minded Continental power to aid them in its maintenance. Besides fear of the 
Eastern powers (Prussia and Russia), the British and French had complementary defensive 
setups. The British were a sea power with a trade empire that gave them access to the 
world’s resources. Even with the massive losses due to Napoleon’s defeat, no other power 
could “bear the brunt of a French onslaught,” contends Rendell.19 Thus, Britain provided the 
naval protection and supplies – the arsenal – for the French soldiers on the continent – the 
sentinel. “Britain had since the eighteenth century,” notes David Edgerton, “armed allies” to 
keep “its own forces out of the front line.”20 The success of the Anglo-French combination 
was revealed when they hindered Russian expansionism in the 1850s. 
Britain’s traditional geo-political concern was a continental hegemon, more than any 
other factor; it had drawn the British to the Anglo-French understanding. Churchill realized 
that after the war, they alone could not halt a potential hegemon, but coupled with the 
Americans, they could. The PM viewed this relationship as a reversal of the Anglo-French 
setup; Britain would be the “sentinel” of Europe aided by the Americans’ “arsenal.” The 
Anglo-American partnership, like the combining with the French in the previous century, 
provided Continental stability while protecting their Empire as well as the resources – men, 
raw materials, and trade – and status derived from it.  
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As part of his strategy to create a modern Concert, one of the PM’s first acts when 
attaining the role was to establish a relationship with FDR.  “My own relations with him had 
been most carefully fostered,” wrote Churchill, and “was a vital factor in all my thoughts.”21 
He believed a natural kinship existed between the English-speaking nations, which 
constituted “a solid identity of interests,” having seen during WWI the benefits of the 1890s 
Anglo-American rapprochement.22 These coinciding interests – a desire to promote the 
freedom of the seas, liberal democracy, and trade – could be used to frame British interests 
as Anglo-American ones.  
Yet, Churchill always felt he needed to lead the Anglo-American combination in its 
dealings with the rest of the world in order to protect British interests. His desire to lead was 
especially true in Europe where he felt Americans “had strong opinions and little 
experience,” especially the combinations’ interactions with Russia.23  Vice President Henry 
Wallace recalled, “England would try to deal with Russia directly and put us in the positions 
of dealing with Russia through England as an intermediary.”24 Acting as the Soviet-American 
go-between was part of his way of reestablishing the balance of power, reprising Lord 
Castlereagh’s role in Vienna. Furthermore, guiding the Anglo-American partnership was also 
part of his way of ensuring Europe would look to Britain for answers to postwar problems; 
along with maintaining the Empire, these two prerequisites were what he felt the UK must 
achieve to remain a great power.   
 The other aspect of the Concert that influenced Churchill’s postwar planning was the 
position of the smaller states of Europe. The fragmentation of Germany into small 
principalities had advantages for the Concert’s status quo – acting as buffers between the 
major powers – but also had major drawbacks that worried the PM. The small states were 
weak and unable to work in unison, which allowed the Austro-Hungarians, French, and 
Prussians to use them for their own ends. A similar circumstance took place between the 
World Wars – the interwar period. The Little Entente, a grouping of small Eastern European 
states, was never able to effectively link together, and thus, they were divided and conquered 
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by Germany. In both instances, without the ability to work together, the small states had 
been at the mercy of the larger powers.  
One of the Concert’s great powers, Austria-Hungary, was of particular interest to the 
PM as a way to overcome the economic viability and security problems of the small states. It 
“had afforded a common life, with advantages and trade and security, to a large number of 
peoples,” who, according to Churchill, on their own did not have “the strength or vitality to 
stand by themselves.”25 Austria-Hungary, the PM felt, linked diverse groups and held in 
check their various political and religious fervors. The appeal was the stability provided by 
large groupings based on economics and security. Its success juxtaposed against the failure 
of the smaller independent states heavily influenced Churchill’s planning for Europe. Any 
combination of small states, therefore, would need “to provide durable safeguards against” 
foreign “penetration and to promote the security and prosperity of the area.”26 If these 
prerequisites were acquired then he could “re-create in modern forms” the “general outline 
of the Austria-Hungarian Empire,” while still providing the buffer between the major 
powers.27 The PM, thus, preferred strong combinations of small states over their alignment 
with major powers.   
To recreate the Austria-Hungarian setup and solve European security problems, 
Churchill wanted to establish confederations in Central and Eastern Europe. He believed in 
the “need for a Scandinavian bloc, Danubian bloc, and a Balkan bloc.”28 These blocs were 
economically viable and therefore less susceptible to major power manipulation. Early in 
1943, Halifax was alerted, “The United States Government were at present examining the 
possibility of some form of federation of the nations of Eastern Europe.”29 This statement 
gave the PM hope that he could reach an understanding over confederations with the 
Americans. However, this scheme would only work if “the Western Powers” were 
“permanently associated in their support.”30 Preserving the confederations security and 
equalizing Big Three standing gave rise to Churchill’s ideas on the international organization 
(UNO). 
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Churchill understood any agreement with the Americans must include adherence to 
the UNO. If designed his way, the organization would cause Europeans to look to Britain 
first while allowing the British to continue their role as the Big Three’s intermediary into the 
postwar. “Churchill had laid great emphasis,” recalled Wallace, on the existence of “three 
regional councils.”31 The PM’s desire for the UNO to be founded upon regional councils 
arose from the need to equalize Big Three standing. At Québec I, he stated, “[S]ubordinate 
to this world council there should be three regional councils, one for Europe, one for the 
American Hemisphere and one for the Pacific.”32 The Big Three would each head a council; 
however, their makeup was unclear, as well as what role Africa was to play and where the 
colonies would be placed. US ties to Latin America, and their desire to sustain them, was the 
opportunity Churchill thought he could use to receive American agreement on the councils. 
He was aware that “[t]he United States believed that the inter-American system had an even 
more important role to fill in the future than in the past.”33 As the head of a regional council, 
the British would have the same standing as the Americans and Russians, i.e., the same 
position in geo-politics. 
The maintenance of Britain’s geo-political standing was Anthony Eden’s top concern 
as well. He thought, however, that the Russians would be the better partners, initially. Like 
Churchill, the Foreign Secretary sought to make sure decisions about the makeup of Europe 
were heavily influenced by British opinion. He wanted London to become the “diplomatic 
capital of the world,” allowing Britain to guide Continental decision-making.34 Eden was able 
to pursue his own strategy due to the nature of the UK’s cabinet structure. 
 Secretaries in the British cabinets (at least ones with portfolios) have authority 
independent of the PM who appoints them.  Moreover, as Under-Secretary Alec Cadogan 
proudly proclaimed, “[N]either Halifax nor Eden” nor himself were “in the least inclined to 
grovel to the Prime Minister.” Consequently, “the Foreign Office preserved a much stronger 
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position during the Second World War than under Lloyd George in the First.”35 This leeway, 
coupled with differing opinions on what strategy England should pursue, led to tensions 
between the PM and the Foreign Secretary until late 1944. As David Carlton observes, “It is 
possible to see the two men by 1941 as already more rivals than allies.”36 This was not helped 
by Churchill’s intrigues about “restoring the old European system,” which “struck Eden,” 
related Craig, “as antiquated and unrealistic,” nor by the fact “[t]he PM generally cared little 
for diplomats,” lamented Cadogan, “or for the F.O. as an institution.”37 Furthermore, the 
Foreign Secretary believed that the Americans would not be a reliable partner in the 
stabilization of postwar Europe.  
Eden did all he could “to reduce the risks of a later withdrawal” of Americans 
troops; still, he was haunted by “the League of Nations” when Americans had abandoned 
the Continent.38 Therefore, he wanted an understanding with the Russians to stabilize 
Europe and prevent the revival of the German military threat – at first. Harbutt points out, 
“[I]t was Eden rather than Churchill who was the principal actor” in fostering “the Anglo-
Soviet alliance.”39 The Foreign Secretary felt “that there was no reason why there should be 
any conflict of interest between the Soviet Government and ourselves” and “that policy 
[was] firmly based on history.”40 The threat of Anglo-Soviet power would forestall any 
nascent Continental powers, leaving Britain the means to continue the Empire with its 
resources and trade, therefore sustaining their great power status. Plus, the Russians did not 
have South East Asian aspirations, unlike the Americans who he presumed would retreat 
back to the Western Hemisphere but continued to expand into the Pacific, a crucial part of 
the Empire’s trade networks.  
Less concerned about American susceptibilities, Eden’s Anglo-Soviet understanding 
was based on spheres of influence in contrast to Churchill’s Anglo-American partnership 
founded on regionalism, which took into account America’s antipathy towards spheres of 
influence. A British-led Western-bloc – the Western Democracies of Europe – based on “a 
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strong France” would reestablish a European balance of power with the Russians guiding 
Eastern European decision-making. Both British planners looked to past security systems. 
Where Churchill looked to the Concert to guide his planning, Eden hoped to finally achieve 
the collective security that failed to materialize during the interwar period. He pursued the 
same goals as Churchill just through different means, which ultimately allowed their planning 
to synchronize. 
 It was due to strategic differences between Churchill and Eden that two plans arose. 
The British pursued these plans simultaneously through 1943. Both were based on framing 
British interests as joint interests, either Anglo-American or Anglo-Soviet, through directing 
their combinations diplomacy with the non-consulted party. Acting as intermediaries and 
framing would be features of Britain’s postwar planning diplomatic strategy throughout the 
war. However, working at cross purposes undermined each other’s planning, which was 
revealed at the meetings in 1943. These meetings caused both men to alter their initial 
strategies, i.e., evolve their positions. With the PM and the Foreign Secretary adjusting their 
planning in 1944, it is difficult to determine the British strategy for Yalta. Therefore, 
ascertaining how and why their positions evolved becomes even more important. Only 
through discerning these factors can an understanding of their priorities be discovered, the 
major factor in determining a strategy. As Britain’s strategy is revealed, it exposes how they 
used the dynamic momentum of the negotiations to reduce the options available to the 
senior parties – US and USSR – and caused their planning to evolve as well.  
Stalin 
 Joseph V. Stalin (1878-1953) was a suspicious person, if not outright paranoid. As his 
wartime number two, V.M. Molotov remembered, ‘Stalin was extraordinarily suspicious of 
everyone around him.’41 Psychological analysis from afar is dubious, but it is clear that the 
autocrat’s upbringing and rise to power left him less trusting than his Big Three 
counterparts. As Roy Medvedev stresses, the Marshal became “an extremely secretive 
person[;] he never told anyone his true intentions.”42 Control over those around him was his 
way of overcoming his distrust of people. As a result, power, not nationalism, nor idealism, 
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nor even revolutionary zeal, drove Stalin. After Vladimir Lenin’s death, the Soviet leader 
slowly worked to his ultimate aim – unchecked power.  
In pursuit of unlimited power, “[h]e aimed at breaking up groups or cliques who 
might,” declares Keith Eubanks, “build a rival political organization.”43 Stalin was able to 
defeat his enemies by compiling information against them and destroying them with it when 
the time was right.44 Furthermore, as Reynolds exposes, “he always had an inferiority 
complex” about his rural upbringing and his “lack of formal education,” which led him to be 
“deeply xenophobic” and eventually manifested itself in the dictator “lashing out at signs of 
Russian subservience.”45 His thinking was, therefore, influenced by a desire for unlimited 
power coupled with the need to see Russia on par with or greater than the Western capitalist 
powers. Zubok describes this thinking as “a combination of insecurity and wide ranging 
aspirations.”46 Thus, the Russian ruler’s postwar planning is defined by the interplay between 
his security concerns and his aspirations for greater control. 
 The past was Stalin’s guide to the questions that the war thrust upon him. Simon 
Sebag Montefiore notes, “He regarded Ivan the Terrible as his true alter ego, his ‘teacher[,]’ 
something he revealed constantly to comrades.”47 He tried to replicate the rule of the great 
leaders of Russia’s past – Ivan, Peter, and Catherine – because “Stalin assigned an inordinate 
significance to the role of personality in politics,” asserts Mastny.48 Yet, as the editor of his 
letters emphasizes, “Stalin was a believer.”49 He was devoted to communism and accepted as 
true that it would ultimately prevail worldwide. Still, Geoffrey Roberts observes, “Stalin did 
not see his ideological policy as incompatible with his security policy.”50 Zubok states, the 
Marshal “transform[ed] the international communist ideology into an imperial, statist one, 
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rooted more in Russian history than in Comintern Slogans.”51 He also realized that ideology 
could be used as a cover for his personal aims. 
 The prime example of Stalin’s use of ideology to cloud his actual aim (sole control 
the Soviet state) was the Purges. The Purges were a series of show-trials that took place 
during the late 1930s, ostensibly against enemies of the state. They were aimed “mainly at 
political opponents” but were “broadly focused on social opposition,” specifically “the 
Kulaks” and “ethnic groups that might threaten the regime,” notes Gellately.52 Stalin felt he 
would need to eliminate individuals holding important positions if they were not loyal to 
him. He spent the 1930s removing people who had a potential to create opposing power 
bases, especially in strategic points such as Leningrad and Kiev. Even the dictator’s former 
friends like Sergey Kirov, Lev Kamenev and Leningrad Party boss Grigory Zinoviev were 
not immune. 53 Eliminating these people and groups removed any potential independent 
power bases that might arise to upset the autocrat’s hold on power.  
An excuse for why the country had not succeeded as well as predicted in the first 
two five-year plans – state-guided economic programs – was also provided by the Purges. 
“[Stalin] typically blamed his own miscalculations on scapegoats while raising the alarm 
about the country security,” declares Mastny.54 The Marshal blamed saboteurs and ‘wreckers’ 
for non-fulfillment; ‘an enemy of the people is not only one who does sabotage but one who 
doubts the righteousness of the party line.’ He finished with, “[W]e must liquidate them.’55 
The essential aspect, however, was to eliminate the people who did not follow ‘the party 
line.’ As the Italian Marxist Paulo Spraino asserts, Stalin assumed “he had to kill the spirit of 
old Bolshevism,” which meant eliminating “the old Bolshevik leading group,” especially 
Nikolai Bukharin.56 An additional benefit of this process was that a cult of personality 
formed around the dictator, which he cultivated to enable his one-man rule. 
 Stalin was a smart tactician during his rise to power; he was able to control (through 
sycophants) all of the institutions of the Soviet state. Amidst the Purges, he helped usher 
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through a new Soviet Constitution (1937) that centralized most functions of the state under 
the auspice of the Central Committee, the leading body of the Politburo. By the time the war 
had begun, the Soviet leader had consolidated all political power in the Central Committee 
and assumed its chairmanship. Thus, “During Stalin’s lifetime, Soviet policy was for all 
intents and purposes his policy,” contends Mastny.57  
The Marshal was not challenged in this process because “[t]hose who were capable 
of such an act were stopped not so much by fear for their lives as by fear of the social 
consequences, which could not be predicted in the conditions of the cult,” declares 
Medvedev. He further claims, “Stalin’s cult of personality was strongest in the party stratum 
of the working class, among the new young intelligentsia, and most especially in the party 
and state apparatus, particularly the apparatus that took shape after the repression of 1936-
38.”58 These groups made up the sycophants who instilled Stalinism throughout the Soviet 
system. It was a well-thought-out and methodical approach that allowed him to establish his 
one-man rule through removing rivals and potential power bases as well as controlling the 
USSR’s strategic points. The length and methodical nature of this process cannot be 
overstated while investigating the Russian ruler’s postwar planning.  
 Stalin thought his domestic tactics and policies could be transferred to the 
international arena. His security scheme planning, domestically and internationally, was 
based on the same principles: eliminate those who could potentially rise up against him or 
create independent power bases and hold strategic points. The Marshal divulged his 
concerns about vital spots to his interpreter, Valentin Berezhkov, after the war, ‘[Russia] 
must have the opportunity of occupying the most vital strategic points.’59 Holding strategic 
points either personally or with dependents and sycophants was the last principle that 
informed Stalin’s postwar planning.  
It could be that Stalin always planned on pursuing a unilateral (non-Big Three) 
postwar plan. As Nikita Khrushchev recalled, “His naked power and unlimited, unchallenged 
authority went to his head.”60 Yet, this opinion seems wanting. A better explanation is 
Stalin’s main underlying interest was the preservation of his own power with the security of 
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the Soviet state interlinked with his personal power. As Maisky stated “the principal 
objective of the Soviet Government was security,” and Stalin subsumes ‘everything to the 
preservation of his own power,” noted Bukharin.’61 The positions that he adopted were 
influenced first and foremost, therefore, by security concerns.  
The Soviets needed to be systematic in their expansionism, according to the dictator. 
He felt being too expansionist a lá Hitler would be the catalyst for the West “to combine 
together.”62 The fear of a capitalistic combination aimed at the Soviet Union was a major 
concern “reinforced by Leninist assumptions about the behavior of capitalist nations,” 
emphasizes Marvin Leffler.63 Thus, the intertwining of Stalin’s security concerns and the 
interests of communism are exposed. He concluded, as a result, that a methodical approach 
akin to his takeover of the USSR was needed; collaboration with the allies would buy him 
time and resources. Therefore, the Marshal would only “reject collaboration with its Western 
Allies” if his “conditions” were not “accepted,” contends Eubanks.64 The initial conditions 
were revealed immediately after the Soviet Union entered the war.  
Stalin’s “worship of military might,” contends Mastny, stemmed from his belief that 
his strength at home and his country’s standing in the world were dictated by military 
prowess.65 Therefore, when the Nazis launched their invasion and sent the Red Army 
reeling, the dictator felt his power threatened. However, almost immediately Churchill and 
Roosevelt dispatched envoys to Moscow to ascertain what help the Western powers could 
offer the fledging Soviet forces. The West’s offer of aid and a wartime alliance presented the 
Marshal with a way out of his predicament. They could provide the Russians the two things 
they needed the most at that time: supplies and a second front.66 If the West armed the Red 
Army and opened a second front, Stalin’s power would be preserved and perhaps even 
enhanced. He would work with the West, ideology aside, if they supplied the Russians with 
these desperately needed elements.   
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Western assistance to beat back the Nazi threat would allow Stalin time to achieve 
his main international security aims: incorporate vital border territories and dominate the 
regions surrounding the Soviet Union. In a failed attempt to stall Hitler’s invasion of the 
Soviet Union, Stalin authorized Molotov to sign an agreement with the Germans dividing 
Eastern Europe between them. The agreement, normally referred to as the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact, gave the Russians the territories in Eastern Europe they wanted to 
maintain possession of after the war – Eastern Poland, the Baltic States, parts of Romania 
and Hungary, etc. At numerous points, specifically at Teheran, Stalin specified the territories 
on his Eastern perimeter he felt must be incorporated into the Soviet State – the Kurile 
Islands, South Sakhalin, and the Ports of Arthur and Dairen.67 His security scheme also 
needed the countries stretching from Korea to Finland, including strategic points such as the 
Baltic Straits, the Dardanelles, Manchuria, and the Polish plain, to be “friendly”.  
What a “friendly” government meant to the autocrat was exposed during the Benes-
Stalin talks in 1943. Edward Benes was the leader of Czechoslovakia during the war. “No 
other established leader was to play a more important role in the wartime Soviet designs,” 
declares Mastny.68 Benes made a Faustian bargain with Stalin during these talks, which was 
the model for what the Marshal desired in a friendly leader. The Czech leader would act as a 
surrogate for the Russians inside Czechoslovakia; in return, they would restore the country 
to its pre-Munich borders.69 In essence, Benes would be dependent on Soviet, specifically 
Stalin’s, goodwill.  
The Marshal was not naïve; a country might become “friendly’ through dependence, 
but he would always have a military presence (threat) to make sure the country followed the 
Soviet Union’s lead. Capitalist countries would have access to Eastern European markets, 
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but these governments would orient themselves towards the Soviet Union. The dictator told 
Yugoslavian rebel leader Josip Tito, ‘[W]e deem it necessary to explain that we do not plan 
the Sovietization of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, but instead, prefer to maintain contacts with 
Democratic Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, which will be allies of the USSR.’70  Stalin believed in 
time the countries around him would become communist, as Leninist doctrine taught him. 
However, their orientation towards the Soviet Union either through dependence or fear was 
the main concern, especially for the successful implementation of his preferred 
military/security policy: defense by depth. 
Alexander I had dispatched Napoleon when he invaded Russia by employing the 
strategy known as defense by depth. It was founded on the concept of attrition; invaders 
would be beaten back by a grinding defensive assault across vast lands. Russia’s immense 
territories would allow this to occur before an invading force reached its heartland. Gabriel 
Gordestky observes, “Defense through strategic retreat and exploitation of depth” was the 
centerpiece of Soviet military strategy.71 Stalin took heed of Russia’s past accumulation of 
territory for the depth part of defense by depth. As a result, “the geographical legacy of 
czarist Russia,” notes Zubok, became a “central source of Stalin’s foreign-policy.”72 Plus, as 
State Department Official Chip Bohlen emphasized, “Underlying Soviet fears was a belief 
that in important matters the capitalist nations would join despite their rivalries, to preserve 
the economic system.”73 The friendly countries would be allies in this potential bipolar war 
while still providing the land where the battles of attrition could take place as they had 
during Alexander’s time, once again revealing the interconnectivity of Stalin’s lessons from 
Russia’s past and his belief in communist doctrine. 
With Western assistance and the control of strategic points, either through 
incorporation or dependency and fear, Stalin could establish his international security 
scheme. Therefore, his postwar planning evolved as he tried to figure out the best way to 
obtain what he deemed was necessary for the establishment of this security scheme.   
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The main person tapped to assist the dictator’s postwar planning was V.M. Molotov, 
the Foreign Commissar. It is hard to discern whether he agreed with the direction of Stalin’s 
planning. As Cadogan noted, Molotov was opaque because “his technique [was] stubbornly 
and woodenly to repeat his own point of view and to ask innumerable questions of his 
interlocutors.”74 Furthermore, the Commissar’s only postwar comments were a series of 
interviews with Felix Chuev. He kept the Stalinist line, but it is unclear if it was due to his 
own heartfelt beliefs or fear of further repression.75 Still, unlike the rivalry between Eden and 
Churchill, “For Stalin, Molotov was a perfect choice, having no greater ambition than to 
serve his master faithfully,” declares Mastny.76 Therefore, the two men worked towards the 
same consistent ends at all times, which gave Russian planning greater uniformity than their 
Western counterparts, an often overlooked aspect of WWII diplomacy. 
Roosevelt 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945) also used lessons from the past to guide his 
future actions. His education under the tutelage of Endicott Peabody and the events 
surrounding the failure to ratify the League of Nations Covenant guided his thoughts about 
the postwar order. Peabody was the headmaster at Gorton where FDR was boarded as a 
youth. The headmaster preached civil service and the duty of the Christian community, 
especially those born into prosperous circumstance, to help the less fortunate – Noblesse 
Oblige. Roosevelt remembered fondly, ‘It was a blessing in my life to have the privilege of 
[Peabody’s] guiding hand.’77 The headmaster’s beliefs heavily influenced all of FDR’s 
thinking about state-to-state relations.  
Peabody’s teachings were fundamentally important in the formation of the 
President’s postwar plans; still, “There was not a motivating force in all Roosevelt’s wartime 
political policy stronger than the determination to prevent repetition of [Wilson’s] mistakes,” 
remembered Robert Sherwood.78 George Herring notes, “Like Wilson, [FDR] firmly 
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believed in the superiority of American values and institutions.”79 Furthermore, noted British 
Ambassador Stanford Cripps, “Roosevelt always [saw] international problems through the 
spectacles of American domestic politics,”80 similar to the former President. Plainly stated, 
instead of seeing the intricacies of international politics, they believed that the same 
dynamics existed in all political fields as those that were at work in American politics.  
Roosevelt, however, gleaned a crucial lesson from watching the small League-created 
nations’ – Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Baltic states – failure to find a niche in interwar 
Europe. It was not political self-determination that was the problem, as FDR believed the 
Baltic States’ ‘plebiscite was on the whole one of the few successful outcomes of the 
Versailles Treaty.’81 Instead, it was the failure of the small European states to find economic 
viability that was at the heart of their problems. “For many years after the World War blind 
economic selfishness in most countries” argued Roosevelt, “resulted in a destructive mine-
field of trade restrictions which blocked the channels of commerce among nations. This 
policy was one of the contributing causes of [the] existing war.”82 The lack of economic 
independence allowed these small states to be manipulated by the major powers and 
eventually overrun by the Germans. Therefore, unlike Wilson’s desire to spread American 
political institutions, FDR felt he needed to instill American economic concepts, in particular 
his New Deal program worldwide – an International New Deal. Thus, Rooseveltian 
Americanism – the desire to reshape international institutions along American institutional 
forms – was focused on economics. 
The Roosevelt administration concluded, “[T]he next peace must take into account 
the facts of economics; otherwise, it will serve as the seed bed for aggression.”83 The 
President felt the implementation of the New Deal was what allowed American economic 
stability to reassert itself after the Great Depression. Furthermore, the same unregulated self-
interest that destroyed American economic foundations – ‘destructive trade restrictions, 
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born largely of greed and unreasoning fear’ – was plaguing the world.84 He, therefore, 
“desired to export to all of the world the economic and social goals and techniques that had 
done so much to raise standards of living, cultural as well as material, in the United States,” 
declared William Range.85 FDR believed these techniques would unlock the world’s latent 
productive potential as the New Deal had done throughout the US.  
The goal of the International New Deal was to export what Charles Maier has 
termed the “politics of productivity,” which promoted “a supposedly impartial efficiency.” 
The plan was “to transform political issues into problems of output,” which could be more 
readily visualized and solved.86 New markets and greater world purchasing power would 
result from the tapping of the world’s latent potential, which would increase its economic 
stability and, therefore, promote worldwide security. At the same time these countries would 
orient themselves towards the US increasing America’s economic vitality. Thus, the 
underlying interest guiding FDR’s postwar planning was spreading his concepts of liberal 
capitalism typified by the New Deal.  
His major foreign-policy initiative prior to the war – the Good Neighbor Policy – 
was Roosevelt’s guide for the process instilling the New Deal’s economic foundation 
worldwide. ‘If ever a policy paid dividends the Good Neighbor policy had,’ stressed US 
Ambassador Adolf Berle.87 Under-Secretary Sumner Welles proclaimed, “The practical 
application of the Good Neighbor Policy had worked a material change in the sentiments of 
the other American Republics toward the United States.”88 The Good Neighbor Policy was 
the first application of what Roosevelt wanted to do at the end of the war: create a climate 
where the Great Powers aided the advancement of the lesser powers of their region – 
Noblesse Oblige. FDR told Churchill, ‘I am firmly of the belief that if we are to arrive at a 
stable peace it must involve the development of backward countries.’89 Furthermore, he 
argued, “The policy of the Good Neighbor has shown success in the hemisphere of the 
Americas,” which made “its extension to the whole world seems to be the logical next 
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step.”90 The influence of Peabody’s teachings is readily visible; the greater country’s duty was 
to assist the economic modernization of the lesser countries instead of exploiting their 
greater standing to impose trade regimes advantageous only to themselves.  
 The implementation of American free-trade, an international Export-Import Bank, 
and American control of relief and rehabilitation would lay the foundation for the 
International New Deal. American institutions and socio-economic principles would provide 
the guide for the great powers to act as Good Neighbors. The Good Neighbor Policy had 
shown the success of Export-Import loans, especially in facilitating the establishment of 
American-styled institutions. Fomenting the creation of similar economic foundations meant 
the aided country would orient their economy towards the United States. As the State 
Department noted, “American aid … would not only gain the good-will of the populaces 
involved, but would also help bring about conditions which would permit the adoption of 
the relatively liberal policies of this nation.”91  
In Brazil, for instance, loans from the Bank helped create a steel plant as well as 
increase rubber and oil production. All three of these greatly benefited the country while 
orienting Brazil towards America.92 As the President of Brazil, Getulio Vargas claimed, 
‘Brazil would follow the lead of the United States,’ emphasizing, ‘on all matters.’93 Vargas 
became quite close to FDR as both men realized the benefits of working together. Brazil was 
the shining example of the Good Neighbor Policy’s successes and the potential of an 
International New Deal. In 1936 Roosevelt even “declared Vargas the co-author of the New 
Deal,”94 highlights Frank McCann.  
Vargas throughout most of his time in power was a dictator; however, FDR slowly 
weaned him away from these policies, and near the end of the war, the Brazilian leader called 
an election without himself as a candidate. 95 In Vargas, Roosevelt saw a dictator he had 
molded into something akin to a liberal capitalist. Roosevelt’s success in transforming 
Vargas’ thinking gave the President hope that through the use of American resources and his 
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own personable style he could mold other totalitarian leaders, especially Stalin, into liberal 
capitalists. As Edward Stettinius related, “President Roosevelt was well aware of the nature 
of the Soviet society.” However, “[h]e knew that no society was static, and he believed that 
the United States could do much, through firmness, patience, and understanding, over a 
period of time in dealing with the Soviet Union to influence its evolution away from 
dictatorship and tyranny in the direction of a free, tolerant, and peaceful society.”96 This 
belief was helped by a report by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) prior to Teheran 
which saw “proof” of “fundamental changes in Russian communism.”97 Still, FDR was not 
naïve enough to believe the Russian leader would be as amenable as the Brazilian President. 
Neither the British nor Russians would be particularly enthusiastic about the 
establishment of American-styled institutions or socio-economic principles. It would make it 
more likely that governments who followed this course would orient themselves to the 
Americans, further accelerating British decline and forestalling Russian growth. The 
President felt that he could, like he had with domestic friends and foes alike, “persuade, 
cajole, and manipulate people rather than browbeat or intimidate them” into acquiescing to 
his plans, notes H.W. Brands.98 At first, FDR thought the British would work with him 
towards his economic aims. However, their natural desire to protect the Empire, specifically 
colonialism and discriminatory trade coupled with the Soviet Union’s entrance into the anti-
Axis coalition, caused an alteration of his planning. Therefore, the International New Deal 
had to be established by directing the victorious coalition’s transition into the postwar.    
During WWII Americans held a romantic view of China and its place in the world, 
encouraged by years of propaganda about its Christian and democratic potential. It was not, 
however, this mythic China that appealed to Roosevelt. He considered “relations with China 
to be one of utmost importance to this country” because it could be a bulwark against 
Anglo-Soviet expansion in the Far East. 99  More importantly, they would be a dependent 
vote in the victorious power directorate, at first the Big Four, later the UNO’s Executive 
Council. The President felt he would always have China’s vote in his pocket whenever he 
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needed it. As US Ambassador to China Charles Gauss wrote, “In the matter of world 
problems, China is disposed to follow our lead.”100 It was for this reason as well as the fact 
“the American Chiefs of Staff were convinced that support of China was essential to [US] 
security and [the] success of the Allied cause” that caused Roosevelt to spend much of the 
war promoting and propping up the Chinese Nationalist Government and their leader 
Chiang Kai-shek.101 From 1942 onwards, FDR focused on placing the Sino-American 
combination atop the anti-Axis coalition. The evolution of his postwar planning reflected 
this overriding concern. 
Besides being a dependent vote, the main role the Chinese were to play in FDR’s 
planning was leading the trusteeships for Southeast Asia. Through leading the region’s 
trusteeships, China would become “the principle stabilizing force in the Far East.”102 The 
President’s concept was different than the League of Nations’ mandates, which were 
controlled by a single power with no international oversight. Roosevelt’s trusteeship idea 
vacillated and is hard to define. Yet, they were always designed to “foster progress toward a 
higher standard of living” and “the right to independence,” declared Stettinius.103 
International control (a cover for US oversight) was the mechanism to make sure these goals 
were achieved. “There is no question in my mind that the old relationship ceased to exist 10 
or 20 years ago and that no substitute has yet been worked out except the American policy 
of eventual freedom for the Philippines,” contended the President.104 The “treatment of the 
Philippines” was the “desirable type of attitude toward dependent areas” and was the basis 
of the trusteeships.105  Also, “certain trusteeships to be exercised by the United Nations 
where stability of government for one reason or another cannot be at once assured” could 
provide structure temporarily, which FDR thought would be needed during the transitory 
period.106  
The President was working under the assumption “everything should have relation 
to [an] interim or emergency period of unspecified duration, during which permanent 
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structures could be shaped and built,” Churchill told Eden.107 FDR declared, “The central 
idea involve[d] a situation where there should be four policemen in the world – the United 
States, Britain, Russia and China – charged with the responsibility of keeping peace,” during 
the transition period, which later developed into the permanent members of the UNO’s 
Executive Council.108 If everything worked out as hoped, FDR would establish the 
International New Deal throughout the world during this period. 
The most influential member of Roosevelt’s cabinet in regards to postwar planning 
was the first wartime Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. “That Hull was a minor figure under 
Roosevelt is a myth without basis in fact,” emphasizes Gabriel Kolko.109 As Kimball states, 
“At Moscow,” the Premier wartime meeting for the Big Three’s diplomatic corps, “Hull 
represented not only his views on the questions of organizing the postwar world, he spoke 
for Franklin Roosevelt as well.”110 More importantly Roosevelt’s planning was based on 
postponement; however, the Secretary wanted agreements to be reached before the end of 
the war. His drive allowed the Americans to use their leverage at its greatest point. The 
decision to pursue their agenda earlier is Hull’s greatest legacy. His principle concern was 
establishing free-trade worldwide – the Americans’ commercial policy. 
During the war, Hull gave a number of speeches on how protectionism, especially in 
its extreme nationalistic form, was the root cause of WWII. In one such speech, he 
proclaimed, ‘Extreme nationalism must not again be permitted to express itself in excessive 
trade restrictions. Nondiscrimination in international commercial relations must be the 
rule.’111 Roosevelt was in agreement on the need for free trade. He declared, ‘The United 
States must continue its leadership in the preservation and promotion of liberal economic 
policies. Only through that leadership can this country fulfill its responsibility in the 
rebuilding of a world economy from the chaos into which it has been plunged by destructive 
trade restrictions.’112 The Secretary’s other goal was to produce a beneficial arrangement 
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between raw material countries and producing countries where the latter did not exploit the 
former, which aligned perfectly with Rooseveltian Noblesse Oblige.  
The British were the main impediment to the implementation of Hull’s concept of 
free trade due to England’s desire to uphold the Imperial preference. It was designed to 
benefit the nations inside the Empire by providing free trade inside the Empire and erecting 
tariffs on non-Empire goods. “[The] United States[’] policy of multilateralism and [the] 
United Kingdom[’s] policy of bilateralism were in conflict,” lamented the Secretary, “and the 
United States was the sufferer.”113 As Welles claimed, ‘the acceptance of the role of 
nondiscrimination’ through ending the ‘application of the most-favored-nation principle’ was 
needed for a ‘multilateral functioning of commercial operations.’114 Thus, only through the 
removal of the Imperial Preference could America’s version of free trade be established. The 
Imperial Preference and American free-trade would be at the forefront of the first major 
diplomatic issue of wartime diplomacy – Lend-Lease.  
Before discussing Lend-Lease, it is important to mention two other highly influential 
advisers – Harry Hopkins and Henry Morgenthau. Secretary Morgenthau was able to expand 
Treasury’s role in foreign affairs because of his close friendship with FDR. “Roosevelt was 
the older brother Morgenthau never had,” notes Bescheloss.115 As a result, noticed Grace 
Tully, the President’s personal secretary, “[Morgenthau] probably had more personal 
appointments with the Boss than any other Cabinet member.”116 He took the lead on 
monetary policy, which was the other side of the coin needed to implement FDR’s 
International New Deal. According to Treasury Official Harry Dexter White, America 
wanted to coordinate worldwide monetary policy to prevent ‘economic warfare’ and ‘foster 
sound monetary policies throughout the world.’117 The implementation of American 
monetary policy would reestablish a currency standard (foundation) so as to avoid the 
volatile currency swings endemic in the 1930s caused by purposeful or forced currency 
depreciation as the market collapsed and WWI reparations payments became untenable. The 
latter problem was heavily influential on the Treasury Department’s planning for postwar 
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Germany – the Morgenthau Plan. In 1942 and 1943 the State Department was the 
department in control of postwar planning, 1944 saw Treasury assume this role with their 
victory at Bretton Woods, until Morgenthau overreached with the his German plan, allowing 
State to reassert itself.   
Hopkins was FDR’s Molotov, a devoted mouthpiece who always toed the 
President’s line, constantly advancing his ideas and policies. “Roosevelt’s personal 
involvement in policy was often,” notes Kimball, “channeled through his closest adviser and 
aide, Harry Hopkins – a man who shared or accepted most of the President’s 
assumptions.”118 Along with Hopkins, Hull, and Morgenthau, FDR appointees Harriman, 
Stettinius, as well as the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS: George Marshall, Ernest 
King, Hap Arnold, and William Leahy) were the President’s closest advisors during his 
postwar planning. Though they would argue their points, they always deferred to Roosevelt. 
As Leahy points out, “There were two men at the top who really fought out and finally 
agreed on the major moves that led to victory. They were Franklin Roosevelt and Winston 
Churchill. They really ran the war. Of course, they had to have some people like us to help 
them, but we were just artisans building definite patterns of strategy from the rough 
blueprints handed to us by our respective Commander-in-Chiefs.”119 Thus, FDR, like 
Churchill and Stalin, was in complete control of American postwar planning up to and 
including Yalta. 
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Chapter Two: Unequal Partners 
A major factor that affects every aspect of a negotiation is the contracting parties’ 
standing – the status of a party vis-à-vis the other party(s) with whom it is negotiating. 
Obviously, greater standing leads to more leverage. However, leverage, or power, has other 
benefits. “[P]ower,” declares de Cremer and Pillutla, “is associated with a greater feeling of 
freedom” to maneuver and make deals because there exists “a sense that fewer obstacles are 
placed in [the party’s] way.”1 The British were unable to increase their standing in any 
meaningful way during the war. Once they realized the implications of their weaker position, 
Britain had to find a way to overcome the greater number of obstacles (lack of available 
options) they faced in comparison to their allies. 
In a wartime coalition, men and resources dictate the standing a country or group 
occupies inside said coalition. To ascertain the Big Three’s respective positions inside the 
Grand Alliance, it is necessary to determine who could place the most soldiers and supplies 
into the field. Quickly after the fall of France, the British realized that “our resources and 
strength [manpower],” wrote Churchill, “unaided will not be sufficient to produce a world-
result of a satisfactory and lasting character.”2 Sympathetic to their plight, the Roosevelt 
administration had tried throughout late 1939 and 1940 to aid the British cause.  Hopkins 
‘was impressed by the determination to resist,’ recalled Harriman, ‘but [was] appalled by their 
lack of means to do so.’3 Besides Britain’s internal lack of resources, arming England was 
hampered by America’s ineffective and detrimental neutrality legislation. In early 1941, 
however, the President concocted a scheme to add the full resources of the United States to 
the war effort: Lend-Lease.  
Lend-Lease 
Dubbed “An Act to Further Promote the Defense of the United States” and 
denoted H.R. 1776, once Lend-Lease passed, the Americans became the main supplier of 
Allied matériel. “[T]he obvious” reason for the bill was “to keep Britain in the war,” 
emphasizes Brand, but equally important, it helped the Americans become “the arsenal of 
                                                          
1.  De Cremer and Pillutla, 123.  
2.  Churchill, Roosevelt, and Kimball, 115.  
3.  Harriman and Abel, 12. 
 47 
democracy,” with the leverage and standing that entailed.4 Once the US took over as the 
main supplier, they permanently altered the balance of power within the anti-Axis coalition.  
Britain’s chief economist and lead economic negotiator John Maynard Keynes was 
worried about the effect of the bill on British geo-political standing. He feared “the fact that 
the distribution of effort between ourselves and our allies has been of this character” meant 
the Lend-Lease setup “leaves us far worse off, when the sources of assistance dry up, than if 
the roles had been reversed.”5  Recall, providing money and matériel was England’s 
traditional role in coalition warfare, granting them leverage inside the alliance and increasing 
their diplomatic options. In previous wars, their aid had made up for the fact that the island 
nation alone could not provide soldiers in the same numbers as their Continental allies. In 
this war, however, the British were desperate for supplies. They had accrued huge debts 
during the first two years of the war. Making matters worse, the Empire’s resource networks 
were shut down due to Axis pressure. Axis threats forced many colonial armies to stay in 
their colony, particularly in India, depriving Britain of these men while consuming much-
needed resources. Thus, the coalition dynamics changed in a manner unfavorable to the 
maintenance of their geo-political standing through England’s traditional means.   
While Roosevelt was using the analogy of lending a neighbor a hose to save his 
house, Hull wanted to make sure Lend-Lease would usher in his concepts of free trade 
(multilateralism). “The State Department,” remembered Halifax, “sees American economic 
collaboration with the rest of the world as an essential stabilizing feature in the post-war 
era,” i.e., the American belief that economic vitality was the basis for international security.6 
According to Welles, “International commerce can only fulfill this role effectively if it allows 
each nation to have normal access to the resources of the whole world.”7 They believed that 
the British Commonwealth system based on the Imperial Preference had blocked American 
business from lucrative markets and key resources. The Imperial system, according to Hull, 
was “the greatest injury that was done to this country in a commercial way.”8 It had, 
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however, sustained and expanded the vast trade networks that helped to maintain the 
Empire’s great power status during the chaos of the previous half-century.  
Differences over commercial (trade) policy remained a point of division between the 
parties throughout the war. The State Department felt “an essential condition” of the 
postwar economic system was “the full backing and partnership of Britain in any plans to 
prevent autocratical (sic) tendencies from reasserting themselves.”9 To induce the British to 
adhere to American policy, Hull made sure to include Article VII, “the elimination of all 
forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce,” in the Master Lend Lease 
Agreement. 10 This article was aimed directly at ending the Imperial Preference and to 
institute multilateralism. “Keynes knew that Article VII” was “an end to Imperial 
Preference,” notes Steil.11 Still, the British were in desperate need of supplies, increasing 
American leverage, and the negotiations were bilateral, eliminating the use of Britain’s 
preferred intra-coalition tactics – framing and acting as its intermediary.  
At first, the English were elated when news of the passage of Lend-Lease hit their 
shores. Churchill famously stated, “The lend and lease bill must be regarded, without 
question, as the most unsordid act in the whole of recorded history.”12 Furthermore, “once it 
was accepted,” he claimed, “it transformed immediately the whole position. It made us free 
to shape by agreement long-term plans of vast extent for all our needs.”13 However, once 
Whitehall realized what was to be included in the agreement, they began to push back.14  
The PM had “always been opposed or lukewarm to Imperial Preference,” having 
fought for free trade as an MP.15 The FO and Cabinet, on the other hand, were adamantly 
against any deal that removed the Imperial Preference. “I found the Cabinet at its second 
meeting on the subject,” Churchill cabled FDR, “even more resolved against trading the 
principle of Imperial Preference as a consideration for lease-lend.”16 They believed the policy 
was non-discriminatory.  Hull, however, “has never been willing to regard the Ottawa 
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Agreements (Imperial Preference) as a permanent exception to the rule” of 
nondiscrimination, bemoaned Halifax.17 They also realized its importance for the Empire. 
Thus, Keynes wanted the agreement to allow for the possibility of some trade regime as a 
mechanism to restart Britain’s economy. ‘My so strong reaction against the word 
‘discrimination,’ the economist told US diplomat, Dean Acheson, ‘is the result of my feeling 
so passionately that our hands must be free to make something new and better of the 
postwar world.’18 Churchill was able to overcome these objections, and the British did 
adhere to the Master Agreement. However, their adherence was based on a dubious 
understanding, the second such misinterpretation, which exposed how the PM willfully 
overlooked traditional Anglo-American differences during the early stages of the war.  
Prior to the Lend-Lease negotiations, the first postwar discussions took place at 
Placentia Bay. FDR and Churchill met and signed the Atlantic Charter, which “was an 
American effort to insure that Britain signed onto its liberal democratic war aims.”19 
Sherwood recalled, “The agreement that Churchill hoped for was definitely not the Atlantic 
Charter.”20 Included in the Charter was language that struck the PM as a way to “pry open 
the Empire.”21 He had reason to worry.  
The State Department, who wrote the charter, was trying to end colonialism, which 
they felt was part and parcel with the economic causes of WWII. FDR held the same view, 
“that if we are to arrive at a stable peace it must involve the development of backward 
countries,” which was the genesis of his trusteeship idea. At the meeting, Roosevelt told his 
son Elliott, ‘America won’t help England in this war simply so that she will be able to 
continue to ride roughshod over colonial peoples.’22 Yet, by the time the charter was 
formally issued, Churchill had come to believe the anti-colonial passages did not apply to the 
Empire. “We had in mind, primarily,” he told the Commons, “the states and nations of 
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Europe now under the Nazi yield,” not the “people’s which owe allegiance to the British 
crown.”23 Similarly, the PM came to believe Article VII also did not apply to them.  
“I did not agree to Article 7,” Churchill told the Commons, “without having 
previously obtained a definite assurance from the President” that we were not “committed 
to the abolishment of the Imperial Preference.”24 FDR led the PM to this belief, writing him, 
you believe we want to know “that Imperial Preference will be abolished. We are asking for 
no such commitment, and I can say that article 7 does not contain any such commitment.”25 
Eden was skeptical, believing correctly that this insinuation was a ruse. In both instances, the 
President had purposefully misled Churchill about his true intentions towards the Empire.  
The other argument that resonated with the pro-Imperial Preference faction was that 
a deal was necessary for American cooperation and supplies. This argument revealed 
England’s lesser standing in comparison to the US. Keynes’ decision was in line with his 
policy towards America, emphasizes Harbutt, which accepted “whatever sacrifice he had to 
make in his Washington negotiations, to yoke the United States firmly to Britain so that their 
future collaboration” would be assured.26 The economist was part of the camp that felt it 
was imperative to have American backing in the maintenance of the Empire for it to survive 
into the postwar. Keynes held out hope that America “would do the right thing by Britain in 
the end.”27 He was right, ultimately, but it would be a number of years until America found it 
in their interest to aid the British economy. Beforehand, Britain suffered its major wartime 
diplomatic defeat: the acceptance of American postwar commercial and monetary policy, 
which was anathema to the reestablishment of the Empire as it functioned prior to the war. 
The Anglo-American negotiations on these policies revolved around Britain’s attempts to 
recreate the Empire’s trade networks under the changing circumstances dictated by 
America’s – the superior party – economic preferences.    
The debate over commercial and monetary policy would continue throughout the 
remainder of the war. However, England had to deal exclusively with the Americans due to 
the British economist’s maneuvering and the skillful tag team of the State Department on 
commercial policy and the Treasury Department on monetary policy. As Keynes himself 
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acknowledged in regards to monetary policy in a letter to White, “When agreement has been 
reached” by “our two Governments” then “it shall be communicated” to the “important 
Governments of the United Nations.”28 The British, therefore, could not frame the 
discussion by entering into agreements with the Russians and were forced to choose from 
America’s options in trying to restart their war torn economy, especially the Empire’s trade 
networks.  
Britain’s first concession on the path to accepting American multilateralism was 
Article VII’s inclusion in the Master Agreement. After it was signed, Hull proudly declared, 
“[T]he foundation was now laid for all our later postwar planning in the economic field.”29 
Still, it would take the rest of the war for British to fully accept the tenets of Article VII, 
revealing that a deal is not finalized until it is implemented.30 
The Roosevelt administration was faced with another daunting task in trying to 
include Russia in Lend-Lease. Eventually, the President was able to include the Soviets but 
only after an exhausting administration full-court press. This effort was made because FDR 
deemed Russian shipments vital to both the war effort and to America’s bargaining position, 
as supplies were his main source of leverage with the Soviets. “Roosevelt’s basic objective,” 
according to Harriman, was to use “the wartime relationship to attempt to develop postwar 
agreements.”31 FDR hoped supplies could make up for American inability to quickly place 
large numbers of troops on the Continent. Under this policy, notes Robert Dallek, 
“Roosevelt demanded no concessions from the Russians for the aid because he believed the 
Red Army was the benefit received.”32 Thus, he could equalize Soviet-American standing, 
like supplies had leveled Anglo-French standing in previous wars. 
Convoys 
The major problem for Roosevelt’s plan was shipping. As he was well aware, ‘The 
meeting of the Russian protocol must have a first priority in shipping.’33 After the Nazi 
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conquests of 1940-1, the Germans closed off the two major routes – Baltic Straits and 
Eastern Mediterranean – into Russia. The German threat left open only three other routes. 
One route, Vladivostok, forced Allied shipping to go through Japanese waters. The Soviets 
had signed a neutrality pact with the Japanese so war matériel could not be shipped through 
this route without ending Soviet- Japanese neutrality. Another route, the Trans-Persian, was 
antiquated and took until 1943 to be fully operational. This meant during the first trying 
years of the war, a solitary route was viable for massive amounts of matériel to be delivered – 
the northern route.34 
The northern route started in Scotland, extended north of Scandinavia, and finished 
in the ports of Archangel and Murmansk. It was patrolled heavily by U-boats due to a 
German installation in northern Norway. Plus, being so far north, the route was also in 
perpetual daylight for months at a time. These factors had terrible repercussions. Many 
convoys were deemed infeasible by the Combined Chiefs of Staffs (CCS).35 In one such 
instance, Churchill cabled Stalin “Had it not been for the German concentration” of forces 
in northern Norway, we would have sent “you a convoy of thirty ships.”36 These suspensions 
infuriated the Russians who were deeply dependent on this matériel.   
Stalin sent this heated message to FDR, “I would like to emphasize the fact that at 
the present moment when the peoples of the Soviet Union and its armies are exerting all 
their powers” against “Hitler’s troops, the fulfillment of American deliveries” on time “is of 
the utmost importance.”37 The Russians “took the attitude that since they were doing all the 
fighting in Europe, Americans should contribute whatever was needed,” stated Bohlen, and 
non-fulfillment “was due to ill will.”38 As Gromyko proclaimed, “There were American 
politicians who wanted the Soviet Union and Germany to bleed each other white, clearly 
hoping the USA would be able to have the last word in settling the terms of the eventual 
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peace.”39 The ill will generated by the delays had a lasting impact on the Grand Alliance, 
especially Soviet-American relations. 
“The effect of making estimates which were not realistic was to deepen Soviet 
suspicion that the policy of the Western Allies was to bleed Russia white,” emphasized 
Bohlen.40 Roosevelt was clearly worried about Stalin’s suspicions when he sent this memo: 
“Frankly if I were a Russian I would feel that I had been given the run-around in the United 
States. Please get out the list and please, with my full authority use a heavy hand,” finishing 
with, “Step on it!”41 Each time shipments went undelivered or under-filled, the Soviets 
misgivings about Western intentions increased. Greater standing had a downside; the 
Russians were ready to assume the US, as the superior Western party, was willingly complicit 
with the attitude taken by the British in regards to the shipment delays.   
The Americans’ attempt to compensate for troops via supplies was undermined 
because the British felt no similar desire. ‘[O]ur past efforts to affect closer liaison with the 
Russians,’ lamented a frustrated Hopkins, ‘have always been sandbagged by the British.’42 
They took a harder line, believing that supplies were assistance from an ally, not a 
contractual obligation. The Marshal cabled Churchill fuming, ‘[Y]our statement that this 
intention to send northern convoys to the USSR is neither an obligation nor an agreement, 
but only a statement” that “can at any moment [be] renounce[d]” is unacceptable.43 The 
decisions about convoys/supplies were delivered to Stalin personally by Churchill at the 
Second Moscow Conference (Aug. 12-17, 1942), as well as the decisions about the second 
front and Operation Torch (discussed momentarily). 
The PM had used his role as the intermediary to make it seem to Stalin that 
shipments would be sent when feasible, as he desired, not at whatever cost as Roosevelt 
wished. This framing meant the Americans would not gain the leverage from supplies they 
had hoped to acquire. This result was not Churchill’s intention, simply an outcome of the 
process. The President, worried about being lumped in with the British, sent this memo to 
Morgenthau, “I do not want to be in the same position as the English … Every promise the 
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English have made to the Russians, they have fallen down on.”44 The first sets of shipments 
were under-filled, and it is important to note this before considering the next negotiations – 
the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942. 
Anglo-Soviet Treaty 
The Soviets were the first to put forth their initial position, typical of the senior 
party. Their proposal included three points: acceptance of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 
boundaries, a landing on the Continent in the fall of 1942, and a twenty-year defensive pact. 
The first two positions were seen as unacceptable to the British. The expeditionary force was 
deemed impossible. As Churchill told FDR, “No responsible British military authority has so 
far been able to make a plan for September 1942 which had any chance of success.”45 
However, the more contentious issue at the time was the first position, the acceptance of 
territorial changes before the end of the war. 
Worried about a repeat of WWI, when secret treaties had adversely affected the 
peace settlement at Versailles, Roosevelt had made sure the PM understood adherence to the 
Atlantic Charter meant no territorial changes prior to the peace conference. Churchill and 
the pro-American camp were adamant in upholding this pledge to the US. Cadogan 
highlighted this belief, “We shall make a mistake if we press the Americans to depart from 
principles, and a howler if we do it without them.” Eden, nevertheless, was “quite prepared 
to throw to the winds all principles, lamented Cadogan.”46 The Foreign Secretary “feared,” 
observes Eubanks, “that a refusal of Stalin’s frontier demands could eventually mean the end 
of all prospects of Soviet cooperation.”47 This is the first time the Eden’s desires 
contradicted Churchill’s strategy. Still, the Americans’ stance was so adamant and relations 
too important; Eden conceded to the Cabinet’s wishes. As Cadogan happily claimed, “Glad 
to find [Eden] realizes we can at least go no further, and [it is] no use haggling.”48 Plus, the 
Anglo-American understanding on boundaries gave the British cover when discussing the 
issue with the Russians.  
                                                          
44.  J.M. Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970), 248. FDR 
quoted. 
45.  Churchill, Roosevelt, and Kimball, 515.  
46.  Cadogan and Dilks, 437.  
47.  Eubanks, 37.  
48.  Cadogan and Dilks, 449.  
 55 
Eden traveled to Moscow in December 1941 to negotiate the treaty. The positions 
he put forth did not please the Russians. Molotov related the nature of the relations at the 
time, ‘When Eden visited us Stalin constantly wounded his vanity, taunting him that he could 
not resolve the territorial question on his own.’49 The Foreign Secretary left with the treaty 
unsigned. The Russians felt empowered enough at the time, due to forestalling Operation 
Barbarossa (the Nazis’ initial invasion), to push for acceptance of all of their positions. They 
held that even a futile effort on the Continent would help ease the pressure on the Eastern 
front. Plus, “We had never officially renounced for all time the territories that were 
temporarily part of the Polish state,” declared Khrushchev.50 Therefore, they assumed these 
boundary changes did not violate the Atlantic Charter. Both sides knew they needed each 
other, and this kept the negotiations alive. Molotov traveled to London the following May, 
with both parties hoping to come to a satisfactory conclusion.  
When the Foreign Commissar arrived in London, the Cabinet had hardened in their 
position against an expeditionary force in 1942 and that any territorial decisions should be 
included in the treaty. “If Mr. Molotov, on arrival, proves unwilling to meet us on the above 
two points, it will, I believe, be of little use to embark upon prolonged discussion of 
alternative formulae for getting over the difficulty,” declared Cadogan.51 Why the Russians 
ultimately accepted a mutual defense pact and not their other two points is often 
misunderstood. 
Molotov signed the treaty, with only a defensive pact, upon his arrival in London 
(May 26, 1942). It is commonplace to argue that the Russian’s decision was a result of an 
offer from Roosevelt. Prior to the diplomat’s departure for London, FDR had written Stalin 
that he wanted to have the Foreign Commissar visit to discuss “a military matter of grave 
importance,” a clear hint about a second front.52 With this knowledge in his back pocket, 
Molotov thought he might travel to Washington and obtain a better decision on the second 
front and force Britain’s hand. 
The second front is the name given to the Anglo-American landing in Western 
France (Operation Overlord), on June 6, 1944. “The main problem,” stated Maisky, 
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“dominating all other diplomatic questions” through the fall of 1943 “was that of a second 
front.”53 The Americans were far less reluctant to embark on a second front in 1942, partly 
because before 1944 the British would supply more men. FDR, however, primarily believed 
“that if such a front does not materialize quickly, and on a large scale, [the Russians] will be 
so deluded in their belief in our sincerity of purpose … that inestimable harm will be done to 
the cause of the United Nations.’54  
 Many historians and Soviet officials contend that during Molotov’s meeting, 
Roosevelt and/or Hopkins insinuated that a second front would be opened in 1942. This 
insinuation is cited as the reason the Foreign Commissar was content with only a defensive 
pact with the British. However, what Roosevelt actually put forth was a symbolic gesture – a 
statement of intentions, not an obligatory act. Molotov later stated Stalin and he 
“understood it was impossible.” Still, they “needed that paper agreement! It was of great 
importance for the people, for politics, and for future pressure on the Allies.”55 The Soviets 
used shaming techniques to put additional pressure on their Allies. Maisky learned that if he 
brought up the second front before a matériel request, it was fulfilled more quickly and 
completely. He passed this up the ladder.56  
It must be noted, Churchill felt the need upon Molotov’s arrival back in London to 
hand him an aide-memoire detailing why the CCS believed it was impossible to launch the 
second front in 1942. This action and Roosevelt’s gesture are the source of the confusion 
over what caused the Russians to sign only a defensive pact. Nevertheless, the actual reason 
was the events on the Eastern Front in the winter of 1941-42, exposed by the signing of the 
treaty before Molotov left for Washington. It would have been tactically more astute to have 
secured American commitment prior to signing the treaty; Molotov was returning to London 
after his meeting in Washington. 
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Barbarossa is correctly portrayed as an overreach. However, it was not the overreach 
that Napoleon had made to which it is so often analogized.57 Under the defense by depth 
policy, the Red Army planned to break down the invading force through attrition. The main 
mechanism for this policy was counter offensives, which were to take place after the initial 
thrust was repulsed. The Russians did not have the same success in 1941 with their counter 
offensives as they had in the Napoleonic Wars. As Stalin told the people, despite the winter 
counter attacks, “The Germans were nevertheless able to take the initiative in military 
operations this year,” something that the Grande Armée could not have done in 1813.58 
Consequently, they knew the German offensive in 1942 would be larger than anticipated in 
the winter of 1941-2, when the defense by depth policy seemed to be working. Thus, the 
Soviets were more intransigent about their desired inclusions in the treaty earlier in its 
formation than in May and June of 1942.  
Molotov remembered, “[W]hen we dropped our demand,” it “was of course 
necessary at the time – they were astonished.”59 It was the Nazi 1942 summer offensive, 
which coincided with Molotov’s London and Washington trips (May-June 1942), that caused 
the evolution of the Russian position. “The Soviets agreed to postponement of the territorial 
concessions” due to “a sudden reverse of their military fortunes,” relates Craig.60 “The 
Russian counterattacks had not driven [the Nazis] out of the important road and railways” of 
the USSR, noted the official British historian.61 Amidst the setbacks, the Soviets were wary 
of doing anything that could affect their supplies, such as taking a hard-line stance over 
inclusion of territorial demands. As Maisky told Eden, “his Government knew that the 
moment the weather improved they would be engaged in intense hostilities … Therefore, 
any equipment which reached them before the campaigning season would be especially 
                                                          
57.  Stoler, 51-2 and Zubok, Failed Empire, 6-9. American Mark Stoler and Russian Vlad Zubok are just two of a 
number of modern scholars who also question the validity of analogizing Napoleon’s and Hitler’s invasions. 
The former does so to give a better assessment of the battles on the Eastern Front, whereas Zubok makes a 
similar claim to the one made above. 
58.  Joseph Stalin, The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 61. November 
8, 1942 Stalin’s October Revolution Speech (Russians calendars were not in-sync with Western ones at the 
time. The October Revolution actually took place in November). 
59.  Chuev, 42.  
60.  Craig, 190. 
61.  Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War 2, 3d ed. (London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationary Office, 1971), Vol. II, 256 and Max Hastings, Inferno (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011), 294. 
Furthermore, “The New Year (1942) offensive … petered out even before the spring thaw arrested 
movement,” notes Hastings. As a result the Nazis broke into the Crimea, just one week before the treaty was 
signed.   
 58 
welcome.”62 Since the Americans, the main supplier, were against territorial demands, 
coupled with Britain framing it as a joint stance, the treaty was only a mutual defense pact.  
Eden misinterpreted what facilitated Molotov’s position change. He falsely 
concluded that the Russians, with patience, could make arrangements with him amenable to 
all parties concerned and that “no ill effects seemed to have been produced by the” refusal 
“to commit Great Britain to the Russians demands.”63  Eden told the Commons, “I attach 
such importance to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty” because it revealed the possibility of an Anglo-
Soviet understanding.64 His belief in a workable understanding with the Russian guided his 
actions at the Moscow Minister’s Meeting.65 
Second Front 
Just because the issue of the second front was left in abeyance during the treaty does 
not mean it shrank from the scene. Stalin and his military leaders believed “the chief reason 
for the Germans tactical successes on our front (in 1942) [was] the absence of a second front 
in Europe [that] enabled them to transfer to our front all their available reserves and to 
create a big superiority of forces.”66 The second front remains one of the most hotly debated 
aspects of the war. Whether it could have been opened prior to June 1944 has been debated 
since the Nazis launched Barbarossa. That discussion is far too complex for this work to 
offer a proper analysis of it. What is important is the effect it had on the evolution of WWII 
postwar planning negotiations. 
Each of the Big Three had their own ideas about the second front, influenced by 
their leaders’ beliefs regarding their countries’ national interests. The British were reluctant 
to launch a premature invasion. They feared the “price we had had to pay in human life and 
blood for the great offensives of the First World War.”67 Churchill constantly pushed for a 
Balkan foray instead or at the cost of the Western European invasion. Many have argued 
about whether his intransigence was purely military. As FDR told his son, ‘Whenever the 
P.M. argued for [an] invasion through the Balkans, it was quite obvious … what he really 
meant … he was anxious to knife up into Central Europe, in order to keep the Red Army 
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out of Austria and Rumania, even Hungary, if possible.’68 Military considerations were more 
than likely the chief concern; however, political considerations must have been in Churchill’s 
mind as well.  As Carl von Clausewitz famously stated, “War is merely the continuation of 
politics by other means.” 
The Russians felt, especially in 1943, that the West could launch an expeditionary 
force but were holding back for ulterior reasons. Stalin told his confidants, “The Allies felt 
insufficiently prepared to open a second front,” and he added that “they were really not 
interested in the swift defeat of Hitler because they were afraid of the Red Army.”69 The 
second front was his test of Western intentions towards the Soviet Union. For Churchill’s 
Balkan strategy was seen, relates Stoler, as “relegating to the Soviet Union the brutal task of 
fighting the bulk of the Wehrmacht while London reaped political benefits in the eastern 
Mediterranean and Balkans, an area of historic Anglo-Russian rivalry.”70 The Marshal told 
Roosevelt the lack of “a second front in France causes me concern, which I cannot help 
expressing.”71 Each delay further heightened his suspicions of the West because the manner 
in which the PM had presented the decision over when to launch the invasion. Instead of a 
reluctant choice by FDR based on exigent circumstances, Churchill presented this decision 
as a jointly held Western position over when to launch the invasion during his meeting with 
Stalin at Moscow.    
The Americans wanted the second front opened as quickly as possible; however, 
other factors were at play greater than just the desire to launch the invasion. These aspects 
reveal how seemingly disparate issues can reduce options and contextualize those choices, in 
a way looking at a singular decision such as whether to open the second front in 1943, could 
not incorporate. Three issues need to be understood when discerning why America’s second 
front planning seemed chaotic: the setup of the Big Three’s military planning, troop numbers 
vis-à-vis the British in Europe, and the war in the Pacific.  
Tripartite negotiations by their very nature try to take on a bilateral form – its 
process – that further helps the method of framing. Recall, even with “the presence of 
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several parties,” a negotiation wants to “become bilateral encounters.”72 This process is 
demonstrated by the planning divisions on the military side of the Grand Alliance. A single 
Allied command did not coordinate nor direct the entire war. Instead, the Anglo-American 
CCS and a separate Soviet High Command existed. Soviet and American joint pressure, like 
at Teheran, could have limited British options and possibly opened the second front earlier. 
However, Britain was able to use the bilateral Anglo-American military discussions, their 
initial superior troop numbers, and the momentum of earlier choices to limit American 
options, delaying the second front with a focus on the Mediterranean.  
Churchill had been able to obtain a fair hearing for his Mediterranean schemes 
because prior to 1944, “the operation (Overlord) would have to be almost entirely British,” 
which the PM concluded meant until such point “the enterprise was therefore one on which 
British Staff opinion would naturally prevail.”73 The Americans being the main suppliers, 
though, mitigated British ability to assume complete control. It was not until after D-Day 
that the Americans surpassed British troops in the European field. Churchill takes time to 
mention this event in his memoirs, further demonstrating the impact of soldiers on standing. 
“We now passed the day … when for the first time… the great American armies[’]” 
numbers were “greater than our own.” He further noted, “Influence on Allied operations is 
usually increased by large reinforcements.”74 The stationing of American troops in England, 
in preparation for D-Day, revealed this outcome was preordained. 
At the First Québec Conference (Aug. 17-24, 1943; Québec I), the Americans took 
over as they made their first forceful push for D-Day in 1944. These decisions laid the 
foundations for the second front discussions at Cairo and Teheran. Québec I began the 
British decline to the junior partner in Anglo-American military endeavors.  
In the Pacific, the situation was different. The Americans, after Pearl Harbor, took 
the lead as the main fighting force. Politically and militarily, the quick defeat of Japan was in 
the interest of American planners. A desire for vengeance coupled with traditional American 
East Asian aspirations gave voice to a constant cry for a Pacific instead of a European focus 
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to the war. Many Americans saw opportunities in the Pacific, such as new markets, they did 
not see in Europe. A vast majority of the administration’s critics held this view. 75  
Roosevelt was always adamantly a Europe-first backer, but in the early days of the 
war when setbacks seemed so numerous, it was hard to ignore the Pacific-first supporters. 
An early second front, assuming victory, would help silence these critics, most importantly 
the administration’s ally Admiral King and their chief antagonist General MacArthur.76 It 
was in this vein that Roosevelt had sent his letter to Stalin requesting Molotov visit during 
the Anglo-Soviet Treaty negotiations. Due to similar thinking, when 1942 was deemed 
impossible for a second front, the President altered his thinking and bought into Churchill’s 
idea for an invasion of North Africa – Operation Torch. Thus, Roosevelt was forced to 
choose from a reduced set of options dictated by the momentum of events and the British 
desire to focus on the Mediterranean. 
Operation Torch and the Free French 
Operation Torch was launched in November 1942. By January 1943, the West held a 
firm grasp on the North African coast. With their success, a whole host of new problems 
greeted them, based on what to do with a defeated foe and the administration of liberated 
territory. Actions deemed necessary to a successful operation triggered Russian fears that the 
West might make a separate peace with Germany. Recall, “[U]nderlying Soviet fears was a 
belief that in important matters the capitalist nations would join despite their rivalries, to 
preserve the economic system.”77  
When planning the invasion of North Africa, the CCS decided they needed help 
from the Vichy regime. Vichy is the name given to the Nazis’ puppet regime in France 
during WWII. The Roosevelt administration had “continued relations with the Government 
at Vichy solely for the advantages derived from having representatives in Vichy France, 
French Africa, and elsewhere,” Hull told Halifax.78 Leahy (along with the influential Col. 
Robert Murphy) was able to persuade the Vichy Admiral, Jean Darlan, and other 
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opportunistic or anti-German members of the regime to not impede Torch.79 This policy 
was successful. “[I]f the French had put up any real resistance the landing could not have 
been carried out,” declared Alanbrooke80 In doing so, however, they granted Darlan 
administrative powers over North Africa under the aegis of the Allied Commander. This was 
troublesome because the admiral was seen as a quisling, a term derived from the name of the 
Norwegian general who ruled the country as Hitler’s crony.  
Stalin outwardly supported Roosevelt, telling him, “I think it a great achievement 
that you succeeded in bringing Darlan and others into the war” on the Allied side. 81 Still, the 
President knew the deal was problematic. Even after Darlan’s assassination ended the 
controversy surrounding him, questions still arose about whether the West would, in an 
effort to speed up victory, continue to make deals with fascists. With Britain’s successful use 
of the negotiational process to limit American military options and their framing of the 
delays in shipments as reflecting a Western stance on the terms of Lend-Lease, another 
suspicious maneuver might wreck any prospects FDR had of winning over Stalin.  
FDR devised a solution he believed addressed the problem of dealing with defeated 
foes – unconditional surrender. He drew on a confused analogy that “[t]he story of Lee’s 
surrender to Grant is the best illustration” of surrender terms. 82 At Fort Donaldson, during 
the American Civil War, General U.S. Grant had demanded from his former West Point 
friend unconditional surrender when he asked for terms.83 Instead, at Appomattox, Grant 
had asked for Robert E. Lee’s surrender, and once acquired, he granted Lee and his men a 
number of concessions, the key being after the surrender. FDR confused these two events 
and combined them into one amalgamation. He used this as the explanation for what 
unconditional surrender would entail.84 Plainly stated, once a defeated foe surrendered 
unconditionally, the Allies would be magnanimous in their peace terms. It was hoped that 
this would forestall a similar end to WWII as had taken place after the Great War.  
                                                          
79.  Leahy was the US Ambassador to Vichy until diplomatic ties were severed in May 1942, whereupon he was 
appointed the Chairman of the JCS. 
80.  Alanbrooke, 367. 
81.  Roosevelt and Schlesinger, My Dear Mr. Stalin, 104. 
82.  Roosevelt, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1485-86.  
83.  Public Domain, Unconditional Surrender Grant, 1854, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YB8KapC6y6o, 
accessed 3/17/2014. Due to this famous proclamation and the lucky happenstance of his first two initials, the 
General became known as “Unconditional Surrender” Grant; it even became a wartime song. 
84.  Kimball, Juggler, 76-77.  
 63 
The administration believed after WWI, “[t]he German people were sure that they 
had not been defeated by Allied military might.” Instead, they lost “because of the 
breakdown of morale within their own borders.”85 Only unconditional surrender would 
make sure to imprint defeat on the German mind. Also, FDR felt, “It could serve to offset 
the mistrust created by the deal with Darlan,” related Hebert Feis, “by inferring no other 
deals of the kind would be considered.”86 The policy was “a promise to the USSR that the 
Anglo-Americans would fight to the end and not negotiate with Germany,” emphasizes 
Kimball.87 Still, the fear of a separate peace never left the Russians’ minds. Even “the 
slightest hint of tampering with [the policy] threw Stalin into a rage,” observes Gellately, 
which was exposed during in the Italian surrender discussions (detailed momentarily).88  
Following Darlan’s assassination, a power vacuum was created on the French side of 
the administration of North Africa. It was Churchill’s hope that this opening would give him 
a chance to foster better relations between FDR and the Free French. The Free French were 
the resistance movement formed after the fall of France by the officers and men who had 
escaped the Nazi occupation. They reconstituted themselves in the French overseas empire 
and quickly consolidated around General Charles de Gaulle. Unfortunately, he was a flawed 
leader. His arrogance and hubris angered friend and foe alike. As Alanbrooke bemoaned, de 
Gaulle “had the mentality of a dictator combined with a most objectionable personality.”89 
Early in the war he ran afoul of the administration when the Free French invaded Vichy-held 
islands off the Newfoundland coast. “Comparatively unimportant though the islands were,” 
Hull irritably recalled, “their forcible occupation by the Free French was greatly 
embarrassing to us.” He fumed “many months spent carefully developing closer and 
substantial relations” with the Vichy regime were put in jeopardy.90  At Casablanca (Jan. 14-
24, 1943), Churchill wanted de Gaulle and the President to sit down to see if they could 
work past their differences.  
The FDR-de Gaulle meeting, though successful in that it created a new 
administrative regime, did not achieve the reconciliation between the two men that Churchill 
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had hoped. “I could, I think, have made a good arrangement at Casablanca,” he told the 
Commons, “but, as my colleagues know, this was frustrated by the preposterous conduct of 
General de Gaulle.”91 Roosevelt left the meeting with the conviction, “de Gaulle is out to 
achieve a one-man government in France,” and “I can’t imagine a man I would distrust 
more.”92 Conversely, “As for the future,” de Gaulle lamented, “[t]he President was anything 
but convinced of the rebirth and renewal of our regime.”93 These differences would 
undergird Franco-American relations for the remainder of the war. Roosevelt would never 
change his opinion of the general, but his thoughts on France’s role in the postwar world did 
evolve, and it is important to take note of when and why as this work progresses. 
Operation Torch ultimately led to a precedent, unconditional surrender, which 
resonated into the postwar. Similarly, three other major contests – Stalingrad, Kursk, and 
Italy – took place prior to the fateful conferences of 1943 that set enduring precedents. 
Stalingrad and Kursk 
The city of Stalingrad was not nearly as important as the cities of Leningrad, Kiev, 
and especially Moscow. Still, the city’s symbolic value was immeasurable having been named 
after the Russian ruler. In planning for their 1942 invasions, the Nazis deemed Stalingrad a 
secondary target. However, it became the turning point of the European war because of 
Hitler’s decision not to allow his army to retreat from the city, but more importantly due to 
the bravery of the people of Stalingrad. These men and women held the city, and because of 
their heroics, the Nazis’ Eastern invasion was broken, as the German’s elite 6th Army was 
decimated and eventually submitted to encirclement. Afterwards, the Nazis did not possess a 
force capable of breaking into the Russian heartland.94 
Prior to Stalingrad, many in the West “believed that the war would weaken the Soviet 
state,” noted Berezkov, to the benefit of “Britain and the United States.”95 After Stalingrad, 
this thinking began to dissipate. With the victory, the Red Army finally initiated the full-scale 
counter offensives called for under the defense by depth policy. It was also due to Stalingrad 
that Stalin felt secure enough to close the Comintern, which further exposed the security and 
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prestige this battle granted the Soviet state.96 As was common of his actions, the Marshal had 
ulterior motives as well. “Dissolving the Comintern would strengthen the national 
[communist] parties,” reveals Gellately, because “they could no longer be accused of being 
‘agents of a foreign power.’”97 Still, “Although the Russians realize that they are now 
accepted as a powerful world power, they are still suspicious of the underlying attitude of 
most nations towards them,” noted Harriman.98 The interplay between their fears and 
newfound power would be a mainstay in Russian postwar planning moving forward. 
As the Red Army pushed forward, they were able to drive the Germans out of 
Russia and into the Ukraine, where the next major fight on the Eastern front – the Battle of 
Kursk – was held. The Red Army’s forward thrust around Kursk, a large open plain, created 
what is known as a salient, a protruding area in the military front into the opposing side’s 
perimeter with the enemy on three sides of this front. The Germans hoped to capitalize on 
this ability to attack from three directions at once and to employ their favorite tactic – 
encirclement. The Russians were able to turn the tables, however, and after what is generally 
referred to as the greatest tank battle in history, it was the Germans who were encircled on 
the plains of Kursk. The battle destroyed the offensive striking power of the Wehrmacht. 
The Nazis’ overextended resources could not rebuild these lost forces.99  
After the battle, “[I]t was almost inevitable,” observes Reynolds “that [the Russians] 
would end up deep in Eastern Europe” and most likely Central Europe, as well as the 
Balkans.100 As the liberators of Eastern Europe, they would control the region’s transition to 
peace. After the battles the Russians were a great power. “The massive scale of these 
events,” relates Gellately, “made Stalin more willing to meet the Western leaders.”101 
Churchill felt the same way. “The advance of the Soviet Armies … made it urgent to come 
to a political arrangement with the Russians about those regions.”102 Herein lies the impetus 
for the meetings in the fall of 1943. 
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Italian Surrender Precedent 
In September 1943, just one month before the start of Cairo and Teheran, the 
Anglo-Americans achieved their greatest military success to date when the Italians ousted 
Mussolini and surrendered to the Allies. The Italian’s capitulation improved the military 
situation, but it increased the political headaches, as another power vacuum was created. 
From this vacuum, each of the Allies wanted a government to emerge that followed their 
political system. Slowly over the next year, groups formed that represented what each ally 
wanted – Churchill’s monarchy, Roosevelt’s liberals, and Stalin’s communists. 
Churchill wanted to see King Victor Emmanuel III returned to power. He told the 
British Representative in Italy, Harold McMillan, “Be careful that nothing is done to make 
the King and Badoglio weaker than they are. On the contrary, we must hold them up and 
carry them forward with our armies.”103 The PM achieved initial success when, in a bilateral 
understanding, Roosevelt acquiesced to the first post-surrender government being created 
under the direction of the King. The Badoglio government, named for the Italian cabinet’s 
PM, was the arrangement Churchill hoped would survive into the postwar. He, like FDR and 
Stalin, realized the initial postwar governance style would have advantage over the other 
possibilities. However, they did not want this government to last. The Americans are, noted 
Halifax, “irritated with the Prime Minister’s leaning towards Badoglio-Victor Emmanuel 
regime.”104 Anglo-American bickering provided an opening for Stalin to insert himself into 
the Italian debate. 
Motivated by a desire for greater prestige, vengeance against a defeated foe, and fear 
of a separate Western peace, Stalin forcefully included the Russians into the discussions on 
the formation of the new Italian government. “The Soviet Union received information about 
the results of the agreements between the two countries just as a passive third observer. I 
have to tell you that it is impossible to tolerate such a situation any longer.”105 The Italian 
Communist Party was one of the strongest communist parties in all of Europe. The leaders 
of the party, who had spent a number of years in Moscow, were known to Stalin 
personally.106 These two facts gave Stalin leverage in the discussions over the future Italian 
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government, especially since the communists were more numerous in the north where major 
fighting was still taking place. The Soviet leader played his hand well and forced the reluctant 
Western allies to bring him into consultation instead of merely being informed about the 
situation.  
Italy was in the Anglo-American military sphere, and the conquest of Italy was 
primarily an Anglo-American endeavor.107 In their view, this meant that they alone would 
deal with the interim government in Italy and in particular its makeup. Churchill felt, 
proclaims Sainsbury, “The Allies could not tolerate a ‘Soviet Veto’ on Eisenhower’s 
control.”108 Under the argument that controlling the interim government in Italy was 
militarily significant, the West believed that they should decide who formed the new 
government. The PM was particularly in favor of this view because Britain was taking over 
the Italian command. After Eisenhower transitioned to Overlord command, British General 
Alexander would assume control over the Mediterranean theater. Thus, Italy “was a British-
led military theater” and “Churchill and the Foreign Office took up [a] proprietary view” of 
the country, contends Harbutt.109  
Stalin accepted the lesser role in Italy but not without taking account of the 
precedent set. “The Anglo-American stance on the Italian occupation backfired,” according 
to Geoffrey Roberts, because “it established a precedent for occupation regimes in the Axis 
countries of Eastern Europe.”110 As the FO feared, “The Declaration at Moscow on Italy 
[the Italian surrender precedent], which originated with the Soviet Government, may be 
taken as an indication of Soviet desires elsewhere … they have drawn a distinction between 
the countries to the east of Germany, which they consider should” follow their lead and “the 
countries of Western Europe who should” be “led by Great Britain.”111 Later the State 
Department noted, “The Commission [in Romanian and Bulgaria] are organized on the 
same general pattern as the Allied Commission in Italy, with Russia playing the leading role 
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which Great Britain and the United States have in Italy.”112 Due to this precedent pushed by 
the British and written by the Soviets, the West conceded input on the formation of 
provisional governments in Eastern Europe. These provisional governments were the basis 
of the countries’ postwar governments, thus allowing the Russian to establish their 
“friendly” governments in the territories surrounding their Western perimeter. 113 
Besides, the use of similar terminology Stalin’s actions in early 1944 revealed an 
implicit Anglo-Soviet understanding on European affairs that would lead to the percentage 
deal. As part of his larger game plan the Soviet leader recognized Badoglio’s Government in 
March of 1944. “[T]he Russian action was advantageous to us in relation to our policy of 
retaining the King and Marshal Badoglio until the occupation of Rome.”114 Britain was a 
greater obstacle to his plans in Europe than the US. Similar to the Marshal’s later use of 
Greek communists as a check to maintain British adherence to the percentage deal by 
recognizing their preferred Italian government, Stalin could thereafter threaten the Italian 
arrangement with local communists if England tried to block his use of the same precedent 
in Eastern Europe. “The objective of Stalin’s diplomacy … was to trade off Soviet 
concessions,” notes Miller, “over Italy [and later Greece] for Western recognition of the 
emerging Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.”115 As 1944 unfolds, it became more 
and more in Britain’s interest to not interfere with Russian actions in the countries on the 
USSR’s border. With the US displaying little concern for the region, the foundation of 
Stalin’s security ring was taking shape.  
Standing 
In the description of how tripartite negotiations unfold, it was indicated that 
negotiations tend to have an ebb and flow. Negotiations are not linear in that everything 
flows to the final endpoint. Instead, a country’s standing can wax and wane amidst the 
lifespan of a coalition, even if ultimately they are moving in one direction. British standing 
eroded throughout 1942-1943, but at points, their standing actually improved, such as when 
Britain took the lead in Italy and placed the King back in power. Standing inside the Grand 
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Alliance continued to be fluid throughout the remainder of the war, though the British were 
always the junior partner.  
A recent work by David Edgerton argues “that Britain was a first-class power” 
during the war.116 He makes a convincing case, yet it is not important whether statistics 
placed them in this position but rather if they were perceived to hold this position. Though it 
is “useful” to look at “objective reality,” relates Fischer and Ury, “ultimately the reality as 
each side sees it” is what is important “in a negotiation.”117 As Halifax lamented, “[T]he 
concept has steadily gained ground in this country that Great Britain has come to occupy a 
position on the world stage which in terms of power and influence is inferior to that of the 
United States and the USSR.”118 Churchill also felt this loss of standing. As Alanbrooke 
noted at Cairo, the PM was upset “since the strength of the American forces were now 
building up fast and exceeding ours. He hated having to give up the position of dominant 
partner” in military matters.119 Thus, the negotiational reality was that Britain was the junior 
partner, in all matters, by the time the vast majority of the decisions affecting the postwar 
world started to take place – the conferences of 1943. 
It is harder to assess the standing between the Russians and Americans. This 
assessment is made more difficult because the Russians based their thinking about standing 
on military prowess. The Americans, on the other hand, saw it through an economic lens. 
“[C]ommonly the parties” have “different interpretations or perceptions of the same facts,” 
observes Mnookin.120 (For the record, the British took a third view and felt geo-political 
aptitude defined a country’s position in the world.)  
The Russian superiority in troops gave them the top slot amongst the Big Three. 
However, the Red Army could only fight with supplies from the Americans.121 Still, after 
1943 the Russians became less dependent on American aid, ironically at the moment that 
shipments were finally being fully delivered. The best way to view Soviet and American 
standing, therefore, is to think of them as 1 (the Russians) and 1a (the Americans), superior 
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to the British but with a distinct advantage for the Soviets. They were dependent on either 
soldiers or supplies that the other possessed but the Americans more so and the Russians 
less so as the war progressed. With anger, not credit, accrued from the first years of 
supplying aid due to Britain’s maneuvering, the leverage amassed by the Americans was far 
less than Roosevelt had hoped to achieve.  
The disparity between the two parties increased before Yalta, especially after China 
failed to be a viable military force in East Asia. Their military failure caused the Americans to 
look to the Red Army for help clearing the Japanese out of Manchuria (detailed in Chapter 4, 
China’s Fall). America’s need for Russian participation in the Pacific meant a clear separation 
in standing existed amongst the countries. The Russian dependency on supplies, however, 
kept them from being in a superior position to the Americans as they were to the British (or 
as the US was to the UK). Standing will be discussed only slightly throughout the rest of the 
work; however, it is important to take note of a country’s ability to place soldiers and 
supplies into the field moving forward, since these two aspects would remain the defining 
factor that dictated the amount of say a Big Three member possessed. 
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Chapter Three: Divergent Visions 
Prior to the conferences of 1943 – Moscow, Cairo I & II, Teheran – Halifax filed a 
report on the attitudes prevalent inside the Roosevelt administration. He noted many US 
officials feared “that the British Government entertain[s] a desire to mediate between Russia 
and the United States. This was interpreted in some quarters as an attempt by Britain to 
recreate her traditional position as the manipulator of the balance of power between Russia 
and the United States as formerly between France and Germany.”1 By acting as an 
intermediary and framing a number of their positions as joint positions between them and 
one of the senior parties, Britain had protected most of their interests, to this point, in spite 
of challenging circumstances. Important British trade routes in the Mediterranean were being 
cleared of Axis troops, British soldiers were saved by the postponement of the second front, 
the delays in the shipments protected Britain’s vital shipping, and a pro-British government 
was establishment in Italy – all beneficial to the reestablishment of the Empire as it was set 
up in the interwar period.  
The Russians were forced to accept convoys being sent when feasible, as Churchill 
desired, which protected Britain’s vital shipping that was needed to move the men and 
resources from the Empire to England. Roosevelt desired that these shipments be sent at all 
cost to better Soviet-American relations, since this was what Stalin demanded. The PM who 
delivered the message about convoys to the Soviets – acted as the intermediary – was able to 
define these conditions, therefore framing the Western stance. Similarly, Stalin had no choice 
but to accept the Mediterranean focus of the Western Allies’ military strategy in 1942-3 
because Britain had reached a bilateral understanding with the Americans. The 
understanding had come about through Britain’s use of the exigent military circumstances 
and the momentum of the negotiation process by eliminating the options available to the 
US. The British were already engaged in the region and thus able to field more soldiers 
during the period. So, they were able to use their superior troop numbers as leverage as well 
as harness FDR’s need to place troops into Europe to assuage Pacific-firsters to launch 
Torch and later the Sicilian as well as Italian mainland operation. 
Russia accepted these decisions because Britain had obtained agreement beforehand 
from America or Churchill had insinuated the positions were jointly held, i.e., they limited 
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the options available to the non-consulted party. Recall, “[v]arious studies have shown that 
the process of framing can have a significant impact on the final outcome of the 
negotiations.”2 Stalin had determined he would only work with the West if his “minimal 
conditions” were met – supplies and the second front. These conditions were not met in the 
manner the Marshal wanted; as a result, his suspicions of Western intentions were quite high 
in the fall of 1943.   
On the other side of the coalition, the pro-British Badoglio Government was 
maintained in Italy when Stalin backed traditional British European interests – the 
Mediterranean basin – in return for a precedent to protect traditional Russian European 
interests – Eastern Europe. The Americans begrudgingly acknowledged the Anglo-Soviet 
decision on the Italian Government because they needed to keep the momentum going 
towards Overlord. They could not afford any Italian turmoil or military adventures in the 
region that would cause “further diversions of forces or matériel which will interfere with 
the coincident mounting of [it],” notes Stimson.3  The tactics – framing and acting as a 
liaison – were British attempts to found postwar geo-politics on the principle of balance of 
power, like the Concept of Europe. The decisions and outcomes produced by the early use 
of these tactics were aimed at reestablishing the interwar setup of the Empire, whose 
resources and men would help them maintain their great power status.  
The underlying interest that informed all British decision-making was the 
maintenance of their great power status. There exists a “difference between expressed 
positions (demands) and underlying interests (actual needs),” declares Cohen.4 It is important 
to remember the underlying interests of the Big Three. Their positions flowed from these 
interests; they guided the evolution of these positions and why they choose certain options. 
Plus, the Big Three’s underlying interests revealed how seemingly unrelated positions were 
actually linked. For instance, FDR’s reaction to the fears detailed above can be interpreted in 
multiple ways. However, if his underlying interest is ascertained, what the President and his 
subordinates were actually trying to address is exposed.  
Roosevelt wanted to usher in long-term peace by remaking international institutions, 
especially world commerce, along American institutional lines based on American socio-
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economic principles – the International New Deal. Directing the victorious allies’ transition 
to peace would offer the President the opportunity to install these institutions. When FDR’s 
underlying interest is taken into account, it is clear he wanted to decrease British influence 
on American planning and Soviet perceptions of said influence on US planning to 
accomplish this goal.  
Britain would try to undermine the multilateral trade and decolonization aspects of 
the International New Deal. Plus, the American version of the UNO would forestall a 
balance of power setup. Equally important, FDR felt he had to make it “clear to Stalin that 
the United States and Great Britain were not allied in one common bloc against the Soviet 
Union.” 5 Alleviating Russian fears cultivated by the delays in supplies and the second front 
was essential to obtaining Russian adherence to the American vision of the postwar world. 
Halifax detailed to the FO this sentiment as well, “[T]he Administration has set out to free 
itself from the charge that it follows dictation from Whitehall.”6 The US needed unfettered 
hands because the Russians would never enter into a postwar alliance where they were 
isolated like they had been in the League of Nations. 
The Americans’ desire for independence in the formation of their positions and 
Churchill’s need for these decisions to be formed jointly caused tensions to rise between the 
Western powers. The PM wanted an American partnership, but he also wanted to sustain the 
prewar setup of the Empire and a regional UNO. He thought the Anglo-American “natural 
kinship” and fears of communism could bind the countries together, but Roosevelt was not 
afraid of and in fact needed the Russians. These tensions were at the heart of Anglo-
American differences over the next eighteen months leading up to Yalta. In hindsight, 
especially using Cold War patterns, Anglo-American differences seem trite and that they 
could and should have been overcome; however, FDR and Churchill held divergent visions 
of how the postwar world should be formed. These different outlooks shaped how the two 
men sifted through and decided amongst the choices available.  
Stalin also contextualized his options through the viewpoint of his underlying 
interest – the preservation of his power. Plus, as will be detailed, he “certainly did not intend 
to allow Britain to act as an intermediary between her and the United States of America.”7 
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The Marshal’s determination to separate Anglo-American planning was born of the 
suspicions created as a result of British maneuverings. These misgivings caused Stalin to 
evolve his positions. Now, on top of his minimal conditions, Western concurrence with the 
establishment of his security sphere on his Western and Northeastern frontiers was desired. 
He would pursue Anglo-American agreement to his security sphere throughout the 
conferences of 1943. Roosevelt’s similar desire to separate Western planning would help 
facilitate Soviet and American movement towards one another during these meetings. 
Eden entered these conferences with the belief that an amicable setup in Eastern 
Europe could be established with the Russians. Recall, after the Anglo-Soviet Treaty 
discussions, he concluded with patience and understanding that the Russians could make 
deals acceptable to all. “I was given to saying at this time that the failure of the British 
Empire and Russia to agree [on] their policies in advance had made possible three great 
conflicts, the Napoleonic war and the world wars,” wrote the Foreign Secretary.8 
Furthermore, “I would say bluntly that on the maintenance of that co-operation lies the best 
chance of building a new and better international security after the war.”9 His main aim, at 
this point, was “Anglo-Soviet consultation and agreement” over the treatment of liberated 
territories to avoid postwar conflicts, notes Sainsbury.10 Eden planned to secure Russian 
adherence to a self-denying ordinance. The ordinance was an attempt to avoid ‘a competitive 
scramble to secure the allegiance of small powers.’11 If it was signed, it would preclude the 
Big Three from making unilateral treaties with provisional governments in the liberated 
territories.  
The problem, as Stalin would tell Stettinius, was, ‘A freely elected government in any 
of these countries would be anti-Soviet, and that we cannot allow.’12 The Marshal had 
revealed his intentions during the Anglo-Soviet Treaty discussions. However, it was not what 
Eden had perceived; instead, Stalin exposed his goal of dominating the territory surrounding 
the USSR and that he would only pursue this ambition when he felt secure. The Red Armies’ 
victories at Stalingrad and Kursk provided this security. “The more clearly you understand 
the other side’s concerns, the better able you will be to satisfy them at minimum cost to 
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yourself,” declares Fisher, et al.13 Misunderstanding his partner’s intentions and fearing that 
this meeting was his last chance to conclude amenable agreements led to a less-than-ideal 
performance for the Foreign Secretary. As a result, the conferences of 1943 would alter his 
belief in an Anglo-Soviet understanding and radically change Eden’s postwar planning. 
Moscow Ministers’ Meeting 
The Western Allies desperately wanted a meeting of the Big Three heads of state, 
especially after the repercussions of the Russians victories in Stalingrad and Kursk (Aug. 
1943) were understood. Eden wrote later, discussions with the Russians “seemed all the 
more necessary in view of what I felt was growing evidence of Soviet power.”14 Stalin, 
however, claimed ‘that things are now so hot that it is impossible for me to be absent myself 
for even a single day.’15 The West, who wanted the meeting more than the Russians, 
therefore had to settle for a tripartite meeting of the Foreign Ministers, at first.  
The Foreign Ministers coming “to them, to negotiate, with the USSR on its own 
ground,” observes Sainsbury, “marked a change in status for the Soviet Union.”16 Having an 
international summit in Moscow signified what their victories in the field had implied – they 
were now a great power. Molotov “showed increasing enjoyment in being admitted for the 
first time into the councils as a full member,” noticed Harriman.17 Two other outcomes of 
the meeting and their implications would also reverberate throughout the reminder of 
wartime diplomacy – the Four-Power Declaration and the results of the Eden and Molotov 
discussions.  
Four-Power Declaration 
The Americans’ top priority for the conference was to obtain “the agreement of 
Russia and Britain to the principle of postwar international cooperation,” notes Sainsbury.18 
Agreement on the directorate that would lead the UNO was the first step towards the 
International New Deal. The organization was the main mechanism in which Roosevelt 
believed that American principles could be instilled but only if they led the association. 
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“China was going to be America’s postwar counterweight to Russia – and perhaps Britain as 
well,” observes Brands.19 The Americans, therefore, needed China to be a major player in the 
UNO since they were a dependent vote on America’s side against colonial Britain and 
expansionist Russia. Prior to the conferences, Hull and the State Department had drafted a 
plan that made the Big Four – Britain, China, US, and USSR – the leading countries of the 
anti-Axis coalition (the foundation of the UNO): the Four-Power Declaration. Anglo-Soviet 
adherence to this document was the Americans’ only hard position at Moscow.  
Hull’s singular focus on obtaining agreement on the Declaration with China’s 
inclusion in the UNO directorate at Moscow perturbed Harriman and angered Eden 
(discussed momentarily). The ambassador felt the Secretary did not press Molotov hard 
enough to maintain the original language of the declaration, especially clause 5.20 Hull 
concluded, however, that he had to seize this opportunity despite the cost because the 
Americans’ plans depended on “having China included in the four power declaration.”21 As a 
result of Soviet adherence, the Secretary was ecstatic about the outcome of the conference. 
He told T.V. Soong, the Chinese Foreign Minister, “[T]hroughout the conference all the 
Russian officials had been exceedingly cordial” and that this was “a splendid state of mind 
with which to launch our great forward movement of international cooperation.”22 Still, a 
number of changes were made to the original draft. The changes to clause 5 were the most 
damaging as they limited Anglo-American options for Eastern Europe. 
Clause 5 of the Four-Power Declaration was designed to deal with defeated enemies 
and liberated territories. It was also designed to alleviate suspicions arising out of the Italian 
surrender and the Darlan deal as well as provide a check on Russia’s Eastern European 
ambitions. The aim was to put into writing the need for “joint action in imposing surrender 
terms” and “subsequent joint action” in these areas as well as in the liberated territories.23 
Instead of realizing this clause was similar to the self-denying ordinance, Eden was worried 
about the implications of this clause on British colonial possessions. “I sensed that even the 
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future of Hong Kong was in question with them,” recalled the Foreign Secretary.24 Both 
Britain and Russia had reasons to check self-determination. 
Eden’s and Molotov’s separate aspirations to limit self-determination created a basis 
for understanding that undermined America’s plans via clause 5. Therefore, the clause’s 
impact was restricted.25 Recall, the Moscow Declaration on Italy (Italian surrender 
precedent), which was advantageous to Anglo-Soviet interests and based on military 
necessity not joint consultation, had just been worked out. Thus, through both actions, 
Britain maintained its options in regions of traditional interest to them – the Mediterranean 
and the Far East – but at the same time the Foreign Secretary had aided the Russians by 
removing restrictions on their actions in Eastern Europe. 
Molotov wanted the clause rewritten because it would limit the Soviets’ options for 
Eastern Europe. At Moscow, “[I]t was indicated that although [the Russians] will keep us 
informed they would take unilateral actions in respect to these countries,” wrote Harriman.26 
Therefore, the Russians needed to remove any language that triggered “joint actions.” The 
stronger language was removed, leaving only ‘consult with one another with a view to joint 
action.’27 Unless the Russians wanted to implement this decision as the West desired, the 
clause was worthless. Once again British interests were protected by siding with a senior 
party at the expense of the other senior party. Hull was forced to choose between the draft 
with strong language or risk losing China’s inclusion as a leading member of the UNO. Since 
the latter option was part and parcel with the Americans’ underlying interest, the Secretary of 
State signed the declaration with a watered-down clause 5.  
The Eden and Molotov Discussions 
The Russians were “determined to have no semblance of the Old ‘Cordon 
Saintaire.’”28 Therefore, they were “violently opposed to the creation of any federations in 
eastern, southeastern and central Europe,” recollected Bohlen.29 Plus, Stalin felt Russia had 
to dominate Eastern Europe to protect his power through the USSR “build[ing] its own 
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sphere of influence.”30 The Foreign Secretary did not fully realize what Russian positions had 
entailed - the protection and expansion of the Marshal’s power – during the prior Anglo-
Soviet discussions. By drawing the wrong conclusion from the Anglo-Soviet Treaty 
negotiations, Eden did not recognize until it was too late that concessions on Eastern 
Europe would not lead to the amenable solution of problems he hoped. Additionally, the 
concessions would forestall the use of the region as part of his refashioning of the interwar 
period collective security and Churchill’s reworking of the Concert of Europe.  
Eden hoped to establish a European Advisory Commission (EAC) in London. The 
EAC would have the dual purposes of creating “machinery for consultation between the 
Allies on European questions,” sans Italy, and reestablishing the balance of power with 
England playing the role of intermediary between Washington and Moscow. Furthermore, if 
it had a wide remit, the Commission would make London “the site,” proclaimed the Foreign 
Secretary, “to deal with planning for peace,” with the standing that would afford the 
English.31 Eden was not unfounded in this belief; Roosevelt feared the Commission might 
make Britain ‘leaders in Europe of the Anglo-Saxon countries.’32 To obtain agreement on a 
broad-based EAC, Eden conceded a hard British position (self-denying ordinance) and a 
major desire (confederations) during his meetings with Molotov, whereas the Foreign 
Commissar conceded only soft positions (EAC in London and with a greater remit). The 
events surrounding these concessions reveal the effects of context, standing, as well as 
process in reducing options and creating the outcome of a negotiation.  
During the conference, the Foreign Secretary had become frustrated with Hull’s lack 
of concern in regards to Eastern Europe. “I found him most unwilling to make any move” 
in respect to the region, especially Poland.33 The Secretary of State had told Eden ‘it was 
more of a British problem.’34 The Americans still felt these decisions were “matter[s] which 
should come within the purview of the general settlement.”35 The British, as noted, felt the 
Russian advances in Eastern Europe meant they had to come to terms with them on the 
region – a time crunch. The Foreign Secretary was concerned that any further Red Army 
                                                          
30.  Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, 310. September 19, 1944 Harriman memo to Stettinius. 
31.  Eden, 493. 
32.  Woodward, Vol. III, 64. FDR quoted.  
33.  Eden, 482.  
34.  Sainsbury, 80.  
35.  FRUS: C/T, 186. State Department memo on Germany. 
 79 
advancements meant “our negotiating power, slender as it was anyways, would amount to 
very little.”36 Cohen notes, “All evidence show that the [party] that feels most constrained by 
time limits will make more substantial concessions”37 Hull and the Americans bear some 
responsibility for Eden’s poor showing by abandoning him, without prior warning, to deal 
with the Russians on Eastern Europe. Still, the Foreign Secretary continued in spite of Hull’s 
intransigence, due in large part to the perceived time crunch; thus, Eden had no ability to act 
as an intermediary or frame positions like he had during the Anglo-Soviet Treaty 
negotiations.  
Eden met privately with Molotov because he felt it was possible “to discuss a 
number of European problems with Molotov and to establish … a common policy.”38 The 
Foreign Secretary wanted to discuss four interrelated issues: the Czech-Soviet Treaty (the 
written version of the Faustian bargain Czechoslovakian President Benes had made thinking 
he was protecting his country discussed in Chap. 1), the EAC, federations, and the self-
denying ordinance. In the end, Eden received definitive answers about all four, but only one 
was what he had hoped for at the outset.  
Amidst the tripartite discussions, Eden had achieved his first measure of success. 
Initially, “Molotov accepted that [the EAC] should be in London,” relates Sainsbury, “but 
made it clear that he did not” want it “to have a wide remit.”39 If London was going to take 
the lead on the EAC, Molotov concluded the EAC should deal with Germany and Western 
Europe exclusively. The Foreign Minister was sticking to the Russian line that “the countries 
to the east of Germany” should follow Russia’s lead and “the countries of Western Europe” 
should be “led by Great Britain,” laid out in the Declaration on Italy.40 Still, by acquiescing to 
one of the Foreign Secretary’s desires, Molotov fostered a need to reciprocate. “Someone 
who is rewarded” for their concessions, notes de Cremer and Pittutla, “will be more inclined 
to view your future requests in a more positive light.”41 When a party concedes a point, they 
alter the balance sheet, and the other party typically feels the need to normalize it – 
reciprocal norm.  
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The Foreign Secretary met the Foreign Minister alone with a desire to reciprocate. 
He now lacked the ability to use American sensibilities as cover. Plus, he was anxious to 
conclude agreements.42 As Eden wrote home, ‘I want to get on as fast as I can.’43 “Time,” 
declares Cohen, “adds pressure, producing stress and forc[es] decision making.”44 The 
Foreign Secretary had told the Cabinet he was against the Czech-Soviet Treaty because it 
excluded the Poles and his self-denying ordinance was designed to forestall these types of 
treaties. Yet, after Molotov had agreed that the EAC should be in London, Eden decided 
not to oppose the treaty and thus abandoned the self-denying ordinance.  
The Foreign Secretary thought, like the previous year, he could mitigate Russia’s 
more untenable demands with patience and understanding. The Cabinet was not sympathetic 
to this plan. They “prefer[red] to maintain the ‘self-denying ordinance.” Eden felt, however, 
“that further opposition to [the treaty] would cause distrust and suspicion,” which would 
undermine the understanding he was trying to foster. The USSR “had a right to make 
agreements,” argued Molotov, “with ‘neighboring’ Allied Governments without consulting 
the British or seeking their approval.”45 In the end, Eden removed the objections, notes 
Eubanks, “because Molotov accepted the British-sponsored European Advisory 
Commission.”46 It is clear Eden acted on his own, which was possible due to the greater 
authority possessed by the British Minister vis-à-vis his counterparts. 
Concessions tend to have a domino effect; one concession leads to reciprocation, 
which then itself is reciprocated and so forth. After Eden removed British objections to the 
treaty, not surprisingly, the Foreign Commissar backed away from his previous position 
about a small remit for the EAC. As a result, Molotov recommended a number of issues – 
French policy, German dismemberment and occupation, administration of liberated 
territories, as well as peace-feelers – to the EAC. The latter two dealt with Eastern Europe, 
but decisions on them were restricted by military exigencies, i.e., the Italian surrender 
precedent. A similar pattern of reciprocal concessions will occur during Teheran. 
Nevertheless, the Russian’s concessions were bought at a steep price, revealing the impact of 
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a time-crunch on decision-making. These concessions also increased the cost of future deals 
over Eastern Europe. 
Another consequence of Eden’s acquiescence on the Czech-Soviet Treaty, proclaims 
Sainsbury, was that “the policy of federation in Eastern Europe, which Britain had been 
encouraging and working on for the past two or three years, received its death blow.”47 Once 
the treaty was signed, the Russians would have a say over whether or not the Czechs and 
Poles would be able to form a federation together – a mainstay of Churchill’s confederal 
plans. The PM also failed to realize, initially, what had been conceded. He felt “the 
importance of” the Moscow agreements “lay in the additional machinery of cooperation 
which was about to be setup,” overlooking the concessions it revealed.48 He believed that 
this furthered his aims of a British-led balance of power setup, not that it eliminated a 
number of options available to the British, such as a Czech-Poland combination.  
To achieve a free hand in Eastern Europe, the Russians preferred to set up the 
region with small disjointed states. “Their idea of a friendly government,” recalled Byrnes 
was “a government completely dominated by them.”49 Only disunity would afford the 
Russians the opportunity to secure “friendly” relations with the countries along their 
borders. Therefore, they would never allow the Czechs to enter into a confederation with 
other Eastern European states. The FO was well aware that “there is little evidence that the 
Soviet Union will be prepared to agree to federations in Eastern Europe after the war.”50 
Without the self-denying ordinance or language triggering “joint action,” the Russians, under 
the Italian surrender precedent, were now free to conclude treaties with the provisional 
governments in Eastern Europe they set up without Western oversight or input.  
These concessions meant the issues of Eastern Europe were not substantially 
addressed, yet the Russians had gained greater leverage over future decisions regarding the 
region and reduced potential options. “It was the high tide” of Anglo-Soviet relations, but 
“the Soviet attitude,” wrote Eden, “would harden with the growing certainty of victory.”51 
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Once the actual implications of the decisions reached at Moscow become apparent to Eden, 
he discarded his Anglo-Soviet understanding strategy.   
Cairo I 
Shortly after the Moscow meeting, a date and time for the much anticipated and 
sought after meeting of the Big Three leaders was finally established. Instead of a single 
meeting, however, FDR would embark on an elaborate multi-act diplomatic mission. The 
impetus for this long and winding road trip was not the President but the PM.  
Once the date for the first tripartite heads of state meeting was established, Churchill 
decided it was “necessary that the British and United States staffs should consult together 
before any triple conference with the Russians takes place.”52 He wanted to form joint plans 
for both the political as well as military aspects of Teheran. Additionally, his doctor, Lord 
Moran, noticed since Québec I the PM “ha[d] grown more and more certain that an invasion 
of France as planned [May 1944] must fail.”53 However, Harriman had alerted the President, 
“It is clear [the Russians] never like to be faced with Anglo-American decisions already 
taken.”54 As a result, the President did “not want to give Stalin the impression we are settling 
everything between ourselves before we met him.”55 FDR, therefore, balked at the idea. 
Roosevelt had been trying to arrange a meeting with Chiang Kai-shek for some 
months. The President thought he could kill two birds – meet with Chiang and allay Soviet 
fears – with one stone by including the Chinese in the pre-Teheran meeting. China’s 
inclusion in the First Cairo Conference would forestall the creation of joint positions, 
provide an opportunity for Roosevelt to meet Chiang, and undermine British attempts to 
further delay the second front.  
The President concocted a convoluted Shakespearian-style getaway: the first act, a 
Sino-Anglo-American meeting with a Russian military presence (Cairo I); the second act, an 
Anglo-Soviet-American tripartite meeting (Teheran); and the third act, a bilateral Anglo-
American meeting, which would finalize the military decisions from the first two 
conferences (Cairo II). To induce Churchill to acquiesce to this schedule, relates Eubanks, 
“Roosevelt had agreed there would be ‘many meetings’ between the American and British 
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Chiefs before either the Russians or Chinese arrived.”56 These meetings never materialized 
because Chiang arrived first.  
The British had two goals at the Cairo conferences: push back the date for the 
second front and undermine the growing Sino-American partnership. Churchill was worried 
about China’s role in “future attempts to dismantle the British Empire,” declares 
Hilderbrand.57 Additionally, he felt that China’s status “as one of the world’s four Great 
Powers [was] an absolute farce.”58 During these conferences (and 1944) Britain worked 
under the assumption, “If China fails to emerge as a strong and dependable factor in the 
maintenance of stability in the Far East, the need for British co-operation may become more 
evident than it is at present.”59 With greater participation in the Pacific, Britain ‘would not,’ 
the PM concluded, ‘become so a junior partner in the Anglo-American effort.’60 
Furthermore, Churchill wanted “to make sure that no agreements would be reached,” 
declares Ronald Heiferman, “that would in any way prejudice British colonial interests.”61 If 
the Americans had another partner in the Far East, they would have little need to support 
the British Empire.  
The Americans, on the other hand, wanted exactly what the PM feared: a Sino-
American partnership to usher in a new anti-colonial era in the Pacific. For instance, 
immediately after initiating his correspondence with Chiang, FDR asked the generalissimo 
for his opinions on Indian independence. Chiang revealed Roosevelt’s meddling during his 
visit to India in 1942, which angered the British, especially Churchill. After the President 
drew the PM’s ire, Roosevelt “shifted his attack on colonialism to French Indochina,” notes 
Herring.62 The President proclaimed, ‘I will work with all my might and main to see to it that 
the United States is not wheedled into the position of accepting any plan that will further 
France’s imperialistic ambitions.’63 Subsequently, FDR focused his planning for China’s role 
in decolonization on French Southeast Asia.   
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The two non-second front discussions at Cairo – the Burma campaign and 
trusteeships – stemmed from the American need to foster a close Sino-American 
partnership. With China in the fold, FDR felt the US was “going to be able to bring pressure 
on the British to fall in line with our thinking, in relation to the whole colonial question.”64 
The Burma campaign would help the Chinese play a greater role in the defeat of Japan, 
which would elevate Chinese prestige. It would also signify an American commitment to the 
country. Finally, this plan meant, “China would carry the main burden of liberating the 
mainland of East Asia,” reveals Odd Arne Westad.65 FDR hoped the Nationalist Army 
would drive the Japanese out of Southeast Asia. Though their soldiers’ presence meant that 
China would direct Southeast Asia’s transition to peace, akin to Russia in Eastern Europe, 
the Chinese dependence on America meant that the US could dictate how that process 
unfolded. The President, as a result, could establish his trusteeship program throughout 
Southeast Asia in the wake of Chinese forces, thus unlocking the region’s latent productivity 
and resources, he felt were bottled up by the colonial powers. 
The typical retelling of Yalta does not delve into Anglo-American differences in the 
Pacific enough to reveal the suspicions created on both sides. “The war with Japan exposed 
differences between London and Washington more protracted than any which affected 
policy in Europe,” declares Max Hastings.66 Without understanding their differences over the 
Pacific theater and when they started to foment – Cairo – discerning the events and in 
particular their effects on the formation of American and British strategies for Yalta is 
impossible.  The issues created in the Pacific were a major impetus in Churchill’s movement 
away from the Anglo-American partnership in 1944. 
The debates at Cairo, observes Sainsbury, were “one of the bitterest strategic 
arguments of the war between Britain and America.”67 Eden echoed this point, “This 
conference was among the most difficult, I ever attended.”68 As noted, Roosevelt wanted the 
Chinese to participate in the liberation of Southeast Asia, which a spring 1944 Burmese 
campaign would afford. Plus, proclaimed Leahy, “The American Chiefs of Staff were 
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convinced that support of China was essential to our own security and success of the Allied 
cause.”69 Recall, the Americans also wanted the Nationalist Army to drive the Japanese out 
of Manchuria. Opening the Burma Road by liberating Burma would give the US a route to 
supply the Chinese the matériel to accomplish these tasks. 
Churchill, on the other hand, felt the main British prize in the Pacific was Singapore. 
A Burma campaign would, in his eyes, needlessly distract from this objective. The PM wrote, 
“Certainly we favored keeping China in the war, but a sense of proportion and the study of 
alternatives were needed.”70 Due to these differences, the Burma campaign became a 
political issue more than a military one.  
FDR and Churchill each had their own operation they wanted as the main priority 
for the 1944 spring campaign season in Southeast Asia. The Prime Minister “preferred 
‘Culverin’ – an attack on Sumatra – to the U.S. sponsored ‘Buccaneer,’” emphasizes 
Sainsbury. American General Joseph Stillwell and the Chinese were planning an offensive 
against North Burma in the spring. “The Generalissimo said,” noted the CCS, “the success 
of operations in Burma” were dependent “on the simultaneous coordination of naval actions 
with the land operations.”71 Buccaneer – a British-led amphibious assault on South Burma – 
would coincide with this action easing pressure on the North Burma campaign. Culverin, 
however, envisioned using the North Burmese attack as a distraction while the British 
recaptured their main Southeast Asian prize: Singapore.  
The Anglo-American differences were over priorities. “The Americans wanted to 
build a road to China while the British wanted to beat a path to Singapore,” proclaims 
Heiferman.72 Besides as a supply route, the Burma Road was important to FDR’s plans for 
China because Chiang saw it as “a symbol of the future.”73 The British, however, had 
“decided upon Singapore as the best site,” recalls General Ismay, “to exercise control of sea 
communications in the Indian and Southern Pacific Ocean.”74 With both sides divided, the 
Burmese issues hung in the air for much of the conference. 
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The first real movement came after the President and Chiang met for the first time. 
The two men struck some type of a bargain aimed at assuring him of American support in 
return for liberalizing Chiang’s government. 75 What is certain is that the Cairo Declaration 
stated, ‘Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores shall be restored to the Republic of 
China.’76 Plus, the President “had given [Chiang] a promise of a considerable operation 
across the Bay of Bengal [Buccaneer],” recalled Ismay.77 After the meeting, the American 
military displayed a more forceful resolve in regards to Buccaneer.  Heiferman relates, “The 
vehemence with which Marshall, Leahy, and King” now “supported Buccaneer” took “their 
British counterparts by surprise.”78 It won out over Culverin. Still, the Americans conceded 
to Britain’s request that Buccaneer should “be considered in relations to other operation to 
be undertaken.”79 This concession would come back to haunt Roosevelt’s plans to increase 
Chinese military prestige.  
FDR also revealed to Chiang, during their meeting, the role China was to play in the 
President’s trusteeship concept. He perceived “the Generalissimo was ‘cheered’ by his 
attitude toward the dismantling of colonial empires,” reveals Heiferman.80 Roosevelt’s plan 
meant, “American power, allied with China, would then replace the Europeans as the 
stabilizing force in Asia,” proclaims Leffler.81 Coupled with the clauses about Chinese 
territory, FDR hoped that Chiang’s and China’s prestige would be elevated by these actions. 
This was just what Churchill feared – a Sino-American decolonization plan – and he was hell 
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bent to rock that boat. The PM “was adamant,” notes Sainsbury, “he would have nothing to 
do with ‘Buccaneer.’”82 Before he could upset the Sino-American applecart, the second act 
of Roosevelt’s convoluted trip took place – Teheran. 
Teheran 
The Teheran Conference lasted four days (Nov. 28 - Dec. 1, 1943). The first three 
days were taken up mostly by military discussions. During these talks, each party achieved 
some successes and suffered some setbacks. Militarily, the Russians secured most of what 
they wanted out of these meetings. They were relieved by the Americans’ attitudes towards 
the second front and the priority they placed on it. Stalin “saw the second front as a critical 
factor in the military equation,” relates Geoffrey Roberts.83 The lack of a second front would 
have resulted in a dire reduction of the Marshal’s military prowess, through greater losses in 
men and matériel, and as a result, the USSR’s standing in the world. Though, Stalin did 
worry that without an established commander ‘nothing would come of the operation.’84 
The Americans received an estimate for the cost of Russian participation in the Far 
East. They also were able to undercut any diversions of matériel and manpower from 
‘Overlord,’ especially in the Mediterranean. FDR believed “the way to save American lives” 
was not “wasting landing craft and men and matériel in the Balkan mountains.”85 Saving 
American lives was the main military priority moving forward, especially in the Far East.  
The British managed to come to an agreement on a more flexible date for the 
invasion (finalized at Cairo II). Their other military desire, however, did not come to 
fruition. “Britain had propped up the ‘sick man of Europe’ throughout the 19th century, and 
this strategically vital country was still a primary British ally and client,” relates Harbutt.86 
This time, though, they were unable to secure their partners’ help in trying to draw Turkey 
into the war, thus raising their prestige before the Russians made demands of them. Not 
coincidently, “Molotov showed no enthusiasm for the idea” of incentivizing Turkish entry 
into the war effort. He “was content to leave the matter in my hands,” recalled Eden.87 The 
British knew that the Turks “demanded that the Allies should equip the Turkish Army,” 
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relates Sainsbury, “before they could take that risk.”88 Acquiescing to this demand would 
divert resources from ‘Overlord.’ The US – the arsenal of democracy – was adamant that 
Turkish entry should not cause “diversions of resources.”89 Therefore, these supplies would 
not be forthcoming. If Turkey was not going to fight coupled with the Americans’ and 
Soviets’ resolute stance about Mediterranean diversions, any hope for a Balkan offensive was 
becoming desperate. 
The FDR and Stalin Talks 
While the military debates were unfolding, the President had his first (second and 
third) chance to meet the Soviet Premier. The first two conversations focused on 
Roosevelt’s pet projects – the UNO and China. He had his first opportunity to unveil to 
Stalin the details of his Big Four plan during these discussions. Roosevelt explained how 
central the Russians were to his planning, part of his attempt to overcome the distrust 
created by Britain’s previous maneuverings. “His conversations with Stalin [at Teheran] 
revealed” that FDR wanted “a universal world organization,” according to Robert Divine, 
only as “a sop to the small powers.”90 De Gaulle recollected, “In [the President’s] mind, a 
four-power directory would settle the world’s problems.”91 This concept fit perfectly with 
Stalin’s view of geo-politics. “It was noticeable in our meeting with the Russian[s],” recalled 
Leahy, that they “showed no interest whatever in any use we might desire to make of the 
smaller Allied Nations.”92 However, the Marshal preferred a regional instead of a worldwide 
basis for the UNO. The autocrat feared “that a European state would probably resent China 
having the right to apply machinery to it.”93 The President now knew he had to overcome 
Stalin’s reservations.94   
Roosevelt understood he needed the Russian ruler’s adherence to the package he had 
offered to Chiang for it to be effective. Plus, he wanted to gauge “the price” of Red Army 
participation in the Pacific. Well aware of the fact that the Soviet Premier would want 
something in exchange for these agreements, the President asked what he (and tacitly 
Chiang) could offer Stalin. The Soviets wanted control if not outright possession of the 
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Ports of Arthur and Darien. They also needed access to these ports. Land access would go 
through Manchuria, so they required Chinese agreement to Russia’s unfettered access to the 
region. For sea access to the ports, they wanted to take control of the Japanese held Kurile 
Islands and the Southern Sakhalin Islands. FDR was amenable to these concessions and 
insinuated he could obtain the generalissimo’s agreement as well. Additionally, his Far 
Eastern plans were given an added boost when Stalin revealed he was opposed to restoring 
“Indochina to French colonial rule.”95 With this quid pro quo established, both men were quite 
pleased and planned to meet again the following day.96  
The third meeting was devoted to Stalin’s chief concerns. His major interests were 
the treatment of Germany, Polish territorial changes, and his desire to incorporate the Baltic 
States into the Soviet Union. The topics were addressed to the satisfaction of the Soviet 
Premier because Russian cooperation was essential for American leadership of the Big Four-
controlled UNO. Furthermore, none of these issues affected Roosevelt’s ability to instill 
American socio-economic principles world-wide, except Germany, but FDR also desired a 
harsh treatment of Germany after the war. He believed that only “[i]f Germans were 
punished and the country was permanently weakened through dismemberment, 
disarmament, and economic controls, then there would be peace,” relates Gaddis Smith.97 
Finally, evolving his positions towards the Soviet stances would be the last step in assuaging 
Stalin’s misgivings about working with the Americans. 
The President gave the Soviet leader assurances that he would support the Russians’ 
desired boundary changes along the Soviet-Polish border – the Curzon Line. The one 
concern was “to avoid an open concession to Russia, largely because he was sensitive to the 
political power of several million Polish-Americans,” notes Smith.98 He was not worried 
enough to alter his planning, revealing public opinion was a factor, not an influence, for the 
President. Therefore, he told the Russian ruler that he needed to wait until after the election, 
at least, to proclaim any territorial changes, but Roosevelt preferred to hold off until the 
peace conference convened. Similarly, he wanted the Soviets to make some “gesture” to 
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world opinion in regards to Baltic self-determination – a plebiscite – before incorporating 
the territory. Stalin knew how to “run” an election coupled with the Russians’ advantageous 
position in Eastern Europe; he saw potential for this arrangement. The President would see 
just how well his first two meeting with the Marshal had gone when this meeting ended.99  
Stalin ended the discussion by telling Roosevelt “he had come to agree with the 
President that [the UNO] should be world-wide and not regional.”100 This deal making 
during the FDR/Stalin conversations was another instance where reciprocity dictated action 
– reciprocal norm. In the final meeting, the American leader felt an obligation to meet some 
of the Marshal’s needs in Europe since the Soviet Premier had met some of Roosevelt’s 
concerns in regards to the UNO and the Far East. Once Stalin realized the President was 
willing to work with him on his main concerns, he felt obliged to reciprocate. Therefore, the 
Soviet leader supported FDR’s version of the UNO.  
If, as typically portrayed, wartime diplomacy was dictated by Soviet-American 
priorities with the British forced to accept these dictates, then more quid pro quo agreements 
like those that transpired during the FDR/Stalin talks should have occurred. The two 
countries’ underlying interests were not necessarily at odds. However, before and during the 
conferences, the British had reduced the options available to the senior parties through 
framing and by acting as the Grand Alliance’s intermediary. Even the context for the 
FDR/Stalin talks – FDR’s desire to eliminate Soviet fears over what Western positions 
entailed and Stalin’s determination to separate western planning – was generated by British 
machinations. Their actions had and would continue to cause the two senior parties’ 
positions to evolve.  
Churchill Enters the Fray 
Stalin’s final concession was an ominous sign for Churchill, who preferred balance of 
power set up based on a regionally based UNO. The PM had set out for Cairo and Teheran 
hoping to establish a united front with the Americans and present joint positions on the 
touchy issues of wartime diplomacy – his Anglo-American partnership. As the conference 
unfolded, however, Churchill realized “that the Americans had deliberately set out to make 
the British seem the ‘odd man out,’” notes Sainsbury, and to paint them as “the main 
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obstacle to Soviet wishes.”101 Before the final day, which would cover the topics dear to the 
PM, he wanted to meet with Stalin and try to set the record straight.  
This meeting is of import not because of what was discussed, since they rehashed 
well worn Anglo-Soviet debates. Instead, it was the first time since the formation of the 
Grand Alliance that Churchill did not try to frame British positions as Western ones; this 
time, he staked out unilateral positions. Most detrimental to the President was the PM’s 
understanding with Stalin that the Big Three (Four) should hold, unilaterally if necessary, 
strategic points around the globe. This plan was a direct threat to FDR’s trusteeship concept 
but was ideal for the dominance of a region or protecting colonial interests.102 As the 
percentage deal reveals, when working with the Russians, Churchill found a convenient 
overlap between his desire to maintain European colonialism and Soviet expansion through 
the concept of holding strategic points unilaterally.  
Churchill continued his unilateral stance during the final tripartite meeting, which 
was the main meeting to discuss political issues. During the meeting he tried to ingratiate 
himself to Stalin by undermining Roosevelt. For instance, after FDR tried to work out an 
agreement with the Russian ruler to allow Finland to remove itself from the war, the PM 
undercut the President. Churchill declared “that the British Government was not insistent 
on anything regarding the Finns.”103 This attitude foreshadowed his movement towards 
Russia, which would slowly take place over the next nine months. However, it was not out 
of the blue that the PM reacted this way.   
On the final day, the British were confronted with a Soviet-American axis. Ironically, 
the PM had caused it to come into existence by convincing Stalin that an Anglo-American 
bloc existed. The positions created by the new axis were unfavorable to the aims to which 
Churchill was working. For instance, the Danubian federation, the PM’s idea for the 
treatment of Germany after the war, was deemed to be insufficiently harsh in comparison to 
the understanding on postwar Germany – dismemberment, disarmament and economic 
controls – reached by FDR and Stalin. Similarly, Churchill’s ideas on reparations, peace 
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feelers, and the treatment of defeated enemies and liberated territories were also met with a 
lukewarm reception. The worst blow for the British was over Poland.104 
Britain hoped “to get assurances from the Russians to allay Polish fears,” specifically 
that “diplomatic relations out to be restored.” Additionally, they wanted to recoup the 
federation plans with “the Polish Government encouraged” by the Russians “to accede to 
the Soviet-Czech Treaty.”105 The plan revealed that the British had realized the implications 
of the concessions made at Moscow. “However, our plan now received an unexpected 
setback,” recalled Eden, “at the hands of President Roosevelt” since he had already 
conceded the Curzon Line.106 Unable to use the frontier as a bargaining chip, Churchill was 
still able to make a bad situation a little better by securing Soviet acceptance of movement in 
Poland’s favor on their western (German) border. Yet, Stalin would not move from the 
opinion that only when “the London Poles were prepared to be reasonable about frontiers” 
would he “consider resuming relations with them.”107  
The Curzon Line was the Soviet-Polish border established at Versailles but was 
superseded by the Treaty of Riga (the peace treaty drawn up after the post-WWI war 
between the USSR and Poland), which established the countries’ prewar boundaries. If 
accepted, it would reduce the viability of the Polish state, under the guise of reconnecting 
ethnic Ukrainians and White Russians with their Soviet brethren. Eubanks emphasizes, 
“Stalin had concluded that security against a revived Germany required a Poland which the 
Soviet Union could dominate. The Curzon Line was the first step in achieving this goal.”108 
Churchill reluctantly accepted these terms, stating he wished to see ‘a Poland which was 
strong and independent, but friendly to Russia.’109 Thus, instead of a resumption of Soviet-
Polish relations, the PM now had to convince the Poles to accept the territorial changes.  
“My feelings at the close of the conference were less easy than they had been in 
Moscow,” recalled Eden.110 In the end, only a few of the outstanding issues facing the Big 
Three were resolved; most were left in abeyance. A number of options, however, were 
removed at the conference, which meant the price for Soviet movement on Eastern Europe 
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was increased.  The Poles were in a weakened position due to these decisions because 
Britain’s best bargaining chip – the Curzon Line – was conceded. Similarly, the countries in 
Eastern (and possibly Central Europe) were now dependent on Russian goodwill since the 
West had few, if any, checks on Soviet power in the region. Yet, each country achieved some 
positive results.  
Despite the setbacks, Britain achieved a modicum of success in regards to France. 
The President and Stalin spent the conference belittling France, yet no action was taken to 
limit their role in postwar Europe due to British pressure. 111 Britain would spend the next 
year trying to build up French prestige. The Soviets maintained their free hand in Eastern 
Europe and laid the foundation for their security scheme in the Far East. The Americans 
convinced Stalin to adhere to the UNO with a worldwide instead of regional basis. Plus, they 
established a reasonable price for Red Army participation in the Pacific and adherence to 
FDR’s Chinese package. Neither the US nor the Russians had conceded a hard position; they 
in fact furthered their chances of having their hard positions adopted. Each member of the 
Big Three had something to bring home, though the Americans’ success in regards to China 
would take a major hit before they arrived.  
Cairo II 
The Second Cairo Conference resulted in mostly negative decisions for the 
participants. However, the decisions were not negative in a military sense, which was the 
main theme of the conference; instead, they were detrimental to FDR’s and Churchill’s 
political aims. The paradoxical nature of Cairo II was that by accepting political setbacks the 
two leaders actually produced a more sound military strategy.  
Recall, at Cairo I the Americans agreed to the British condition that Buccaneer be 
considered in relations to ‘other operations.’ At Teheran, a new operation, Anvil, was 
concocted and given priority over other operations in 1944, sans Overlord.112 Churchill gave 
way on Anvil, which would preclude any Balkan operations, because of greater American 
standing due to their superior number of soldiers in both Anvil and Overlord.113 Still, “Anvil 
and Overlord,” relates Heiferman, “necessitate[d] the cancellation or postponement of 
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Buccaneer.”114 Anvil was of greater benefit to the ultimate victory than either of the 
operations that were abandoned to achieve it. As General Ismay noted, “[F]rom a military 
point of view, Dragoon was fully justified.”115 Plus, “Marseilles was to prove an invaluable 
asset,” notes Hastings.116 Still, this setback was detrimental to the President’s planning.  
By the third day of the conference, Roosevelt had come to the realization that ‘no 
further resources could be found for ‘Buccaneer.’117 Roosevelt cabled Stilwell, “The British 
just won’t do the operation, and I can’t get them to agree to it.”118 He reluctantly informed 
Chiang that ‘Buccaneer’ was off.’119 FDR’s plan of increasing Chinese standing by having 
their forces liberate Southeast Asia would now be left to the Chinese and their US military 
advisors alone. Unfortunately, this decision meant the contentious Chiang/Stilwell 
combination had to find a way to produce the military victories in Burma. This task would 
be too much for their fragile working arrangement (discussed in Chap 4.). Still, for the time 
being, FDR had reason to hope. As he said in an address to the nation shortly after Cairo, 
“Today we and the Republic of China are closer together than ever before in deep friendship 
and in unity of purpose.”120 The other side of the Atlantic had much less hope. 
The major setback for Churchill’s political planning was the loss of any possibility of 
major operation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Anvil took the remaining landing-craft 
available in the Mediterranean, which would have been needed for actions in the Near East. 
As noted, without an operation in the region and/or supplies to give Turkey, the country 
would not enter the war. Together, these developments meant no third front in the Balkans. 
Therefore, unless Churchill’s last hope – an aggressive campaign in Italy –  occurred, the 
Soviets would liberate all of Central and Eastern Europe with the previously discussed 
repercussions. A larger campaign in Italy than planned at Cairo and Teheran could move 
“first to Istria and Trieste and ultimately upon Vienna,” and perhaps even Budapest and 
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Prague, the PM wrote Roosevelt.121 It is important to take note when the Churchill’s final 
Mediterranean adventure is eliminated as this story unfolds.  
The other major decision coming out of Cairo II was the appointment of 
Eisenhower to the command of ‘Overlord.’ As noted, Stalin believed the appointment of a 
commander necessary before the operation would move forward. This was the culmination 
of very successful series of conferences for the Soviet Premier. Stalin had managed to 
emerge with the greatest available options, especially in regards to the issues close to his 
heart – Eastern Europe, Germany, and the Northern Far East. Yet, options are only valuable 
if finalized in a manner upholding one’s interests, i.e., one’s positions (choices) are 
implemented.  
The problem with hard bargaining tactics is that they have diminishing returns. 
Parties tend to harden their positions over time when confronted with hard bargaining, and 
worse, they start to devalue a hard bargainer’s concessions. Research has shown, observe 
Mnookin et al., “a party may devalue a proposal received from someone perceived as an 
adversary, even if the identical offer would have been acceptable when suggested by a 
neutral or ally.” Furthermore, “[a]lthough some bargainers can start off playing” hardball 
“and later move on to a problem-solving approach” most “have so thoroughly poisoned 
their relationship” this move “becomes impossible.”122 Most negotiators prefer not to deploy 
these tactics in negotiations that are trying to tie the parties to a long-term arrangement.  
The wartime diplomacy under discussion in this work was a negotiation aimed at 
building a foundation for the postwar. Therefore, using tactics typical of one-off 
negotiations (negotiations in which the parties will never again interact) would invariably 
have a negative effect moving forward. The way to identify hard bargaining is the use of 
tactics such as: extreme claims, followed by small, slow concessions; belittling the other 
side’s arguments or alternatives; good cop, bad cop; and personal insults.123 These tactics 
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were displayed by the Russians during these conferences and would be a part of their 
repertoire moving forward. As the conferences and meetings of 1944-5 unfold, remember 
the diminishing effects of hard bargaining because it undermined Western faith in deals with 
the Russians and whether they could be trusted at all.  
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relations and future negotiations.”  
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Chapter Four: “When I Have to Choose” 
Positions tend to develop quickly because they have been “constructed to meet some 
underlying need, concern, want, or fear,” notes Fisher et al., which can be construed before 
the issues are fully realized. This process has a downside, however; “The more that a 
positions is worked out in detail and the more often it is repeated, the more committed to it 
a party becomes.”1 The parties are thus dissuaded from trying to find collaborative solutions 
because they are now more committed to their positions. It was only natural, with the Big 
Three divided on how the postwar world should be shaped, that 1944 was a year of very 
contentious negotiations. Instead of laying the foundation for postwar cooperation, these 
negotiations tested the Grand Alliance and altered the Big Three’s strategies for Yalta.     
The British tactics – framing and acting as an intermediary – worked initially, in 
particular protecting shipping and soldiers, instilling a pro-British government in Italy, as 
well as focusing the Western military effort on the Mediterranean. Yet, Churchill’s and 
Eden’s plans, the Anglo-American partnership and Anglo-Soviet understanding respectively, 
had failed to protect British interests during the 1943 conferences. Both statesmen aimed at 
having the states of Europe aligned with and looking towards London for leadership. With 
this setup, Britain’s prestige would increase; it would provide them a method in which to act 
as the Big Three’s intermediary, as well as afford them the clout to resist America’s attempts 
to break up the Empire. Eden’s focus on securing Russian agreement and Churchill’s desire 
for a Western partnership, while effective at first, backfired when all the parties met because 
they worked at cross purposes, which built up momentum unfavorable to a beneficial 
outcome for the British. 
Acting as an intermediary worried the Americans and more importantly threatened 
Roosevelt’s underlying interest – instilling American economic principles worldwide: the 
International New Deal. As a result, the EAC was given a lower-level diplomatic presence 
because the Americans wanted to put an end to Britain’s tendency to act as a go-between. 
Roosevelt appointed his Ambassador to Britain, John Winant, as the American 
representative on the Commission. “Who your side sends to the table can depend on, and 
influence, who the other side sends,” declares Mnookin et al.2 The EAC, therefore, was 
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headed by ambassadors, not ministers, reducing its ability to increase British prestige. Plus, 
Britain’s view of the Commission “conflicted,” recalled George Kennan, “with FDR’s 
aversion to anything that might commit him in advance or restrict his freedom of action.”3 
The EAC negatively affected FDR’s underlying interest; therefore, he diluted its potency but 
only after Eden had traded away the possibility of a Czech-Polish confederation, a mainstay 
of the PM’s European security planning, to acquire Molotov’s adherence to the Commission. 
Similarly, framing British stances as Western viewpoints scared the Russians into 
thinking the West was “ganging up on them.” Stalin was concerned about Anglo-American 
intentions due to the delays in supplies and the second front – his preliminary minimal 
conditions. He believed that these decisions were Western stances because Churchill had 
framed, during the Second Moscow Conference (Aug. 1942), the decisions to delay both 
forms of assistance as reflecting the Anglo-American intentions towards the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet Premier concluded these delays were an attempt to “bleed them white” and to 
exclude Russia from the rewards of victory. Again the British tactics had affected their 
counterpart’s underlying interest, in this case Stalin’s need for postwar security through 
military prowess. The PM’s successful framing caused Molotov’s insistence on Soviet 
unilateral action in Eastern Europe, which prompted the price Eden had to pay for his 
London-based EAC to increase because the price reflected the Russians’ new minimal 
conditions. It also produced the Marshal’s desire to break up what he perceived as a 
bourgeoning Anglo-American axis.  
Also wanting to separate Western planning and determined to alleviate Stalin’s fears, 
Roosevelt went to Teheran determined to work with the Russians. The Soviet and American 
leaders’ similar wishes led to a constructive series of talks. Symbolized by FDR’s acceptance 
of the Curzon Line and Stalin’s agreement that the UNO should be formed on a worldwide 
basis; however, these talks were detrimental to British interests. As a result of working at 
cross purposes, both Churchill’s and Eden’s strategies had been frustrated at the end of 
1943.  Only working towards the same ends could the British use their tactics effectively.  
The setbacks in the fall of 1943 caused the two primary architects of British postwar 
planning to alter course. It also drew the two statesmen together and started the process of 
them working towards the same ends instead of opposing ones. A way to overcome the 
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country’s shrinking standing was the most important diplomatic task. A counterweight to the 
Russian expansionism in Europe and American decolonization efforts in the Pacific was 
necessary.  Independently, the pair came to the same conclusion. Eden was wary about US 
commitments to policing Europe, and Churchill was concerned over America’s recent 
attitude towards the Empire. Plus, both now thoroughly distrusted the Soviets’ postwar 
intentions. These factors caused the two British statesmen to look towards the restoration of 
France.  
An Anglo-French combination could be the intermediary between the US and 
Russia, thus recreating a balance of power setup the British had been aiming for throughout 
the war. It would also create the means to reestablish and protect the Empire with its much-
needed men and resources. Both aspects would play a role in the maintenance of the British 
standing as a great power. As Eden wrote, “We wish to see, indeed we needed, a strong 
France after the war.”4 Lafeber notes that, “For the sake of British interests in both Europe 
and Asia, London officials felt they had no choice but to fight for a fully restored France.”5  
Thus, the Anglo-French combination could be a bulwark against an expansionist Russia in 
Europe and a united colonial front against the Sino-American decolonizing partnership.  
Restoring France meant reestablishing the French Empire, which, like the British 
Empire, would provide the French with soldiers and supplies. Additionally, the French 
Empire would assist in protecting British interests in and the stabilization of the Far East, 
Mediterranean, and the Middle East. Churchill knew FDR’s decolonization plan focused on 
French territory in the Far East as a precursor to his attempts to wrest away British colonial 
possessions, especially in China. With the Anglo-French combination liberating Southeast 
Asia, not the Chinese, the pair could control the region’s transition to peace. Furthermore, 
China would lack the prestige to make demands on the British. However, the US, recollected 
Leahy, was determined that “no French political authority should be permitted by the Allied 
Powers in areas controlled by them outside of continental France.”6 American opinion on 
France was important because, with Britain lacking the financial wherewithal, the US would 
finance and equip any French forces that might combine with Britain to re-colonize 
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Southeast Asia. Thus, British dependence on American assistance would frustrate any 
attempts to restore France.  
Britain would have large negative trade imbalances after the war, meaning they would 
need assistance to fix their economy. Only the US could grant the postwar aid necessary to 
offset these imbalances. Cadogan feared, “Without such aid there was no hope of” creating 
“equilibrium in the balance of payments.”7 American aid, however, was tied to the 
acceptance of their ideas on colonialism and free trade, both of which undermined the 
reestablishment of the Empire as set up in the interwar period. Having already accepted anti-
Empire commercial pledges in Article VII of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement, British 
options for restarting their economy were limited. Only an equitable Anglo-American 
arrangement on monetary policy could assist in reinvigorating British trade and in turn create 
the economic prosperity necessary to prop up France as well as themselves. As 1944 
dawned, the FO felt, “[T]he extent to which [US] policy expands or restricts British trade 
opportunities” will “determin[e] the course of Anglo-American relations.”8 Bretton Woods – 
the major monetary conference of the war – would be Britain’s opportunity to turn the tide 
and secure a better postwar economic footing that was necessary to restore the Empire and 
their great power status.  
Bretton Woods 
 The main salvos of Bretton Woods (July 1 – 22, 1944) actually took place before the 
conference. The Americans and British each wanted the plan drafted by their chief 
economists adopted, the White Plan and Keynes Plan, respectively. Anglo-American 
monetary talks had been ongoing since the Lend-Lease discussions. However, when the 
Treasury Department sent the Cabinet the final draft of the White Plan, the discussions 
turned to negotiations. The problem was that these talks were bilateral, which did not allow 
the British to employ either of their main diplomatic tactics.  
 The White Plan, created by Harry Dexter White, aimed to make the US Dollar “the 
de facto currency in the system” and replace “the bilateral diplomacy of the 1930s” that was 
the basis of the Sterling bloc (the Empire’s monetary setup) with “broad international 
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agreements” on currency valuations, proclaims James M. Boughton. 9 With the 
implementation of the plan, America would have “veto over exchange variations and access 
to international resources” that had been locked up by British trade practices, declared 
economist Alfred Eckes. 10 Plus, it would create “the basis for a successful penetration of 
global markets by American business,” observes Georg Schild.11 White had designed the plan 
to aid FDR in installing American economic principles worldwide. For instance, it was 
agreed that “the Bank should assist in providing capital … for projects which will raise the 
productivity of the borrowing country.”12 Furthermore, “other countries would sign up to 
the scheme in order to get vital emergency access to dollars.”13 Thus, it was readily visible 
that the plan was drawn directly from FDR’s desire to combine the New Deal with the 
Good Neighbor Policy – the International New Deal – with its focus on what Maier termed 
the “politics of productivity.”14 
 Keynes’ initial concern was “the part played by gold.”15 “The White Plan,” noticed 
economist John Williams, sought “to preserve as much as possible the previous role of 
gold.”16 According to White, “the trouble in the ‘30s” happened when “country after country 
went off of gold and their currency began to depreciate,” which had led to “floating 
exchanges.”17 Keynes wanted floating exchanges to incentivize creditor nations to aid debtor 
nations in ending depreciations by reducing the value of creditor nations’ holding of the 
debtor nations’ currency. White felt, however, a fixed rate – gold – was needed to end the 
trend of nationalistic depreciations emblematic of the interwar period, which the Roosevelt 
administration concluded had been a driving force behind the prewar economic instability 
and a root cause of WWII. As Hull proclaimed, ‘economic nationalism’ caused the ‘division 
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and weakening and final breakdown, of the necessary international foundation on which 
peace is based.’18  
The difference between the two economists over gold reflected the main divergence 
between their plans: whether imbalances should be corrected solely by the debtor (White) or 
by both the creditor and debtor (Keynes). The differences were indicative of the two 
countries’ wartime economic positions, with the Americans being the Premier creditor 
nation and the British being a major debtor nation. A dual system would help the British 
eliminate their trade imbalances more quickly; decreasing their dependency on American aid. 
Floating exchanges were part of Keynes’ plan to assist debtor nations, but his chief 
mechanism was the Clearing Union.  
The Clearing Union was designed to stabilize capital flows, which envisioned 
“creditors as well as debtors would be pressured to take corrective action to reduce 
imbalances,” relates Steil.19A reserve fund would be established into which creditor nations 
would be incentivized to deposit funds. The debtor nations could draw from this fund to 
correct imbalances and end depreciations. White felt that the International Monetary Fund 
should provide “some measure of intelligent control of the volume and direction of foreign 
investment is desirable.”20 However, with America being the largest creditor nation, they did 
not want “the Fund’s resources to meet a large or sustained outflow of capital.”21 Therefore, 
White’s plan envisioned only debtor nations would correct imbalances. The differences on 
capital flows and floating exchanges meant their plans differed too much to be melded 
together, though Keynes thought and more importantly argued otherwise.  
The Joint Statement 
America’s economic leverage played a major role in the victory of the White Plan. 
However, this influence was made insurmountable when Keynes proposed the idea of a 
Joint Statement (issued April 1944). Steil notes that the Englishman felt, “[I]f the two could 
agree the other Allies would have little leverage and quickly fall in line.” The idea of a joint 
Anglo-American statement on monetary policy was not received well by the Cabinet, 
whereas the Americans were quite thrilled by the proposal. The Cabinet’s objections were 
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quelled by the argument that to “reject the joint statement,” since the US had latched onto 
the idea, would “place nonmilitary American aid in dangerous jeopardy,” which revealed the 
effects of British dependency on American assistance. Yet, while Keynes was trying to 
overcome the Cabinet’s objections, he failed to realize he was being outfoxed by White. He 
“outmaneuvered his far more brilliant but willfully ingenuous British counterpart,” declares 
Steil, because the British economist failed to comprehend he was being tactically bested by 
the Treasury official in his scheme to make the White Plan, the Joint Statement.22  
 Keynes’ hope of influencing the makeup of the Joint Statement was ended when it 
was decided to issue it prior to Bretton Woods. This decision gave White the ability to 
concoct the statement alone because no Anglo-American meeting to draft the document 
would occur. Therefore, ‘everything of importance had been discussed and settled in the two 
years’ leading up to the conference, conveyed Treasury Official Edward Bernstein.23 In his 
attempts to force upon the other allies the Anglo-American plan, Keynes had highlighted 
that the two plans were similar. This maneuver backfired. White used his counterpart’s 
statements about the similarities of the two plans to include in the Joint Statement a gold-
convertible exchange and the quota system, his version of exchange rate determination and 
capital flow decisions, respectively. The exchange meant a currency’s value would be based 
on its relations to the gold convertible exchange currency. The quota system called for every 
country not just creditors to endow the IMF. Both designs favored American economic 
principles.  
White’s maneuvering was so effective that at the end of the conference Canadian 
delegation head, Louis Raminsky, stated “the area of agreement on principles was found to 
be very wide” and “was embodied in the Joint Statement.”24 With the statement codifying a 
pro-American version of capital flows and currency exchange, the remaining differences 
between the Anglo-Americans were over the administrative details. White designed an 
ingenious scheme to control that debate.  
The Conference 
Bretton Woods took place in two stages. However, the possibility of altering the 
Joint Statement at either stage was eliminated by the way White set up the committees and 
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commissions at the steering and drafting meetings, respectively. To give the conference the 
feel of an international negotiation instead of revealing it as the fait accompli it was, he placed 
foreign ministers atop the committees/commissions. Yet, White placed Americans in the 
group’s second slot tasked with undermining any alternatives to the Joint Statement. The 
‘one general rule,’ Fed official Emanuel Goldenweiser declared, is ‘that anybody can talk as 
long as he pleases provided he doesn’t say anything.’25 Steil notes, “a risk of committee 
debates actually shaping the Fund” or Bank never existed.26 After the steering meeting 
finished with no major changes to the Joint Statement, the full meeting convened. The 
commissions for the full conference were tasked with determining the administrative details 
of the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development later renamed 
the World Bank.   
The Fund was designed to provide resources to promote and protect financial 
stability and let loose blocked trade channels. It was emergency funding, whereas the Bank 
would provide long-term credits, i.e., postwar reconstruction lending. Unlike the Keynes 
Plan, which had built-in mechanisms to cause needed readjustments, the Fund’s members 
would determine when its resources should be used to correct international financial 
problems. The quota-based voting system followed Roosevelt’s desire to place the Sino-
American partnership atop the postwar power structures. The two countries’ votes in the 
IMF, determined by a nation’s quota, could outvote the rest of its members, sans the other 
US dependents in Latin America.27  
The crafty American economist even kept the various drafts of the Articles of 
Agreement hidden from other delegations so they could not understand its full broad 
strokes. Keynes was kept busy by heading the Bank’s commission. It, however, “mainly 
played the role of providing incentives [reconstruction loans] for the states to join the 
Fund,” relates Schild, which then tied the country to American economic principles.28 Yet, 
chairing the commission gave Keynes the confidence that he was working with the 
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Americans and could modify the articles “behind the scenes” to include mechanisms to 
force reluctant creditor nations to assist debtor states.29  
 The major achievement for White (and the American economy) occurred during the 
IMF debates on July 13th. British delegation member Dennis Robertson asked, would it not 
‘be easier for this purpose to regard the United States dollar as what was intended when we 
speak of gold convertible exchange [the unit of record for the Bank and the Fund]?’30 
Robertson “walked into White’s trap,” observes Steil. White used the term gold-convertible 
as cover for the Dollar. Once Robertson put forth the motion, the Americans’ quickly 
gaveled through the modification. Henceforth, all national currency values would be based 
on their relation to the Dollar. Thus, the Dollar displaced the Pound, and as a result, 
Washington, not London, would direct global finances. Keynes, still under the impression 
that he was working with the Americans “behind the scenes,” only realized after the 
conference the major shift ushered in by Robertson.31  
 One detail not covered in the Joint Statement was the exact location of the Fund and 
the Bank. The British were adamant to have one in London and the other in the US. This 
setup would give the appearance that commercial and monetary policies were controlled by 
the Anglo-American partnership and would “afford a formal link with the United States that 
would transcend the Grand Alliance,” emphasizes Randall Woods.32 If accepted, the 
European countries might still look towards the UK for guidance on commercial and 
monetary policy decisions as part of Churchill’s desire that matters “concerning European 
economic affairs” be “handled in London.”33 Having the Bank based in London was the 
final option Britain had to influence postwar global financial decisions, after the defeats thus 
far in the conference. However, the Americans were convinced that both institutions had to 
be located in Washington.34 To ensure they received the votes necessary to locate them in 
the US, the Americans increased the amounts smaller nations could withdraw from the Bank 
in return for their votes. This maneuver revealed the power the US had through controlling 
lending and why it was so important to the implementation of the International New Deal.  
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Keynes reproached Morgenthau in a ‘very combative’ manner about the attempts to 
bribe the smaller United Nations. The Englishman, relates Steil, threatened “to ‘withdraw’ 
from the conference.”35 The Secretary had two conflicting priorities forced upon him; 
Britain’s chief economist’s support was necessary to usher through the Joint Statement, yet 
Congress had to be appeased to ratify the agreements. Therefore, Morgenthau insinuated 
that British compliance to American postwar economic planning would be a condition for a 
postwar aid. This threat scared Keynes, again exposing the impact of Britain’s dependency 
on American assistance. After the meeting, the British accepted that the US would house 
both institutions. Even the Anglophile Acheson had to confide to British delegation 
member, Lionel Robbins, ‘You fellows will have to give way on this matter.’36 Robbins 
pleaded, ‘We know we will be beaten’ but please help us ‘avoid being humiliated.’37 The 
Americans accepted the appeal and included the clause, “The Bank may establish agencies or 
branch offices in the territories of any member.” 38 Thus, a regional branch could be located 
in London.  
The British debacle at Bretton Woods meant other methods had to be found to 
reinvigorate their postwar economy, particularly their export trade. The design of White’s 
plan forced England alone, not their creditors, to offset their trade imbalances. A major 
option – pro-debtor nation monetary policy – for restarting the British economy, a 
prerequisite for reestablishing their Empire as well as France’s, had thus been lost. The more 
rapidly these imbalances were offset by reinvigorated trade, the less American aid would be 
needed, with its ramifications on Britain’s planning. The attempts to revive their trade as 
quickly as possible are an often overlooked aspect of Churchill diplomacy in 1944, which 
explains a number of his seemingly chaotic maneuvers.  
The Russian Stage 
“With the primary Soviet task after the war being economic reconstruction, the 
USSR” was “‘extremely interested’ in American economic assistance,” emphasizes V.O. 
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Petchanov.39 The Bank was just the type of access to funds they needed. As a result, the 
Soviets resumed the adversarial bargaining tactics that they had displayed throughout the 
conferences of 1943, sans the FDR/Stalin talks. The West, particularly the Americans, 
“showed considerable resentment towards the Soviet Union and its negotiational strategy” at 
Bretton Woods, declares Schild. M.S. Stepanov, head of the Russian delegation, played the 
role of the good cop. However, he always had to secure Moscow’s (bad cop) assent to move 
on his two positions: a quota on par with the UK (1.3 billion) and a 50% reduction in their 
contribution to the Fund.40 Their underlying interest was more power in the Fund while 
decreasing their contribution to it as well as increasing access to the Bank’s credits.  
Roosevelt wanted to use the Fund as another mechanism to tie the Soviets to 
postwar cooperation. Recall his belief, ‘Nations will learn to work together only by actually 
working together.’41 Still, the IMF with the Bank as it carrot was the foundation of his ability 
to instill US economic principles worldwide. The Americans, therefore, were only willing to 
go so far to obtain Russian adherence to the accords. Thus, Morgenthau countered that the 
Soviets could have one of the two demands. Days later, Stepanov returned with another 
counter offer. He emphasized his ability to reduce the amounts to 1.2 billion and only a 25% 
reduction in their contribution but then added a new demand that, of course, Moscow had 
forced upon him. The Russians wanted the gold mined during the war to not count towards 
their gold liability – the data used to calculate a country’s Fund contribution. Morgenthau 
vented his frustrations, ‘I am shocked that two great nations should begin what we call ‘to 
horse trade.’42 Eden lamented, ‘It was disparaging to negotiate with the Soviet Government 
when they invariably raised their price at every meeting.’43 By offering movement on one 
position, the Soviets added a new demand making the negotiation more difficult and lengthy.  
 Stepanov’s use of hard tactics, especially increasing Russia’s demands, created a time 
crunch for the Americans. The administration wanted to conclude the conference before the 
Democratic Presidential Convention. With an agreement in hand, the accords could be a 
“part of the Democratic Platform, and brand the Republicans rejecting the plan as 
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isolationists,” observes Steil. The Americans countered the Russian offer with the removal of 
their wartime gold liability and a choice of either the reduction or the increase. Stepanov, 
playing the good cop, implied that he thought the offer reasonable but stated his Moscow 
bosses were willing to sever the negotiations if these demands were not met.44 “[T]hreats can 
lead to counter-threats in an escalating spiral that can unhinge a negotiation and even destroy 
a relationship,” emphasizes Fisher et al.45 Feeling time restrictions and fearing a ruined 
conference, the Americans conceded. 
The Soviets’ adversarial tactics achieved their desired results, but they were sidelined 
for the remainder of the conference. Morgenthau told White, ‘You tell Mr. Stepanov I am 
afraid this is the last time he is going to say thank you at this conference.’46 As a result, the 
Russians, the only country with leverage over the Americans, did not alter the inner 
workings of the IMF, a decision the Soviets would come to regret. Still, the US did not 
concede a hard position to gain Russian adherence; FDR could still use the institutions to 
implement the International New Deal. The next major conference – Dumbarton Oaks – 
concerned Stalin’s underlying interest – security. He felt “the postwar organization” was the 
best possible way for the “maintenance of security” after the war, notes Hilderbrand.47 
Therefore, the Russians adversarial tactics became amplified.  
Dumbarton Oaks 
The Dumbarton Oaks Conference (Aug. 21 – Oct. 9, 1944) was similar to Cairo and 
Teheran. The Americans wanted the Big Four – China, UK, US, and USSR – to meet and 
hash out the details of the UNO. The Russians were still unwilling to meet with the Chinese. 
Therefore, like the conferences in 1943, Dumbarton Oaks had two phases: first, a Russian 
phase, and then a Chinese phase.  
The Russian Phase 
The Russian phase was long and contentious. The two relatively easy parts were 
regional groupings and France’s role in the organization. Churchill abandoned regionalism 
for the UNO when the Americans agreed that regional arrangements could be under its 
auspice, setting the stage for his movement towards the Western-bloc concept (detailed 
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momentarily). In their attempts to restore France, Cadogan secured American and Russian 
agreement that a permanent seat on the Security Council – the executive committee of the 
organization – alongside the Big Four should be given “in due course” to France.48 The PM 
believed the French would be dependent on England after the war in a manner similar to the 
Sino-American dependency. De Gaulle noticed that Churchill felt, “[I]t would be for the best 
that France participate [in European Control], but on condition that she does so as a 
subordinate.”49 Therefore, the French could offset America’s Chinese-enhanced voting 
power in the Security Council but only if she and Britain were not dependent on American 
economic assistance.  
Initially, broad-based agreement seemed possible, but soon this hope dissipated. 
“The preliminary proposals drawn up by the three powers,” declares Hilderbrand, “revealed 
a broad base of common ground.” The differences arose over how dominant a role the Big 
Four would have in the UNO. They all agreed that the Security Council alone could use 
military force to maintain peace. However, Stalin wanted great power concurrence before its 
use. “For Stalin, great power unanimity was much more than a voting principle,” notes 
Hilderbrand. “[I]t was sin qua non of any effective peacekeeping organization.”50 Gromyko 
argued ‘The moment this principle of unanimity breaks down there is war.’51 The West was 
divided on the scope of the Big Four’s veto power.  
The British and the State Department believed that voting on a matter to which one 
was a party violated a liberal sense of justice. Others in the Roosevelt administration felt 
differently, arguing that if the US did not possess a veto over the use of military force, the 
Senate would never ratify the UNO’s charter. At first, FDR was in the latter camp, since 
Senate approval was a factor in his thinking. Early in the conference, however, Hull met with 
the President and convinced him to adopt the State Department’s position that only a super 
majority in the Security Council should be required, i.e., no veto.52 Once again FDR’s vision 
of American socio-economic principles trumped his desire to placate domestic opinions. 
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The new American position was “a shock to the Soviet delegation,” wrote 
Cadogan.53 Stalin believed the new “stance represented a retreat from the principle of 
unanimity among the Great Powers set forth … at Teheran,” relates Hilderbrand.54 The 
Russians wanted the veto provision because they feared “being isolated within the 
organization,” observes Schild.55 Not surprisingly, they reacted to the new American position 
with a new demand – membership for all sixteen Soviet republics. When an adversarial 
bargainer’s underlying interest is threatened, as noted, they tend to escalate threats, creating a 
negative spiraling effect. Stalin “expected his Western Allies to take advantage of their 
overwhelming number of votes” to “turn [the UNO] against” him, contends Hilderbrand.56 
The Russians’ new position was understandable; still, it was untenable. These republics were 
not independent states. During the Soviet period of the Russian Empire, modern nation-
states, such as Belarus were considered Soviet republics akin to US states. 
FDR feared that “Soviet insistence” over membership “would ruin the chance of 
getting an international organization approved by the United States Senate,” declares 
Schild.57 The Americans tried to convince Gromyko to quash the demand, but he would not 
budge without movement on the veto issue. Still, unwilling to grant a uniform veto, 
Roosevelt tried to appeal to Stalin. However, the Marshal opposed any changes; he worried 
“that plans for the new organization were moving too far away from Roosevelt’s idea of 
Four Policeman” unanimity.58 Russian intransigence caused a change in the American 
strategy. Therefore, “[f]rom mid-September on[;] American strategy,” notes Schild, “shifted 
from seeking compromise with the Soviet Union to postponing the debate” until Yalta.59 In 
the end, emphasizes Hilderbrand, “difficult decisions were deferred.”60  
The Americans felt that the “settlement of these items could best be handled by the 
President personally.”61 The Russians who also desired a successful conference, agreed to 
wait until the next Big Three meeting to make final decisions on the veto and membership 
question. In the end, the Big Three decided “the best solution” was “for the delegates to find 
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‘some general language’ to cover the disputed points.”62 The Chinese phase of the 
conference did not start until Sept. 28th; this is important to note as it is after the next 
conference – Québec II.  
Octagon 
The typical narrative of Québec II (Octagon; Sept. 12-16, 1944) portrays, “The quid 
pro quo [to which] Churchill” had agreed, argues Kimball, was “the Morgenthau Plan” for 
“a continuation of Lend-Lease to aid British reconstruction.”63 Simply stated, Britain’s 
weakened standing in the wartime alliance coupled with their poor postwar economic 
prospects forced the PM to accept the Morgenthau Plan – a treasury scheme to turn 
Germany into an agricultural instead of an industrial state. The plan aimed to make her “so 
dependent on imports that Germany [could] not by its own devices reconvert to war 
production.”64 In return, Churchill acquired FDR’s assistance in securing an increase in 
supplies during Phase II of Lend-Lease.65 The PM declared in his memoirs that he was 
cajoled into accepting the plan, part of the confusion over the way Octagon 
transpired.66Also, Hull and Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War, both opponents of the 
plan, also portrayed the agreement in this manner after the war.67 
The PM’s post-meeting feelings are what matter moving forward since the outcome 
of Octagon “sen[t] Churchill scurrying off to Moscow,” as Kimball contends.68 However, as 
Michael Bescheloss notes, “At crucial moments in his diplomacy, he performed surprising 
flip-flops, trying to maximize British influence, even if it cost him consistency. The Prime 
Minister’s overnight reversal on the Morgenthau Plan was” one “such example.”69 
Furthermore, the PM “played outrageously fast and loose with his facts in his six volumes of 
The Second World War,” contends Andrew Roberts.70 The plan appealed to Churchill for other 
reasons than increased Lend-Lease aid, at the time. Only after the war was this justification 
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put forth. These reasons exposed why he “played fast and loose” with the details, and it is 
important to take into account Britain’s concerns about dependence on American assistance 
as well as England’s resulting need to restart their trade in understanding the PM’s diplomacy 
in late 1944.71  
Prior to Octagon, the British had suffered a number of setbacks in their planning for 
a quick postwar economic recovery, especially trade, which was needed to reestablish the 
Empire. Recall, “Keynes knew that Article VII” of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement was 
“an end to Imperial Preference,” and now the Bretton Woods Accords did not assist debtor 
nations’ attempts to offset trade imbalances, i.e., the two principle options to restart Britain’s 
economy.72 The Americans had shown little desire to help London in this process because 
American assistance was their leverage to get British adherence to the International New 
Deal. Instead, Hull and Morgenthau had made it clear that the British needed to restore their 
trade on their own, though under American economic philosophies. As a result, Britain 
“must increase its civilian production” to “begin to restore its lost export trade” proclaimed 
the FO.73 Britain wanted Phase II “written in such a way as to allow her to reduce her 
production of munitions while reviving her production of civilian goods, a key factor in the 
recovery of both her domestic and export industries,” relates David Woolner.74 This plan 
was seen as their last resort to revive their economy, or so it was thought prior to Octagon. 
It is true that Phase II played a vital role in the restoration of the British economy. 
However, Octagon’s Phase II clauses were only beneficial to British interests after the fact when 
later events caused a change in American planning. Churchill’s questionable retelling and the 
implications of the Phase II agreements at Octagon create a need to find a different set of 
reasons for why he accepted the plan than has typically been presented.  
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The Morgenthau Plan 
On the third day of the meeting, Morgenthau introduced his idea to the British. In 
his war memoirs, Churchill states that “[a]t first” he was “violently opposed to this idea.”75 
However, before the next meeting, the PM’s treasury advisor, Lord Cherwell, brought 
Churchill around to the idea. Woolner emphasizes that Cherwell “possessed considerable 
powers of persuasion,” over the PM.76 The British Lord highlighted that due to the plan, the 
British “foreign exchange position will be strengthened” by the “expansion of her exports” 
into the former German markets.77 As Eden contended, “Cherwell had supported 
Morgenthau and their joint advocacy prevailed.”78 The PM finding the desirability of 
expanding into new markets calls into question the standard Octagon narrative, as new 
markets could also restart Britain’s foreign trade. The State Department concluded this was 
Churchill’s reason for accepting the plan, noting “The proposal apparently appealed to the 
Prime Minister on the basis that Great Britain would thus acquire a lot of Germany’s iron 
and steel markets and eliminate a dangerous competitor.”79 This scheme, unlike a Phase II 
increase in supplies, would decrease British dependency on American aid, with its 
ramifications for the Empire.  
The PM claims in his memoirs to have “had no time to examine [the Plan] in 
detail.”80 Yet, both Cherwell’s and Morgenthau’s records of these conversations revealed 
contradictory evidence.81  The most conclusive proof that Churchill understood the 
Morgenthau Plan was that he dictated the Québec Memo, which outlined the plan. “The 
result is the document,” noted the State Department, “was entirely the Prime Minister’s 
drafting.”82 Amidst his transcription, FDR interrupted and told his friend that 
deindustrialization “does not apply to the Ruhr and Saar, but the whole of Germany.” Eden 
was “quite shocked at what he heard” and stated, ‘You can’t do this.’ The PM contended 
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‘what this meant in the way of trade’ was worth it; ‘they would get the export trade of 
Germany.’ He finished with, ‘the future of my people is at stake, and when I have to choose 
between my people and the German people I am going to choose my people.’83 The 
exchange with Eden and dictating the memo exposed that Churchill knew the details of the 
plan. Plus, the line concerning Germany’s export trade revealed why the PM actually agreed 
to it. The only major decision regarding Phase II also adds further weight to this contention. 
The agreement at Octagon was only “on the creation of the lend-lease committee,” 
which “will agree and recommend to the Head of their respective Governments the amount 
of Mutual Aid … to be provided for the most effective prosecution of the war.”84A link had 
been established but not between Phase II and the Morgenthau Plan, instead between British 
participation in the Pacific and the aid they would receive during Phase II. As will be 
detailed, this linkage further calls into question the typical narration of Octagon. 
Additionally, this agreement does not seem like enough “quo” to entice the PM to agree to a 
plan to which he was supposedly “violently opposed.” Morgenthau, though biased, “denied 
that there was any connection between the Prime Minister’s acceptance of the German 
policy … and his eager desire to obtain a commitment on Lend-Lease in Phase 2.”85 Instead, 
the Americans had harnessed the momentum of the negotiation process by eliminating first 
the Imperial Preference and then a pro-debtor nation monetary policy, Britain’s two main 
options for restarting their economy. These actions left Churchill a choice between a Phase 
II agreement, which relied on American goodwill, or it and the Morgenthau Plan, with the 
latter’s possibility of new markets. The second option was clearly more appealing at the time 
since new markets would reduce Britain’s dependence on US aid.  
At the same time Churchill accepted the plan, he was becoming more convinced of 
the need to integrate Germany into his planning. Presidential advisor Bernard Baruch 
“found the British torn between a fear of a resurgent Germany, capable of again waging war, 
and a desire to rebuild her as a buffer against an aggressive Russia” after his discussions with 
                                                          
83.  FRUS: Québec II, 362. 
84.  Ibid, 348, 372, 468.Treasury notes on Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting on September 14; Québec 
Memorandum on Lend-Lease to the United Kingdom.  
85.  FRUS: Yalta, 135, 137. September 20, 1945 State Department memo on German Economy. Backing 
Morgenthau’s statement is the fact that “the memorandum on lend-lease aid was not drafted until the final day, 
Churchill had agreed to the policy on Germany prior to the drafting of the memorandum.” 
 115 
Churchill that summer.86 He discarded the Morgenthau Plan in November. Only after the 
Empire’s traditional avenues of trade were granted more security and an economically viable 
Germany was needed to be part of the British bulwark against Russia was this decision made 
(detailed below). The PM decision to abandon the plan was made after the President had 
abandoned it himself, again revealing that Churchill had his own reasons to adhere to the 
plan. Thus, the only lasting decision at Octagon in regards to Germany was that Britain 
would safeguard the northwest zone and the Americans the southwest zone during the 
postwar occupation. 
Military Matters 
The meeting at Québec was a military meeting despite the fact that the political 
decisions are often the most discussed outcomes of the conference. The British realized that 
if they were going to receive a fair hearing from the Americans about postwar economic 
help, “It was only to be expected that the British Empire in return would give the United 
States all the help in their power towards defeating Japan,” declared Churchill.87  However, 
they had to overcome that “[p]sychologically most Americans,” revealed Halifax, “view[ed] 
the war against the Japanese as their own concern, to be concluded on their own terms.”88 
Plus, the Americans feared that the main British fleet was going “to be employed for political 
reasons.”89 This feeling was justified because the PM made it well known that his main 
concern was that “Singapore must be redeemed.”90 Singapore was not part of the previously 
agreed strategy for defeating Japan – the island-hopping campaign – and thus fostered 
suspicions that the Fleet would be used for political ends.  
The President’s misgivings were heightened when the State Department warned him 
that “British policy has swung behind restoration of French authority” in Indochina to 
“strengthen their claim for restoration of Hong Kong.” The link between their postwar 
planning and military designs was revealed when “reports indicate[d] a British hope to 
extend the SEAC Theater to include Indochina, most of the Dutch East Indies, Borneo and 
Hong Kong,” plus, a “British desire to create a Southeast federation of Burma, Malaya, 
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Thailand and Indochina under British aegis.”91 The PM went so far as to tell FDR ‘the 
interests in this theater are overwhelmingly British.’92 These actions had increased US 
suspicions about British motives but also exposed the united Anglo-French colonial front 
the Britain was pursuing. In that vein, Britain tried to restore France as a major power during 
the conference, further alarming the Americans.93  
The British envisioned the Anglo-French combination liberating Southeast Asia with 
the control over the region’s transition to peace that entailed. “[T]he desire to see Britain’s 
colonial territories in Southeast Asia wrested back from Japan by her own military efforts,” 
notes Christopher Thorne was “simply one particularly pertinent example” of the British 
putting political aims above military expediency.94 Thus, “Churchill nursed the ill-founded 
delusion that victory over Japan would enable Britain to sustain its rule in India, and reassert 
command of Burma and Malaya,” observes Hastings.95 The Americans “[i]n principle wished 
to accept the British Fleet in the Pacific,” but these reports and their actions at the 
conference created reservations about the implications of British participation. 96 Therefore, 
the US put qualifiers on England’s involvement. 
 It was determined that “[t]he British Fleet should participate in the main operations 
against Japan in the Pacific, with the understanding that this fleet will be balanced and self-
supporting.”97 Thus, the implication was the US would support the British efforts if they 
helped defeat Japan, but if they pursued their political agenda, the Americans would enact 
the qualifiers placed in this clause as well as the aforementioned Phase II clause, ‘for the 
most effective prosecution of the war.’98 American actions at Octagon were designed to 
control the direction of British participation in the Pacific, a direct attack on Britain’s 
underlying interest – the reestablishment of the Empire and the great power status it 
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conferred – something Churchill could not overlook.99 In his final conversation with 
Canadian PM Mackenzie King at Québec II, the British leader expressed frustration with the 
“struggle he had just had in getting the Americans to accept a British Fleet that would work 
with the U.S. Fleet” and that the role of the fleet was one of ‘sub-participation,’ relates Roger 
Sarty.100 
The PM achieved some military success at the conference by securing landing-craft 
for the Italian campaign. As he obtusely told Alanbrooke, the British are “coming to Québec 
solely to obtain 20 landing ships out of the Americans to carry out an operation against 
Istria.”101 Admiral King promised “to lend [the British] his landing-craft” for the attack. The 
JCS, however, repaid the British for Buccaneer by placing certain conditions on the 
agreement: only if “Kesselring forces [are] routed” then could the Allied forces in Italy 
embark on “a pursuit towards the Ljubljana Gap.”102 Unfortunately, as Mckerber details, 
“The British advance into Southern Austria was blunted by the inability of Allied armies to 
win a decisive victory in Italy.”103 By the beginning of October it was clear, lamented 
Churchill, that all “hopes of a decisive victory had faded,” which meant Russia would 
liberate all of Eastern Europe and possibly Central Europe.104 The Soviet’s potential 
dominance over Eastern Europe and the recent American undermining of Britain’s 
underlying interests caused the PM to search out an understanding with the rising 
Continental power.  
The Western-bloc 
Still an avowed anti-communist, Churchill concluded that a bulwark against Russia 
was also essential. Lord Moran wrote, “Winston never talks of Hitler these days, he is always 
harping on the dangers of communism. He dreams of the Red Army spreading like a cancer 
from one country to another.”105A strong France was the only hope for a barrier between 
England and Russia. At Octagon, Churchill felt “that the time had not yet come to recognize 
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formally the [French Committee] as the provisional government of France.”106 After the 
setbacks at Québec II and in pursuit of a new strategy, the PM “was now prepared to 
recommend in concert with our Allies, the official acceptance of this body as the 
Government of Liberated France.”107 This decision was part of a turn towards his version of 
the Anglo-Soviet understanding, based on spheres of influence.  
During the first part of the war, the FO had drawn up plans based on British and 
Soviet spheres in Western and Eastern Europe, respectively. Duff Cooper laid out the plan, 
our “policy should be directed towards the formation of a group of the western democracies, 
bound together by the most explicit terms of alliance. That the nucleus of that group should 
be the Powers that have fought and suffered together – Great Britain, France, Belgium, 
Holland, Norway, and Denmark. There is no reason why it should not subsequently be 
extended to Sweden, to Portugal and Spain, and to Italy.”108 Churchill felt the idea was the 
best way to work with and bracket the Russians. Yet, he went even further than the FO; the 
PM wanted Germany attached to the grouping. He told Colville ‘no alternative to the 
acceptance of Germany as part of the family of Europe after the war’ was possible.109 
Churchill felt it was best if Germany was pro-Western instead of pro-Russian. Recall the 
American’s agreement about regional groupings under the UNO’s auspice. Thus, the 
Western-bloc could create the regional European council the PM had always desired. Along 
with the spheres of influence for which the bloc was designed, the combination could 
recreate a balance of power set up while allowing Britain to remain the Big Three’s 
intermediary.  
Octagon was the low point for Britain, when no one was helping them to protect the 
vital trade routes in the Near East and Southeast Asia. Therefore, the PM tried to find a way 
to reinvigorate trade independent of those routes. American leverage based on economic 
superiority had allowed them to dictate the options from which Churchill had to choose, 
hence his acceptance of the Morgenthau Plan. However, the remainder of 1944 provided 
him other ways to protect the traditional trade avenues for the Empire, lessening the PM’s 
need for new markets, thus his abandonment of the plan. The key is that Churchill discarded 
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the Morgenthau Plan in November after the next two major events – the percentage deal 
and the recognition of France.  
Tolstoy 
Prior to the Fourth Moscow Conference (Tolstoy, Oct. 9-19), Churchill told FDR 
that the arrangements made there would only be “a temporary working arrangement for the 
better conduct of the war.”110 The PM also led Stalin to believe that he spoke for both 
Western parties, once again acting as an intermediary. The State Department informed FDR, 
“Apparently the Soviet Government had supposed the whole arrangement had had 
American approval.”111 Hence, Roosevelt “sent a cable to Stalin informing him that 
Churchill had no authority to speak” on his behalf.112 Still, as Leffler stresses, “The 
documents now demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt that the percentage agreement 
was neither designed as a temporary accord pending the end of the war nor contingent upon 
American acceptance.”113 The PM does not even mention the deal in his post-meeting 
message to FDR. 114 
Recall that the junior party in tripartite negotiations gains greater leverage for their 
positions by entering into bilateral understandings prior to a tripartite meeting. At the time 
of Tolstoy, the Big Three were arranging the meeting that was to become Yalta. British 
interests in the Near East, particularly Greece, Egypt, and Turkey, were tantamount to their 
maintenance of the Empire. The region provided the link to India and the Far East (the Suez 
Canal), protected the Middle Eastern trade routes, and provided raw materials for Britain’s 
industrial machine. The Americans, however, would not help the British reestablish 
themselves in the region, as had been revealed throughout the war, most recently in 
Greece.115 Thus, at Moscow, emphasizes Schild, “the Prime Minister was primarily interested 
in preserving the British imperial position [in the Near East] by granting the Soviets a limited 
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sphere of influence in order to contain them in Eastern Europe.”116 The decisions in 1943 
meant that to acquire Russian movement on Eastern Europe – renouncing control over the 
Greek transition to peace – Churchill needed to move from a hard position – integrating the 
region into his European grouping. 
The Percentage Deal 
At their first meeting, Churchill requested of Stalin, “Let us settle about our affairs in 
the Balkans.” The PM then explained what he thought were the percentages of interest in 
each of the Balkan countries. Afterwards, he jotted down the numbers and “pushed [the 
paper] across to Stalin,” who after it was translated “took his blue pencil and made a large 
tick,” indicating his acceptance of the percentages. Revealing that he knew this agreement 
was permanent, the PM asked, “Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had 
disposed of these issues so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let us 
burn the paper.” Stalin knowing this would have value later protested, “No, you keep it.”117 
Thus, to retain a say in Greece, Churchill had forsaken the Balkan confederation, a major 
facet of his ideas on European security.   
The final percentages were worked out the next two days between Molotov and 
Eden.118 The Foreign Secretary later defended the agreement as the “only practicable policy 
to check the spread of Russian influence throughout the Balkans.”119 Their meetings also 
determined how the Allied Control Commissions for Eastern Europe would function, which 
revealed the impact of the Italian surrender precedent.  Except for Greece, it was decided 
“during the period before the German surrender” the commissions in Eastern Europe 
would be under “Russian control.” Only “[a]fter the surrender of Germany, British and 
American representatives would participate.”120 Eden was forced to concur because of the 
precedent and Britain’s desire to keep the Soviets contained.  
The Polish Question 
Poland was the only Eastern European country not included in the agreement 
because of Britain’s close ties to the country. Churchill had “convinced” the Polish Premier 
Stanislaw Mikolajczyk to come to Moscow and meet with Stalin and the Lublin Poles 
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(Russia’s puppet Polish government) with the desire to find a working arrangement between 
the groups. The PM “made it clear that refusal to take part in the conversations would 
amount to a definite rejections of our advice and would relieve us from further 
responsibility” for the London Poles (the legitimate Polish Government).121 Originally, the 
Polish PM had wanted to go in the hopes of obtaining Soviet assistance for the now failed 
Warsaw Uprising. Due to the Russians’ intransigence, that assistance came too late.122 Plus, 
“Roosevelt did not see how he could help the Poles against Stalin’s will without endangering 
the larger objective” of postwar Soviet-American cooperation and more immediately Red 
Army participation in Manchuria, declares Schild.123 Stalin felt the uprising was aimed at 
keeping the Russians out of Poland and propping up an anti-Soviet government. “The 
uprising finally convinced him that” a Soviet-London Pole working “arrangement was not 
possible,” notes Geoffrey Roberts.124 In the end, Mikolajczyk went because he wanted to 
secure a modus Vivendi with the Russians and if possible with the Lublin Poles.   
On Oct. 13th, the first meeting between Mikolajczyk, Stalin, and his sycophants from 
Lublin took place. The PM felt “[i]t was essential for [the London Poles] to make contact 
with the Polish Committee and to accept the Curzon Line as a working arrangement.” Yet, it 
quickly became apparent to all “that the Lublin Poles were mere pawns of Russia.”125 When 
their leader, M. Beirut, stated, “We are here to demand on behalf of Poland that Lvov shall 
belong to Russia,” Mikolajczyk realized he could not work with them. The Polish leader 
would accept the line as one of demarcation but nothing more.126 Stalin, however, “did not 
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think it desirable to proceed with an attempt to form a united Polish government without 
the frontier question being agreed.”127 This difference would not be overcome, and both 
Mikolajczyk and the Marshal took drastic actions after the meeting. The Polish Premier 
resigned, and the Soviet leader recognized his Lublin puppets. 
Spheres of Influence 
In describing the events at Tolstoy to FDR, the PM included, “Contrary to his 
previously expressed view, [Stalin] would be glad to see Vienna the capital of a federation of 
German states” happily continuing “a large Danubian federation.”128 The PM also included, 
“I should prefer to add Hungary” to the federation, but “U.J. is strongly opposed,” which 
revealed the line of demarcation between the Russian and British spheres.129 At Teheran, 
Stalin had shot down the idea of a Danubian confederation.130 He, like with FDR at Teheran, 
had reciprocated because Churchill helped the Soviet Premier on a matter important to the 
preservation of his power – domination of Eastern Europe. Thus, the Marshal removed his 
objections to a non-Eastern European federation. That the PM does not mention Stalin’s 
concession about the possibility of a Danbuian federation in the actual text of Triumph and 
Tragedy is noteworthy in understanding the actual causes of accepting and discarding the 
Morgenthau Plan.131  
The federation would, according to Churchill, “fill the gap caused by the 
disappearance of the Austria Hungarian Empire,” something he believed necessary for 
European stability.132 This omission and the incomplete record described to FDR in the 
PM’s post-meeting message conveyed details of this story were hidden both 
contemporaneously and historically. During Tolstoy, Churchill was still touting the 
Morgenthau Plan, as a means to overcome Stalin’s suspicions, at Teheran, about Britain’s 
intentions towards postwar Germany.133 However, Germany would be needed for the 
Danubian confederation to be economically viable, a prerequisite for a confederation’s 
success. The necessity of an economically viable Germany revealed that one of the reasons 
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Churchill abandoned the Morgenthau Plan was to pursue his version of the Western-bloc, 
since now that was needed as part of his plan to work with the Russians. Additionally, the 
percentage deal protected traditional British trade routes in the Near East decreasing the 
need for new markets. It would also create a grouping on par with the Americans and 
Russians who could act as the Big Three’s go-between. Thus, the PM’s planning had evolved 
but stayed consistent to its original goals of restoring the Empire and creating a balance of 
power setup with London as the intermediary to maintain Britain’s great power status. 
The last reason Churchill abandoned the plan was the Russians’ recognition of the 
Lublin Poles, which eliminated the need to placate Stalin’s fears about Germany. The Soviet 
Premier had his own reasons to maintain the percentage deal – the building up of his 
Eastern sphere – so that deal would not be upset by Britain pursuing a soft peace with 
Germany. Also, his “growing concern over the events in Eastern Europe,” proclaims 
Hilderbrand, “made him only too happy to reestablish a united front with the Americans.”134 
Thus, the PM wanted to maintain the understanding with the Russians and create a united 
front with the US that would deal with the remaining thorny diplomatic issues. Additionally, 
he held fast to the idea of a Western-bloc as a counter balance to America’s superior 
standing. Churchill, therefore, concluded that understandings with the US and USSR would 
reign in the excesses of the excluded party.  
The Russian recognition of the Lublin Poles exposed that Stalin believed the 
percentage deal to be a permanent arrangement. The Marshal felt that the London Poles 
would never be the “friendly government” he needed. Therefore, he wanted ‘a handpicked 
government which will insure Soviet domination,’ wrote Harriman.135 So, it was only natural 
that after Britain seemed to have given them a free hand in the region the Russians would 
‘handpick’ a government in their sphere. The President had made it clear the he “was 
disturbed and deeply disappointed” that Stalin could not “hold in abeyance the question of 
recognizing the Lublin committee … until we have had an opportunity at our meeting to 
discuss the whole question thoroughly.”136If he did not believe the percentage deal was 
permanent, the Marshal would not have acted with such resolve. 
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The Americans recognized the permanency of the deal at Tolstoy as well. The 
percentage deal, declared Stettinius, “made it evident that the United States could no longer 
adhere to the position” that “[a]greements regarding postwar Europe’s problems” could wait 
until the peace conference.137 British actions removed this American option and forced them 
to make decisions earlier than they desired. Similarly, British decisions also changed FDR’s 
planning in the Far East.  
China’s Fall 
General Stilwell launched an attack on Burma with his Chinese forces in April 1944 
to open up the Burma Road. Sadly, notes Louis Allen, “by the time the road was safely 
pushed through to Kunming, it was too late.”138 Stilwell’s invasion failed to achieve its 
objective in time because of the poorly trained nationalist army. Plus, his prospects were 
made more difficult because Buccaneer had been called off due to a lack of landing-craft. 
Landing-craft was a problem; however, England’s hearts were not in it. They “believed that 
Burma should be retaken solely by British forces and then restored to British rule,” which 
meant they “could not support Stilwell’s plan,” contends Wenzhau Tao.139 Buccaneer could 
have diverted forces away from Stilwell’s operations. Regardless, as a result of the failure to 
rapidly open the Burma Road, the Chinese would not have the resources necessary to 
liberate Southeast Asia nor play a decisive role in the final defeat of Japan by clearing 
Japanese troops out of Manchuria. Supplies were one reason China failed to play the role the 
President had imagined for them; the other was the Nationalist forces themselves.  
From the end of Cairo II until mid-October 1944, Roosevelt tried to reinvigorate 
and reorganize Nationalist forces. Immediately after Octagon, FDR cabled Chiang, “I have 
urged you time and again in recent months that you must take drastic action to resist the 
disorder which has been moving closer to China and to you.”140 However, the Chinese were 
never able to coalesce into a proper fighting force. This failure also undermined Stilwell’s 
invasion plan, which was dependent on these forces moving south to meet his forces 
moving east from India. Here is where the British attack would have played a vital role 
making up for Chiang’s forces poor performance. Problems such as discipline, 
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undermanned-formations, and lack of pay plagued the Nationalist Army, but their leadership 
was what really made them a poor fighting force. Chiang had his excuses and told Wallace, 
“[T]he failure to initiate an all-out Burma Campaign had had a decidedly adverse effect on 
Chinese morale.” They “felt that they had been deserted.”141 Still, Roosevelt was so fed up 
with the generalissimo’s lack of success that he even tried to force him to accept Stilwell as 
the commanding officer of all Nationalist forces after more negative reports were received 
post-Octagon.  
When Chiang received FDR’s ultimatum, delivered by Stilwell himself, the Chinese 
leader demanded the general’s recall. Roosevelt recalled Stilwell to appease Chiang. 142 
Ostensibly, the lack of success during his operation was used as the justification for the 
move (Oct. 19). Yet, the President was so despondent with the generalissimo’s regime that 
he “declined to name another American officer to command Chinese armies,” notes Ronald 
Specter, “because he thought the military situation in Eastern China was past saving.”143 It 
was the final determination that culminated in the President’s decision to sideline the 
Chinese for the remainder of his guidance of American diplomacy. 
FDR was beginning to realize that Chiang’s China would never play the role he 
envisioned for them – liberators of Southeast Asia and clearing Manchuria of Japanese 
troops – prior to Chinese phase of Dumbarton Oaks. As a result, they were now seen as 
only as a dependent vote in the UNO and “were relegated in advance to a status that was 
little more than ceremonial,” relates Hildenbrand.144 Therefore, the Chinese phase, declares 
Schild, only “confirmed the results of the first phase.”145 Because the country could still be 
useful to the President in controlling the organization, after he “realize[d] the lessened 
importance of China’s military contributions, he did not then reduce his rhetoric or 
significantly alter the American diplomatic effort in China,” notes Russell Buhite.146 Still, he 
now had to adjust his plans for Manchuria and Southeast Asia.  
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French Recognition and Southeast Asia 
The combination of Chiang’s poor performance and Roosevelt’s unrealistic 
expectations for the Chinese meant the British and French were the only forces available to 
stabilize Southeast Asia. Due to their previous possession of the region, they had 
administrators with experience in stabilizing Southeast Asia as well as the troops and the 
desire to assume this role. The Americans used the “effective use” clause of Phase II to 
increase British participation in the region instead of decreasing it, as Octagon had 
portended. “British forces” were then given a free hand to liberate their former “colonial 
holdings in South and East Asia,” observes McKerber.147 FDR also complied with 
Churchill’s request and recognized the Free French as the provisional government of France 
(Oct. 24). Plus, despite his belief ‘that Indo-China should not go back to France,” Roosevelt 
allowed the French to reenter Indochina, which had been the centerpiece of his plan to end 
European colonialism.148 Thus, before the PM’s November abandonment of the 
Morgenthau Plan, another avenue for reinvigorating trade and preserving the Empire had 
been presented to him. 
The loss of Indochina and the need for Anglo-French forces to stabilize Southeast 
Asia caused the President’s trusteeship plan to evolve. The JCS wanted military bases in the 
Japanese held islands. Hull related the idea, “I opposed the view of our Joint Chiefs of Staff 
that the Pacific islands we would take from Japan should become United States property.” 
He contended, “[A]ll of the colonial territories wrested from the Axis should be placed 
under a United Nations trusteeship system,” FDR concurred.149 Similarly, the UNO could be 
used as a mechanism to tie the colonial powers to the trusteeship idea. Therefore, the 
President had a “definite desire that the international trusteeship be firmly established and 
that the international organization should provide adequate machinery for that purpose.”150 
The fall of China’s importance in the President’s planning is mirrored by the UNO’s 
ascendency in said plans as the way for the US to control the transition to peace and instill 
the International New Deal.   
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1944 was a bittersweet year for the Americans; they had started the path towards the 
UNO and American economic hegemony. Yet, their options concerning a European 
settlement were limited by the percentage deal. Furthermore, China’s failure as a fighting 
force meant the Anglo-French combination was America’s only choice to liberate Southeast 
Asia. These events precipitated a reduction in China’s importance in FDR’s military planning 
as well, increasing in the US dependence on the Red Army’s help in Manchuria. The 
President was faced with an Anglo-French combination aimed at re-colonizing Southeast 
Asia and an Anglo-Soviet understanding on Eastern Europe that could extend to all of 
Europe. This fear was heightened when, acting like Poland was part of a new Soviet sphere, 
Stalin recognized the puppet Lublin Poles. Faced with these new Anglo-axes, the President’s 
postwar planning was sent reeling.  
The tumult surrounding the administration’s postwar planning in the final months 
prior to Yalta has led many astray. However, since FDR’s underlying interest – the 
International New Deal – has been found and his positions have been traced up to this 
point, briefly retracing this path will help reveal how the President’s positions evolved, where 
they stood entering the conference, and the priority he placed on them. The same process 
can be used to determine British and Russian strategies entering the conference as well. 
Therefore, the work turns to the conclusion of the first part – the Big Three’s strategies for 
Yalta.  
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Epilogue: Strategies 
British 
The fall of France along with further military setbacks in 1940 convinced British 
leadership of their inability to win the war alone and thus radically altered British diplomacy. 
Many Britons worried that “the influence of the mother country and of the Commonwealth 
in general” was “now in the wane.”1 The Cabinet felt that, only with “a revived European 
balance in which Britain had influence, and the recrudescence of a strong Empire,” 
emphasizes McKerber, “could Britain hope to remain a Power of the first rank.”2 They 
concluded a partner was essential to defeat the Germans and assist them in remaining a great 
power. American willingness to aid the British and later their entrance into the war offered 
one potential partner. Equally, the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union presented a second 
possible collaborator. Each country desired the defeat of the Axis threat, but which of the 
nations might assist Britain in maintaining their great power status was unclear.  
Churchill felt “the common identity of the English-speaking peoples” – liberal 
democracies – made them the logical choice.3 As the Prime Minister, Churchill was the 
leader and main mover of British foreign policy; however, the power given the Foreign 
Secretary allowed Eden to conduct his own policy initiatives. He concluded Russia would be 
a better partner since they, unlike the Americans, had a stake in European affairs. Eden’s 
review of the international scene during the interwar period led him to conclude that 
countries would only protect interests vital to them.4 
Both men looked to the past as a guide to reestablish a balance of power setup for 
world politics and as a way to revive the Empire. It is clear, wrote Wallace, that “the English 
theory was still the balance of power theory – the theory which England has always had.”5 
The PM wanted to recreate the Congress of Vienna with America, Britain, and Russia 
controlling the direction of the world politics. The US would dominate the Americas while 
Britain oversaw the Near East as well as Southeast Asia, and they would partner to maintain 
order in Europe and the Far East, relegating Russia to their corner of Eurasia. Eden hoped 
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to create an understanding with the Soviets to maintain order in Europe. With order 
established on the Continent, the British could focus their efforts on restarting the Empire 
and forestalling American encroachment in the Pacific. He assumed the US, like after WWI, 
retreat back to the Western Hemisphere, but continue their economic expansion into the Far 
East. Thus, “[i]t is possible to see the two men by 1941 as already more rivals than allies and 
hence to contend that all their arguments about policy issues have to be seen in this light,” 
notes Carlton.6  
Churchill and Eden felt their plans, the Anglo-American partnership and Anglo-
Soviet understanding, respectively, would protect British interests best if they guided their 
combinations planning with the excluded party. They astutely realized their interests could 
be advanced by directing the manner in which postwar planning transpired through the use 
of two specific tactics – framing and acting as an intermediary. “England would try to deal 
with Russia directly and put us in the position of dealing with Russia through England as an 
intermediary,” noted Wallace.7 As a result, Churchill “went to great lengths in his cables to 
Stalin to present himself,” observes Harbutt, “as the director of Anglo-American strategy.”8 
By getting out in front of the negotiations, the British could create an advantageous 
understanding with the party most likely to align with their interests involved in whatever 
issue was under discussion. Then they could force the hand of non-consulted party, who 
presumably had a position on the issue that was adverse to English interests, since said party 
was presented with a bilateral understanding instead of just Britain’s position. Thus, their 
positions were granted more clout than the weakest party’s position ought to be afforded by 
limiting the options of the non-consulted party choices to ones that aligned better with 
British interests.  
Through these tactics (procedures) the British harnessed the momentum of the 
negotiation process affecting how the Americans and Russians viewed the postwar planning 
alternatives. It is, therefore, revealed how the procedures used allowed the actors to control 
the process by directing its momentum. Furthermore, it is revealed how the process 
controlled the actors by limiting their options as the negotiation progressed. However, by 
pursuing different agendas, the PM and Eden eventually were unable to employ these tactics 
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effectively because one of their use of the tactics worked against the other’s employment of 
them.  
At the Second Moscow Conference, Churchill presented Stalin with Anglo-American 
understandings on supplies and the second front, but he framed them in a manner that most 
protected British interests. The delays in supplies and the second front saved British soldiers 
and shipping, with the hope of allowing them to maintain parity with the Americans after the 
war, as well as allowed for a military focus on the Mediterranean, an area of traditional 
interest to the Empire. However, “the Russians resent[ed]” the “tendency for us to agree on 
matters with the Americans first, and present the results to the Russians,” noted Eden.9 Also, 
the PM’s confederation idea and the US refusal to endorse wartime territorial changes, the 
latter upheld by the British due to Churchill’s insistence, gave rise to Russian fears about a 
revival of the Cordon Sanitaire – the manifestation of Anglo-American ill-will foreshadowed 
by delays in assistance. Thus, when Eden went to work out his Anglo-Soviet understanding 
at the Moscow Minister’s meeting, he was confronted with a more suspicious Molotov, who 
had been instructed to increase the Soviet demands required for postwar cooperation.  
Making matters worse for Eden in his dealings with the Russians, the Americans 
were trying to distance themselves from the British. Roosevelt’s postwar vision was 
predicated on controlling the transition to peace; British guidance of the Anglo-American 
interactions with the Soviets would forestall his ability to implement the International New 
Deal. Plus, fear of the effect that Churchill’s maneuverings were having on his relations with 
Stalin caused the President to openly separate American and British planning. As a result, 
Hull was instructed not to seem like he was “ganging up” with the English against the 
Russians. Eden, therefore, found that the Americans were “most unwilling to make any 
move” with him in regards to Eastern Europe.10 The US desire to separate their planning left 
the Foreign Secretary to bargain with his Russian counterpart mano e mano. The dual problem 
of Hull’s abandonment and Molotov’s increased demands meant Eden was forced to 
concede more to gain less than originally envisioned. Furthermore, what he was able to 
secure – the EAC – was undercut by the same American suspicions generated by the PM.  
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Similarly, the concessions the Foreign Secretary made to lay the groundwork for an 
understanding with the Soviets on Europe severely set back Churchill’s planning. His Anglo-
American partnership was to be aided by a system of confederations for Central and Eastern 
Europe, one aspect of his plan to reestablish a balance of power setup for Europe and 
maintain control over Southeast Asia.11 Eden’s concessions included allowing the Russians 
and Czechs to sign a treaty. As a result, Poland and Czechoslovakia would never enter into a 
confederation as called for in Churchill’s planning. While at first Britain’s tactics had 
protected and even advanced their interests, now due in large part to the PM and Eden 
working at cross purposes, the tactics were backfiring and had caused the US and Russia to 
evolve their positions away from Britain and towards each other. 
The failure of the first attempts to find a postwar combination was typified by the 
Roosevelt and Stalin talks at Teheran. The President was successful enough at separating 
Western planning that he and the Marshal began to form their own understanding. 
Decisions (or lack thereof) at Teheran, reflected Soviet-American preferences on issues, such 
as the Polish question. The last option to resurrect Britain’s failing initial plans – using the 
Curzon Line as a bargaining chip to attach the Poles to the Czech-Soviet Treaty – was 
undercut by FDR’s acceptance of Stalin’s position on the Soviet-Polish border. Afterwards, 
Eden feared “that Russia has vast aims” and that “it was impossible to work with these 
people even as partners against a common foe,” which caused him to abandon his attempts 
at an understanding with the Soviets.12 Even though Teheran was a major setback the two 
British statesmen were finally working towards the same purpose, meaning future attempts 
to frame position through acting as an intermediary would be more successful.  
The other conferences – Cairo I and II – in the fall of 1943 disturbed the British 
because there, like at Teheran, the US moved away from England and towards another 
partner. The possibility of a Sino-American partnership threatened Britain’s ability to restart 
the Empire, just as a Soviet-American understanding would end the hopes of reestablishing a 
balance of power in Europe. Churchill told Cadogan, ‘Certainly [China] would be a faggot 
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vote on the side of the United States in any attempt to liquidate the British overseas 
Empire.’13 From Cairo II to Octagon, the PM did everything in his power to undermine this 
potential partnership. He believed, correctly, that “[i]f China fails to emerge as a strong and 
dependable factor in the maintenance of stability in the Far East, the need for British co-
operation may become more evident than it is at present.”14 Therefore, Britain could re-
colonize the area by controlling its transition to peace. 
After the setbacks of 1943, the British statesmen realized a counterweight to an 
expansionist Russia and America’s attempts to decolonize the Pacific was essential. France 
was the answer to both of these dilemmas. However, the US was needed to assist in the 
recovery of France and Britain unless the English could find a way to revitalize their 
economy quickly and reestablish control over Southeast Asia. The lack of success on both 
measures was the final impetus for Churchill to alter course; yet, while his planning evolved, 
Eden continued working towards the same ends as the PM (outside of the their 
disagreement over the Morgenthau Plan).  
Economic issues and FDR’s attempts to control Britain’s role in the Pacific strained 
Churchill’s belief in the Anglo-American partnership past the point of breaking. Octagon 
was the culmination of the events that led the PM to abandon, albeit briefly, the Anglo-
American partnership.15 Between Québec I and II, he realized “certain conditions would be 
attached to that aid,” notes Woods, especially in regards to the British Empire.16 The failure 
to find a way to revitalize British trade after the war, particularly at Bretton Woods, caused 
the PM to accept the Morgenthau plan because it would decrease the need for American 
postwar aid, with its ramifications for the Empire. The plan would also provide the resources 
essential for reviving the traditional trade routes of the Empire, but only if they Anglo-
French control over Southeast Asia was reestablished. Thus, when Roosevelt made it plain – 
through clauses in the Lend-Lease Phase II agreement – that Britain’s participation in the 
Pacific would be dictated by American not British priorities, Churchill went to Moscow.  
After Octagon, the price to partner with the Russians – Eastern Europe – seemed to 
the PM to be less detrimental than America’s fee – dismantling the Empire. Stalin and 
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Molotov had made it plain that Western Europe was Britain’s prerogative, including France, 
and that they cared little for Southeast Asia. Specifically at the time, the Anglo-Soviet 
understanding on the Balkans – the percentage deal – protected British interests in the Near 
East, including the all important connection to India – the Suez Canal.17 Eden justified the 
deal as the “only practicable policy to check the spread of Russian influence throughout the 
Balkans,” which would threaten the canal and the Middle East.18 Furthermore, if the 
understanding was founded on the British-led Western-bloc, then it could “promote the 
revival of a strong, independent France.”19  
The PM’s planning now centered on Anglo-Soviet spheres in Europe; the British 
sphere would work with and forestall the Russians. Plus, Anglo-French re-colonization of 
Southeast Asia, exposed by the “[m]ilitary operations of the SEAC,” which Hull reported 
was “aimed primarily at the resurgence of British political and economic ascendency in 
Southeast Asia.”20 Furthermore, Elliot Roosevelt recalled, “When the British colonial troops 
marched in, they took with them French Troops and French administrators.”21 The 
Americans even began to refer to SEAC as “Save England’s Asian Colonies.”22 Eden was 
skeptical about the intentions of the Western-bloc because it “might well precipitate the evils 
against which it was intended to guard.”23 Still, he was willing to accept Churchill’s planning, 
again “to check the spread of Russia influence.”24 
The new strategy was aided by separate American and Soviet decisions in late 1944. 
Roosevelt reluctantly concluded that Anglo-French forces were the only viable option to 
restore order in the Southeast Asia. FDR hoped China would play this role, but they needed 
to open the Burma Road first to allow supplies to flow into China, which was irrevocably 
delayed by the cancelation of Buccaneer. Britain’s ability to include the clause “in relation to 
other operations to be undertaken” into the Buccaneer section of the Cairo declaration 
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allowed them to use Anvil to cover their desire not to conduct operation. “Time and again 
the timing and direction of the Pacific War was influenced by demand of other theaters,” 
declares Ronald Specter.25 Without the necessary supplies China would not liberate 
Southeast Asia nor guide its transition to peace. “Above all, American officials, including 
Roosevelt, wanted an orderly, not revolutionary South East Asia open to Western interests.” 
Therefore, “he allowed the colonial powers to re-enter Indochina,” relates Lefeber.26 Thus, 
the British were reestablished in the region. 
After the percentage deal alleviated Stalin’s fears about a Cordon Sanitaire, he 
indicated support for “a large Danubian federation.”27 Eden’s concessions on confederations 
had undermined Churchill’s plans for a regional council of Europe. The Marshal’s decision 
gave the idea new life. The addition of the confederation to the Western-bloc would give the 
British-led coalition control over half of Europe. Coupled with the agreement that regional 
councils could be established under the UNO’s auspice, Britain’s bloc as well as the Soviet’s 
sphere placed atop the European political realm would reestablish balance of power control 
over the Continent. The Western-bloc was the key to creating this setup; therefore, it 
survived past the PM’s next planning evolution and caused the abandonment of the 
Morgenthau Plan.  
Churchill’s Anglo-Soviet plans did not last long. The British leader had purposefully 
left Poland out of the percentage deal hoping that the country would not fall into the Soviet 
sphere. However, Stalin recognized his puppet Poles only two months after Tolstoy. The 
PM felt betrayed and “distressed at the course events [were] taking.”28 Churchill realized the 
Americans, for all their faults, were the better partners, especially since he had undermined 
FDR’s Sino-American decolonization plans by maneuvering the Anglo-French combination 
into the role of Southeast Asia’s liberators.  
Churchill’s postwar planning had come full circle, not surprisingly, since in 
multilateral negotiations “structure is reflected in shifting coalitions and in variations in 
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alliance cohesion,” observes Daniel Druckman.29 Plus, now Eden was working towards the 
same aims. The lessons of the past four years revealed they needed to have some check on 
American machinations. An Anglo-American partnership was still preferred but would 
include the Western-bloc built around the Anglo-French combination to lessen British 
dependency on America. The US commitments to active participation in postwar geo-
politics would be secured with British adherence to Roosevelt’s visions of the UNO. “Only 
by encouraging the formation of some World Organization are we likely to induce the 
Americans,” wrote Eden, “to accept any European commitments.”30 However, US postwar 
commitments would only be of import if the French were part of this postwar machinery 
because “British interest demanded the restoration of French power,” demoting the UNO to 
Britain’s second priority. 31 Thus, the inclusion of France in the EAC and a zone for them in 
the postwar occupation of Germany took the top slot.  
To make sure Poland did not fall into the Russian orbit, a liberal democratic 
reorganization of the Polish government was necessary – the third hard position. Britain still 
wanted the markets and lack of competition from Germany offered by the Morgenthau Plan, 
even though they did not want the complete deindustrialization that would preclude it from 
contributing to the economic viability of a Danubian federation that could act as a bulwark 
against Russian expansionism. Eden feared, however, that German reparations would create 
a powerful German economy. As a result, “Britain’s interest as a reparation claimant is 
distinctly secondary” to “controlling the German economy” so as “to limit German 
competition with British exports.”32 Their fourth hard position was, thus, to limit reparations 
claims. Finally, they wanted to maintain their predominance in the Eastern Mediterranean.  
Predominance in the Mediterranean was why the British entered into the percentage 
deal. They did not abandon the agreement when Churchill pivoted back towards a 
partnership with the Americans because the US had made it plain they were not comfortable 
with British actions in Greece and the deal would force FDR to accept British primacy in the 
country. Furthermore, having already secured the agreement meant these positions were of 
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lower priority to the aforementioned positions. Still, it was essential that the scope of the 
deal expand to “consolidate our position in Greece and Turkey,” wrote Eden.33 Britain’s fifth 
through seventh positions were derived from this need: no alteration to Anglo-Soviet 
agreements on Greece, no Russian encroachment on Turkish sovereignty, and Russian 
adherence to the Subsiac-Tito agreements for Yugoslavia.34 These were the hard positions 
that the British wanted adopted.  
Remember, the “price that” a party “is prepared to pay to achieve” is often more 
important than their objectives in determining position priority.”35 French policing of 
postwar Germany was seen as a way to entice the Americans into accepting a greater role for 
France, especially an occupation zone for them. Churchill wrote FDR, France “may prove 
the means for releasing some of your men more quickly than you had hoped.”36 Also to 
entice the US to accept their planning, British acceptance of the American voting plan was 
seen as a way to secure their commitment to the UNO. These trades would solidify the 
Western-bloc and the Anglo-American partnership. 
Besides maintaining the percentage deal, bringing Tito into the Yugoslav government 
would lay the groundwork for an Anglo-Soviet understanding on Eastern Europe. However, 
the key piece to create a workable arrangement was the most important soft (tradable) 
position: movement on the Polish border question. Churchill revealed at Teheran he was 
against moving the border too far to the West. Yet, he was willing to concede these border 
changes if the Polish government was reorganized. After the setbacks at Tolstoy, “the War 
Cabinet had assured the Polish Government that they would support the extension of Polish 
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territory in the west as far as the Oder, even if the Americans did not agree,” recalled Eden.37 
Maintenance of the percentage deal and movement on the Polish borders was thus seen as 
both a way to check Russian expansionism as well as entice them to work with the British, a 
very fine line to walk.   
Churchill sent Roosevelt a cable shortly before Malta stating, “Eden has particularly 
asked me to suggest that Stettinius might come on 48 hours earlier … so that he (Eden) can 
run over the agenda with him beforehand, even though Molotov is not invited.”38 The 
Foreign Secretary’s aforementioned statement and the PM’s letter expressed the sentiment 
that guided Britain’s strategy for Yalta, consistent with their approach throughout the war: 
conclude bilateral agreements by acting as intermediaries, which would force the hand of the 
non-consulted party through limiting their options. By concluding bilateral agreements they 
could overcome the difficulties with the Russians raised by Britain’s positions on the Near 
East and reparations as well as the US opposition to the movement of the Poland’s Western 
border and British primacy in Greece, and finally, both countries’ hostility to a greater role 
for France.  
American 
Past success – the balance of power in Europe – guided British planning for the 
postwar; likewise, Roosevelt’s success during the 1930s would inform his postwar decision-
making. His administration held that “the next peace must take into account the facts of 
economics; otherwise, it will serve as the seedbed for aggression.”39 The same unregulated 
self-interest that destroyed American economic life – ‘destructive trade restrictions, born 
largely of greed and unreasoning fear and by ruthless aggression’ – was taking its toll on the 
world-at-large, according to FDR.40 The implementation of the New Deal had allowed the 
US economy to surmount these problems. If he could “export to all of the world the 
economic and social goals and techniques that had done so much to raise standards of living, 
cultural as well as material, in the United States,” they could also overcome the problems of 
un-checked economic nationalism worldwide, concluded Roosevelt.41 The idea was to turn 
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political difficulties into economic ones (how to increase productivity), like he had 
domestically, what Maier has termed the “politics of productivity.”42 As a result, the 
underlying interest that informed his postwar decision-making was the desire to spread his 
concepts of liberal capitalism worldwide – the International New Deal.  
In the 1930s, the President achieved a modicum of success instilling these ideals in 
Latin America through the Good Neighbor policy. The success of the policy was founded 
on “benevolent paternity” aimed at modernizing the aided country and developing its latent 
potential. US Export/Import Bank loans were the mechanism by which the Good Neighbor 
policy helped increase productivity in Latin America.43 The policy’s “success in the 
hemisphere of the Americans,” argued FDR, made “its extension to the whole world seem 
to be the logical next step.”44 It was assumed after the war, ‘Every country will need 
industrial rehabilitation and reconstruction.’45 This need would create a similar opportunity 
as in Latin America, where  “the facilities of the Export-Import Bank in Washington were 
called upon to tide over several American governments that were under a severe financial or 
commercial strain,” recalled Welles.46 American control of postwar lending would be the 
mechanism that the President could use to implement the International New Deal. The 
Americans realized their large monetary holdings granted them predominance in the lending 
agencies. This advantage, however, would only be useful if the US directed the victorious 
coalition.  
The President’s first attempt to guide the Allies’ transition to peace, especially 
economically, was revealed at Placentia Bay. “The Atlantic Charter declare[d] the right of all 
nations to access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world” as 
prerequisite “for their economic prosperity,” declared Hull.47 It was hoped with free trade 
and equal access, world productivity would be invigorated. Roosevelt felt the English-
speaking powers could guide this transformation, at first. The British, however, feared the 
implication of FDR’s planning. Instead of following the President’s economic planning, as 
he thought they would, Churchill maneuvered to undermine the anti-British aspects of the 
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approach. His maneuverings caused Roosevelt to alter his planning, a pattern that would 
continue throughout the war. The evolution of FDR’s planning, therefore, is revealed by his 
changing methods to achieve American predominance amongst the United Nations. The 
cause of these alterations – catalyst for position evolution – exposed why the President 
altered his planning: the British.  
Britain’s natural tendency to protect the economic foundations of the Empire – 
colonialism and discriminatory trade – forced a reevaluation of the President’s decision to 
partner exclusively with England. “British dependence on lend lease” was “the leverage” to 
undermine Britain discriminatory trade practices, relates Harbutt.48 The negotiations over the 
Lend-Lease Master Agreement and at Bretton Woods both exposed this phenomenon. 
However, no similar leverage existed to cajole the British to take part in Roosevelt’s ideas for 
decolonizing the Pacific. The mechanism FDR envisioned for modernizing the former 
colonies was a trusteeship, a great power(s) trust over the former colonies with the trustee(s) 
goals “aimed at future independence” for the colony through modernity.49 A local Asian 
partner would reinforce the Good Neighbor aspect of FDR’s International New Deal by 
removing suspicions of Western domination and help overcome British reluctance to take 
part in decolonization. China was the ideal decolonization partner because of their large size 
and potential as well as the fact that they were dependent on America aid.50 
 Placing the Sino-American partnership foremost amongst the United Nations was 
FDR’s new means to implement the International New Deal. Roosevelt’s ideas on the UNO 
developed as he tried to figure out how best to place this new partnership in control of the 
transition to peace as well how the organization should be set up to establish his socio-
economic program. Hence, the President always focused on Big Four control of the group 
instead of a truly democratic organization. Hull hinted at what Roosevelt envisioned for the 
transition period: “During this period of transition the United Nations must continue to act, 
in the spirit of co-operation which now underlies their war effort,” i.e., cooperation led by 
the Big Four power directorate.  
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The Four-Power directorate was a reaction to Britain’s protection of their interests. 
The directorate was also the President’s method to overcome the wild card that was the 
Soviet Union’s entrance into the anti-Axis coalition. A different approach was needed to 
obtain Soviet adherence to American ideas for postwar peace. The US had decided to rally 
only 90 divisions instead of the 200 divisions the JCS determined would be needed to win 
the war allied with the British alone, which meant the US was dependent on the Red Army 
to defeat the Nazis. Once again the President’s success during the 1930s was his guide, 
specifically his dealing with the Vargas regime in Brazil. Roosevelt felt Stalinist Russia could 
also be transformed in the same manner.51 The President was sure he could “influence its 
evolution away from dictatorship and tyranny in the direction of a free, tolerant, and 
peaceful society,” emphasized Stettinius.52 The Americans and Russians had to work 
together in close partnership since, ‘Nations will learn to work together only by actually 
working together,’ contended FDR.53 Russian adherence to the Four-Power declaration at 
Moscow bound the countries together, hopefully granting the time to liberalize Soviet 
society.  
The creation of the Four-Power directorate was, however, the high point for the 
Sino-American partnership. Cairo II started a year-long process that culminated in the 
President’s abandonment of his close partnership with the Chinese. Afterwards, they were 
relegated to a mere dependent vote. As noted, British intrigues in the Pacific made a difficult 
situation impossible – Chiang’s ability to liberate Southeast Asia. Roosevelt was, therefore, 
forced to let the colonial powers reestablish control over the region. After three years of 
diplomacy, FDR was back to where he started; China “was as much a shambles as it had 
been in 1942,” notes Hastings.54 The President once again needed the British to agree with 
his decolonization planning and was forced to cajole and/or bribe them to go along with the 
idea. Plus, the lack of military assistance from the Chinese meant Russian participation in the 
defeat of Japan was now essential as well, since only they had the manpower to clear the 
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Japanese out of Manchuria. Yet, China was still a dependent vote that would allow the US to 
direct the UNO’s power directorate. As a result, the organization became the President’s 
main focus.  
 Strong social and economic councils included in the organization were necessary to 
provide the arena to control the socio-economic direction of the former colonies and the 
world-at-large. Additionally, pressure on the British to comply with decolonization would be 
greater if the trusteeships were under the UNO’s aegis. The UNO would “serve as 
mechanisms of political control that allowed [the US],” notes Ikenberry, “to lock other states 
into a favorable set of postwar relations.”55 Coupled with their control of the lending 
agencies the Americans could implement the International New Deal. The need to shape the 
UNO meant Anglo-Soviet adherence to FDR’s positions on the organization’s final details. 
Thus, the President’s positions were based on garnering concessions on the UNO via 
adopting British or Russian positions. Most of the trades were aimed at securing Russian 
adherence to American positions by agreeing to Soviet positions that were of little 
importance to US interests.  
At Dumbarton Oaks, two major issues – membership and the veto – threatened to 
undermine the American-led organization the President desired. The membership question 
almost wrecked Dumbarton Oaks. Yet, Feis recalled before Yalta, “The President had been 
persuaded that [the admission of extra Soviet republics] would do no harm, and that it might 
elicit firmer Soviet cooperation in the work of the United Nations.”56 To overcome the veto 
deadlock, the State Department had created a new plan: the partial veto (what Britain would 
adhere to in their attempt to obtain US commitments to Europe via the UNO), thus, 
admitting a few Soviet Republics could gain Russian adherence to the partial veto.57  
The other way the Americans planned to gain Soviet adherence to the UNO as 
designed by Roosevelt and the State Department was to accept the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact territorial changes in Eastern Europe. John Hickerson articulated the idea, “I would 
favor using any bargaining power that exists in connection with the forgoing matters 
[Eastern European territorial changes] to induce the Russian to go along with a satisfactory 
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United Nations organization.”58 Throughout the war, FDR and Hull made it clear that 
Eastern Europe was not a priority. However, American public opinion on the subject 
worried them. Roosevelt “went to Yalta keenly aware of public opinion,” remembered 
Bohlen, but not enough to alter his plans.59 As a result, “Mr. Roosevelt was in general ready 
to accept the Russian standpoint, but the matter must be arranged in a manner which would 
give the least offense to the American public,” recalled Eden.60 The State Department, 
therefore, concocted the Declaration on Liberated Europe (DLE).61 Like the General 
Assembly was a sop for the lesser powers, the DLE was a pacifying agent for American 
public opinion, allowing the President to tacitly accept Stalin’s program for Eastern Europe 
in return for his adherence to FDR’s version of the UNO.  
After Yalta, Ambassador Grew wrote, ‘Russian entry [into the war against Japan] will 
have a profound military effect in that almost certainly it will materially shorten the war and 
save American lives.’62 As noted, US military decisions were informed, first and foremost, by 
a desire to “save American lives.” The ambassador’s statement reveals why FDR was more 
than willing to trade the concessions Stalin had requested in the Far East for Red Army 
participation in the Pacific. Plus, the agreement would safeguard Chinese sovereignty, 
essential because Russian troops would be in control of Manchuria after the war. “American 
officials expected that, once Soviet troops intervened in China, they would work closely with 
the Communists,” emphasizes Buhite; the deal would hinder this possibility.63 The price was 
known, which decreased its priority, therefore concluding the Far Eastern trade was 
secondary to the trades to define of the UNO’s mandate.  
FDR was also willing to work with the Russians on their reparations needs, as long 
as it did not affect his economic planning; the State Department was skeptical that this was 
possible. “The Americans wanted any assessment to be within Germany’s ability to pay. But 
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Roosevelt wanted to avoid giving the impression that the United States was ganging up with 
Great Britain in a callous effort to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining compensation for 
its grievous suffering.”64 The President’s other positions on European issues, such as the 
willingness to move Finnish borders in Russia’s favor or revisiting the Monteux Treaty, were 
aimed at deal-making as well.65 Concessions on Eastern Europe and the Far East could 
obtain Stalin’s cooperation; French concessions were necessary for British cooperation.  
Once FDR reluctantly allowed the French back into Southeast Asia, he was more 
ambivalent about their role in European affairs. He hoped to use Britain’s desire to revive 
France, declares Lefeber, as “leverage to moderate Anglo-French activities in [Southeast 
Asia],” specifically British adherence to trusteeships inclusion in the UNO’s charter.66 As a 
result, “The President was disposed to give the French a zone” of occupation in Germany to 
persuade Britain to adhere to his planning for the UNO.67 His only concern was the 
possibility of France wrecking American control of the UNO’s power directorate; hence, he 
was hesitant to give France an immediate spot on the Security Council. Recall, at Dumbarton 
Oaks, it was decided the France would receive a seat “in due course;” if maintained, the Big 
Four would still control the transition to peace. 
American strategy, therefore, was to use British and Russian aspirations to influence 
European affairs to shape the UNO, particularly by imbuing it with far-reaching powers to 
transform the socio-economic conditions of the world. Plus, the US delegations could utilize 
Russia’s desire to safeguard their Eastern approaches and for a Pacific outlet to maintain 
Chinese sovereignty, while having the Red Army carry the load in Manchuria. 
Russian 
Soviet diplomacy is frequently portrayed as “a mystery, inside an enigma,” citing 
Churchill’s famous line.68 However, Stalin, the single architect of said diplomacy, was quite 
consistent in his aims up to Yalta: domination of Eastern Europe and the Northern Far 
East, plus the integration of the territories included in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the 
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Far Eastern Agreements.69 The pact exposed the Soviet Premier’s territorial ambitions and 
the concern that guided his thinking. The territory it added to the Soviet Union had one 
underlying theme – protecting the approaches to the country. This theme would define 
Stalin’s territorial ambitions through Yalta. He believed “[d]efense through strategic retreat 
and exploitation of depth” was Russia’s best strategic option, notes Gordetsky.70 The 
territories the Soviet Union gained and the areas they wanted to dominate were essential for 
a successful implementation of the policy. All other considerations were consigned to the 
dictator’s main concern – the preservation of his power. Molotov’s pact with Ribbentrop 
displayed Stalin’s willingness to subsume communist ideology to the preservation of his 
power. The evolution of his postwar planning, therefore, reflected the Marshal’s perception 
about how the changing circumstances would affect the preservation of his power during 
and after the war, not the desire to expand communism. 
Military prowess dictated the power a leader had within his country and throughout 
the world, according to Stalin. He “worship[ped] military might,” declares Mastny.71 The 
Nazi attack revealed that the Soviet’s military power was far weaker than he realized. Almost 
immediately, however, Russia was provided a way out of this predicament when the West 
promised aid and wartime alliance. Supplies and a second front were the two items needed 
the most, both of which the West could impart. If the Anglo-Americans armed the Red 
Army and opened a second front, Stalin could preserve and perhaps even enhance his power 
– his minimal conditions. He would suppress his hatred of capitalism if his allies made 
available these desperately required elements.  
From America’s entrance into the war until the conferences of 1943, the West failed 
to live up to the conditions that Stalin believed necessary for Grand Alliance cooperation.72 
Western positions, most often dictated by British priorities, seemed to portend that they 
“wanted the Soviet Union and Germany to bleed each other white,” declared Gromyko.73 
For a man who felt military power was the primary factor in geo-politics, these machinations 
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could not help but cultivate doubts in the Marshal’s mind. As noted, American refusal to 
endorse wartime territorial changes increased Soviet concerns when the British idea of 
confederations seemed to signify a new Cordon Sanitaire – the potential manifestation of the 
perceived Western ill-will. The FO sent Eden a memo stating, “[T]he Russians will regard 
our attitude on the subject of Confederation as one of the tests of our real intentions 
towards them.”74 The situation was mostly rectified in the fall of 1943. 
Eden’s concessions at Moscow and Stalin’s talks with FDR at Teheran alleviated 
some of his fears. However, it was the adamant determination to launch the second front 
that finally assuaged the Soviet Premier’s apprehension about Western intentions enough for 
the Russians to conclude ‘there are certainly conditions for the continuation of cooperation 
… into the postwar period.’75 The West was again displaying a desire to assist his military; 
therefore, Stalin could again work with them. Still, the first two years of the Grand Alliance 
had made him wary of Anglo-American maneuvering. As a result, Russia’s price for postwar 
cooperation had increased. After the Western intrigues, the Russian ruler now required 
endorsement of his security scheme before the Soviets would cooperate with the US and 
Britain.   
The UNO was Stalin’s mechanism to bind his allies permanently to their wartime 
promises. “[T]he long-term continuation of the Grand Alliance assumed greater, not lesser, 
importance” as the war come to an end, observes Geoffrey Roberts.76 If the Russians played 
their cards right, then the UNO could codify their wartime gains and transition the Grand 
Alliance into a peacetime triumvirate. The visible expression of this cohesion was, according 
to Stalin, “the unanimity of agreement of the four powers.”77 The organization, therefore, 
had to endorse “the principle of unanimity” through the Big Four’s possession of an 
unchecked veto, his first hard position.78   
Stalin’s next set of hard positions reflected his desire to dominate Eastern Europe. 
First, the Allies had to approve the continuation of the percentage deal, his second hard 
position. Then, the Polish government had to be dependent since “it could be turned into a 
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convenient bridgehead for anti-Soviet adventures,” noted Gromyko.79 The best way to 
ensure the Poles were dependent on the Russians was to guarantee they feared future 
“German aggression.”80 Moving the Polish borders towards Germany would cultivate this 
potentiality. Thus, the movement of Polish borders westward was the Soviets’ next hard 
position, which meant explicit Western endorsement of the Curzon Line. The line had 
foreign security ramifications, like all of the Russian ruler’s postwar planning, but it also had 
domestic implications. 
In the early days of the war, the Nazi advances were aided by Soviet minorities on 
their Western border, chiefly the Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and White Russians. “[T]o 
[Stalin’s] dismay, [the Nazis] had sometimes been welcomed as liberators,” relates Gellately.81 
Plus, Cripps noted prior to Barbarossa, “there is a great deal of Fifth Column work in the 
Ukraine,” which “must have done a great deal of harm to the Russians.”82 The Curzon Line 
would increase these areas’ economic viability. Still, Stalin did not believe this was enough to 
cease the separatists’ agitation; they needed a political outlet.83 Request for membership for 
all sixteen Soviet Republics was a tactic concocted in response to the perceived Anglo-
American intention to isolate the Soviet Union in the UNO.84 With a veto, however, the 
USSR could not be isolated as it had been in the League. Therefore, the Russian position on 
membership was about placating subversive groups to protect the Marshal’s power. Thus, 
Stalin wanted the republics of Lithuania, the Ukraine, and White Russia to acquire a seat, 
each hot beds of subversion and border territories. Membership for a different group, 
however, was more important, relegating membership for the republics to the fifth hard 
position. 
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A seat for Poland’s Lublin government was essential so that the regime could acquire 
prestige as quickly as possible to emasculate any possible agitations or uprisings, making it 
Stalin’s fourth hard position. Plus, it was feared an uprising in Poland would lead to agitation 
in the eastern republics. A “constant concern,” relates Geoffrey Roberts, existed “in 
Moscow that non-Soviet Ukrainians and Belarusians living in Poland could be used as a base 
for the subversion of their compatriots within the USSR.”85 Military force could be used to 
suppress these agitators; however, this would run counter to the goals of the organization 
codifying Stalin’s gains. Therefore, he needed the Russian borderland – Eastern Europe – to 
be dependent on the USSR. The best way to accomplish this as well as reduce intra-state 
subversion was to aid in rebuilding.  
Molotov told Mikolajczyk, ‘The USSR undertakes to settle the reparation claims of 
Poland from its own share of reparations,’ thus fostering Polish dependency on Russia.86 
The Soviets, therefore, needed a good reparation settlement since the country had been 
devastated by the war. “Whenever the future of Germany is discussed[,] the Russians bring 
up the question of reparations. That is what interests them,” remembered Moran.87  They 
wanted a large reparation settlement and half of its total receipts – Stalin’s sixth hard 
position. If accepted, his first five hard positions would create the Western section of the 
security scheme. 
Eastern Europe was the pathway of most invasions of Russia; therefore, Stalin 
prioritized positions related to dominance of the region. However, the Northern Far East 
had also been an avenue for invasion. As a result, security on this border was necessary as 
well. His sixth hard position was the Western backing of Russian predominance in the area.  
If these positions were adopted then Stalin believed a path for Grand Alliance postwar 
cooperation existed.  
Soviet preparation for Yalta revealed Stalin “wanted to have the best of both worlds: 
the benefits of continued cooperation with the Western Allies and at the same time the 
consolidation of their newfound positions, the latter being the more vital and ultimately 
decisive priority,” declares Petchanov. His study of Soviet planning documents also led 
Petchanov to conclude that, unlike at Teheran, a Western “combination against the USSR 
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was considered unlikely given ‘the Anglo-American contradiction,’ which provided the 
Soviet Union with additional room for maneuver.”88 Thus, the Marshal believed he could 
exploit his advantageous position – military control of Eastern Europe and American 
dependence on the Red Army’s participation in Manchuria – to make a number of horse 
trades to acquire adherence to his hard positions.  
 The deal-making aspect of the Russians’ strategy for Yalta focused on American 
adherence to or movement towards Soviet positions rather than British, since the percentage 
deal was still in effect.89 America’s concern over the defeat of Japan made Red Army 
participation in the Pacific Stalin’s most tradable asset; the Eastern section of his security 
scheme could be secured if he played this card right.90 The Marshal also realized that the 
Americans had pinned their hopes on a successful UNO and wanted to shape the 
organization. With the veto, the other US concepts for the organization would not matter 
much to the Russians. Trading Soviet backing for America’s position on the UNO would 
secure Roosevelt’s movement towards Stalin’s hard positions.91  
Yet, Britain was the country that could codify Russia’s the Western section of the 
security scheme, since the US was publically opposed to spheres of influence. Litvinov 
argued, “[I]t is difficult to outline some concrete basis for [American] positive political 
cooperation apart from a mutual interest in the preservation of world peace” because of 
“[their] resistance to spheres of influence;” therefore “deals of this kind with the British” 
were necessary.92 Greater recognition of France was something the Russian ruler preferred 
not to occur, but it was a Western Europe country, and if Britain codified his domination of 
Eastern Europe, he could tolerate French concessions. Harriman noticed, prior to Yalta, that 
“Stalin’s attitude towards” France “had changed abruptly” since Teheran.93 Similarly, the 
Soviet Premier had given up any say in the direction of Greece to gain British acceptance of 
his predominance in the remainder of the Balkans. He was more than willing to threaten this 
arrangement if the British tried to reestablish themselves in the region. Conversely, he was 
willing to help Britain maintain the setup if they were pressured by the Americans to 
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liberalize their policy on Greece, since “[it] was never high on the list of Russian and Soviet 
geopolitical objectives,” notes Plohky.94     
Yugoslavia was a source of differences between the two powers due to the 
percentage deal outlining joint predominance in the country. Stalin wanted to prevent her 
from becoming a “springboard for foreign invaders,” notes Gordetsky, “by preserving 
Yugoslavia’s sovereignty.”95 The Russian ruler feared the British would control a government 
run exclusively by the King. He controlled Tito (or assumed he did) and felt he could adhere 
to the Subasic-Tito agreements once the “little Marshal” was brought formally into the 
Yugoslav government, thus preserving Soviet predominance in the country.  
Russian strategy, therefore, was based on trading their adherence to the Western 
delegation’s greatest concerns in return for dominance over Eastern Europe and the 
Northern Far East endorsed by the UNO under a Big Three triumvirate. Britain’s fear of the 
Red Army’s power in Europe and the US need for these troops in the Pacific provided Stalin 
the leverage believed he could use to secure Anglo-American agreement to his security 
scheme. 
To assess the Big Three leaders’ performances, their ability to move their 
counterparts towards their hard positions must be ascertained. Churchill and Eden’s strategy 
aimed at agreement on French inclusion in the EAC and the occupation of Germany, 
American commitment to the UNO, a liberal reorganization of the Polish government, 
small-scale reparations, British predominance in Greece, maintenance of Turkish 
sovereignty, and Russian adherence to the Subasic-Tito agreements. Roosevelt wanted the 
partial veto, trusteeships as well as economic and social councils included in the UNO, Red 
Army participation in the Pacific, and Russian adherence to the DLE. Stalin went to Yalta 
striving for the UN veto, recognition of his Western Sphere – perpetuation of the 
percentage deal, acceptance of the Curzon Line, recognition of the puppet Polish 
government, membership for the three republics, and large-scale reparations – as well as the 
creation of his Eastern Sphere. Furthermore, what return did they acquire from their soft 
(tradable) positions?  
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Interestingly, a noticeable lack of planning for Germany was apparent. Besides 
reparations and the zones of occupation, the latter determined beforehand, treatment of 
postwar Germany was discussed in vague generalities during the preparations for Yalta. As 
FDR often stated, ‘Our attitude should be one of study and postponement of final 
decision.’96 Churchill fluctuated between wanting to build up Germany as a bulwark against 
Russia or following the President’s lead and postponing decisions until greater information 
on the state of postwar Germany was ascertained. Stalin wanted his counterparts to take the 
lead on the German problem except where German issues encroached on his other 
positions. As Murphy noted, in his study of the Soviet actions in the EAC, they were “in no 
hurry to make binding agreements concerning Germany’s future.”97 The Soviet Premier’s 
planning was a cynical ploy to use the outwardly aggressive nature of his Allies stances on 
Germany as propaganda to gain greater influence for the Soviets in postwar Germany. 
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